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AN ANALOGICAL PARADOX FOR NONHUMAN PRIMATES:  
BRIDGING THE PERCEPTUAL-CONCEPTUAL GAP 
by 
TIMOTHY M. FLEMMING 
Under the Direction of Dr. David A. Washburn 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past few decades, the dominant view by comparative psychologists of 
analogical reasoning in nonhuman primates was one of dichotomy between apes, including 
humans, and monkeys: the distinction between the analogical ape and paleological monkey 
(Thompson & Oden, 2000).  Whereas evidence for analogy proper by representation 
reinterpretation in monkeys is sparse and debated, the gap between that which is analogic and 
paleologic has been narrowed by the studies presented here. Representation of relational 
concepts important for analogy proves difficult for rhesus and capuchin monkeys without the 
ability to rely on a greater amount of perceptual variability, implicating a perceptually-bound 
predisposition in problem-solving (Chapters 2-3).  A shift in attention from perceptual features 
to abstract concepts for employment in relational matching is again difficult, but not impossible 
given cognitive incentive in the form of differential outcomes to refocus attention on conceptual 
properties (Chapter 4). Finally, chimpanzees unlike monkeys appear more apt to reason by 
analogy, perhaps due to a more default conceptual focus (Chapter 5). Taken together, these 
studies provide an account for the emergence of analogical reasoning skills throughout the 
primate lineage in contrast to views regarding analogy a hallmark of human intelligence. 
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An analogical paradox for nonhuman primates:  
Bridging the perceptual-conceptual gap  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
Analogical reasoning serves as the “core of cognition,” providing a seminal foundation 
upon which logical inference, problem-solving, decision-making and other higher-order 
reasoning can be built (Hofstadter, 2001, p. 499; see also Halford, 1992). According to Halford 
(1992) and Hofstadter (2001), its role is central to many aspects of thinking, at least for humans, 
which were the focus of those studies. What then of analogy for nonhuman animals? Animals 
solve problems, make decisions, and manifest higher-order reasoning, at least in some situations; 
so should we predict that nonhuman animals have the capacity for analogical reasoning, perhaps 
even as the foundation of these other competencies? With some researchers arguing cogently for 
the existence of rudimentary reasoning by analogy in nonhuman primates (e.g., Premack & 
Premack, 2003; Fagot & Parron, 2010; Thompson & Flemming, 2008; Thompson & Oden, 
2000), the study of analogy seems to have much to offer in the debate over the continuities and 
discontinuities between human and animal minds. 
Overview 
Analogy can be defined as shared structural abstraction (Gentner, 1983; Hofstadter, 2001; 
Premack, 1983) or the judgment of relations-between-relations (Thompson & Oden, 2000). The 
mapping of knowledge from one domain to another is central to the assumption in formal 
analogical reasoning that relational concepts are held constant from one domain to the other. A 
formal theory of analogy (Gentner, 1983) assumes the formation of mental representations of 
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base (sample) and target (choice) relations, with the alignment of these relations across domains 
being considered analogy. 
Analogical reasoning is a cognitive process through which previously learned rules are 
applied to novel situations. As a cognitive heuristic, reasoning by analogy is a form of 
representativeness wherein judgments are based on how much the structure of one event 
resembles that of another (Goldstein, 2011). Allowing us to apply flexibly common rules and 
bringing to the forefront the underlying structure of a problem, analogy enables the avoidance of 
relearning upon every new set of instances encountered. For all of these cognitive savings, 
analogies allow us to be efficient, and thus are functionally adaptive as an accurate and 
sometimes rapid process by which we make decisions about our surroundings. Further, in the 
words of Gentner (1999), they are thought to lay the foundation for critical thinking. 
It [analogy] is central in the study of learning and discovery. Analogies permit transfer 
across different concepts, situations or domains and are used to explain new topics… 
Analogies are often used in problem solving and inductive reasoning because they can 
capture significant parallels across different situations. Beyond these mundane uses, 
analogy is a key mechanism in creativity and scientific discovery (p. 17). 
 
In the most basic instantiation, an analogy involves establishing a relationship between two given 
elements and subsequently seeking out that same relationship between two novel elements (e.g., 
Goswami, 1995; Premack, 1976; Thompson & Oden, 2000).  Mechanistically, this process 
involves perception of relational information and computation of conceptual equivalence 
between these relations; in other words, it is the ability to judge relations-between-relations. In 
this vein, concepts are equated to one another, rather than simply put to use for purposes of 
object identification. 
Humans across cultures have been shown to have this universal ability to reason by 
analogy (Bellack, 1992; Dunbar, 2001; Hofstadter, 2001; Nehaniv, 1999). In fact, there is little 
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evidence to the contrary. Notably though, this skill does continue to emerge throughout 
development from only limited recognition of relations in early years to a full mapping of 
underlying structure later in cognitive development (Gentner, 1988; Goswami & Brown, 1989). 
By approximately age 7, humans typically show proficiency in most problems involving 
employment of analogy (Rattermann & Gentner, 1998a). Given the rather late emergence in 
human development of a full capacity for analogical reasoning compared to other cognitive 
abilities, it remains unclear whether analogical reasoning is present in other animals. 
Whether analogy is unique to humans has been the subject of debate for more than 30 
years—a debate that has become more active as of late. Premack (1976) initiated this debate 
when he provided evidence that a language-trained chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) was capable 
not only of completing by also of creating analogies. Several primate species without language 
training have subsequently been reported to have the ability to reason by analogy (e.g., Fagot & 
Parron, 2010; Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008; Spinozzi, Lubrano & Truppa, 2004; Thompson, Oden 
& Boysen, 1997) or to exhibit analogical precursors (e.g., Fagot, Wasserman & Young, 2001). In 
the present chapter, I will review this distinction between analogy proper, the mapping of mental 
representations for relations, and analogical precursors, which are relational discriminations and 
any matching of relations measured behaviorally, and build an argument that analogy has 
emerged throughout the primate lineage from basic perceptually-bound relational judgments. 
Specifically, I will explore whether failure to match relations reflects an inability to manifest 
higher-level abstraction or the potency of the lower-level abstraction and being overwhelmed by 
the perceptual features of stimuli. 
If there is a discontinuity across species in the evidence for analogical reasoning, it 
remains unclear whether it is a difference of degree or kind. Dunbar (2001) describes and 
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analogical paradox wherein human subjects tend to focus on superficial rather than structural 
features to solve problems particularly in the laboratory setting.  This may be analogous to 
patterns of behavior observed in nonhuman primates. Because some non-ape species possess the 
requisite knowledge of relational concepts, but subsequently fail to apply those relational 
concepts to match the relations-between-relations (e.g., in relational matching-to-sample tests 
like those described later), analogy might seem to be driven by an intervening cognitive variable 
different from that used to learn relational concepts (e.g., Marcus, 2001; Penn, Holyoak & 
Povinelli, 2008). This operational difference, however, does not necessarily imply a qualitative 
difference in the cognitive abilities between apes and non-apes. Rather, the level of 
representativeness or meaning of which the thinker is capable is likely involved in observable 
differences in analogical abilities between species. 
Consider one useful task – the labeling of stimuli as being either the same or different.  
This ability emerges around age 4 in children, and adult humans make such judgments rapidly 
and seemingly with little or no cognitive effort.  However, comparative assessments of sameness 
and difference judgments provide a radically different picture.  Ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
shifts in performance based on same/different judgments prompts questions regarding the origin 
of such competencies. Comparative studies with nonhuman animals gather evidence for the 
evolution of the cognitive mechanisms of analogy. More generally, by examining differences in 
the cognitive abilities of several species researchers are able not only to determine the behavioral 
capabilities of each species but also perhaps better to identify alternate cognitive approaches that 
manifest as similar behavioral outcomes. In addition, the cognitive phenomena as they develop 
within the individual, both human and nonhuman, can be better understood. In the case of 
analogy, comparative studies including those to be discussed here provide empirical evidence for 
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a shift from perceptual to conceptual learning in the acquisition of these skills both throughout 
the evolutionary history of primates and developmentally within humans.  
Behaviorally, analogical reasoning is observed in most instances whereby an individual 
correctly matches relations (Thompson & Oden, 1996). Cognitively though, for reasoning to be 
considered analogical by definition, the mental representation of concepts is required (e.g., Gick 
& Holyoak, 1980; Gentner, 1983).  Where the metaphorical line is drawn between that which is 
considered analogy proper and an analogical prerequisite is the subject of some debate with some 
drawing species distinctions (human/nonhuman or ape/non ape; see Penn et al., 2008; Thompson 
& Oden, 2000) and others drawing cognitive (levels of representation) lines. I will discuss the 
integral role that several cognitive processes and requisite types of knowledge play in enabling 
analogical reasoning or behavior and the implications that each have for the discontinuity 
observed in analogy proper and analogical prerequisites. 
Learning relational concepts and analogies: Methodology 
One must consider critically all of the differences in methodology utilized to assess 
analogical reasoning. The following tasks presented to human and nonhuman animal subjects are 
illustrative of increasing levels of conceptual complexity: matching-to-sample (MTS), 
generalized match-/nonmatch-to-sample, transpositional learning, same/different discrimination, 
conditional same/different (S/D1) discrimination, within-set relational matching and 
same/different (S/D) relational matching-to-sample (RMTS).  A taxonomy of these tasks and 
associated descriptions of conceptual complexity is presented in Table 1.1. Relational-conceptual 
judgments of identity and nonidentity are not entirely removed from the matching or                                                         
1 The S/D notation will be used throughout this manuscript to refer to knowledge of both same 
and different as complimentary opposites of the same conceptual coin. S/D will also be used 
commonly as referring to the types of tasks and discriminations involving this complimentary 
knowledge of both concepts. 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Table 1.1. 
Tasks in order of increasing complexity of relational computations 
 
     1.             2.    3.    4a.  |  4b.           5.           6.           7a.  |  7b. 
     Matching-to-Sample          Match/Nonmatch       Transpositional          Same/Different   Conditional    Within-Set             Relational 
                            (MTS)     (MTS/NMTS)            Learning              Discrimination   S/D Discrim.   Relation Matching            MTS (RMTS) 
                          >2 items   |   2 items       >2 items   |   2 items 
                                                            
Relational            =                   =  or  ≠                 ≈              =  and  ≠                If ★, than =      If  ≈ (e.g., smallest),           If =, than = 
Computations             If ●, than ≠  than choose ≈             If ≠, than ≠ 
 
 
Capable Species 
Pigeon   1. & 2. Zentall & Hogan (1976) 3. Angermeier et al. (1965)   4b. Blaisdell & Cook (2005)                          7a. Wasserman et al. (2002) 
Sq. Monkey  1. & 2. Burdyn & Thomas (1984)             5. Burdyn & Thomas (1984) 
Capuchin 1. & 2. Katz et al. (2002)  3. Scanlon et al. (1976)   5. Chapter 3     6. Kennedy & Fragaszy (2008)  
Baboon  1. Wilde (1994)         4a. Fagot et al. (2001)                    7b. Fagot & Parron (2010) 
Rhesus  1. & 2.Harlow (1943)  3. Gentry et al. (1959)   5. Chapter 2-3               7b. Chapter 4 
Orangutan  1. Vonk (2003)                        7b. Vonk (2003) 
Gorilla  1. Vonk (2003)                        7b. Vonk (2003) 
Chimpanzee  1.& 2. Finch (1942)  3. Köhler (1938)     4b. Woodruff et al. (1978)          6. Chapter 5         7b. Thompson et al. (1997) 
Human  1. Weinstein (1941)                    6. Gentner (1983)  7b. Flemming et al. (2008) 
 
Note. For example problems, samples are presented above choices; + indicates a correct selection. For relational computations, = reflects an identity/same 
relation, ≠ reflects a nonidentity/different relation, and ≈ reflects an otherwise “is relative to” stimulus generalization.
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nonmatching-to-sample paradigm, but involve an additional level of assessment and 
computation. In a matching-to-sample (MTS) paradigm, subjects make one such equivalence 
computation (Thompson & Oden, 1996). Transpositional learning studies (e.g., Gentry, Overall 
& Brown, 1959; Köhler, 1938; Spence, 1937) address relations through simpler mechanisms of 
featural stimulus generalization. Transpositional learning requires an evaluation of one stimulus 
relative to another and subsequent choice of one stimulus that follows a consistent rule relative to 
that sample (e.g., darker than/lighter than) akin to generalized matching. In a S/D discrimination 
task one can use a similar singular equivalence computation. Finally, in a conditional S/D 
discrimination task wherein the subject makes responses to both identity and nonidentity based 
on specific discriminative cues present, two separate cognitive computations (one for identity 
and one for nonidentity) are required (Burdyn & Thomas, 1984). These computations are no 
more complex individually than are those utilized for matching to sample. 
Tasks designed to assess knowledge of analogies add an additional level of conceptual 
complexity. Within-set relational matching tasks often presented to children wherein subjects 
must attend to the physical attributes of one item as it relates to the others in a given set are 
exemplary of the mapping of relations required by analogy (Goswami, 1995; Rattermann & 
Gentner, 1998a). These tasks require only attention to and selection of one item after an 
evaluation of its terms of relatedness amongst others, allowing for a focus on more local 
properties of stimuli. Relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks on the other hand require the 
evaluation of sets of two or more items as they relate to one another and the subsequent selection 
of another entire set of stimuli, necessitating a focus on global properties of stimulus sets. 
Whereas both of these tasks are commonly used as measures of analogical reasoning ability in 
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human and nonhuman primates, neither necessitates the use of mental representations per se as 
required in analogy proper.  
Step one: Concept learning 
By definition, analogy first requires the determination of terms of similarity between two 
or more items (Gentner, 1983; Gillian, Premack & Woodruff, 1981; Premack, 1976; Thompson 
& Oden, 2000). This determination implies knowledge of relational concepts. Essential to 
analogy, concepts provide the framework upon which a relationship between items can be 
represented. The ability to sort items into classes allows one to transfer knowledge of these terms 
of relatedness to novel stimulus sets. Thus, applicable to humans and nonhuman animals alike, 
“concepts are the glue that holds our mental life together” (Murphy, 2002, p. 1).  
Concepts are adaptive and cognitively efficient, and thus are likely to be observed at least 
in rudimentary form in nonhuman animals. There are several types of concept learning. In his 
learning-intelligence hierarchy, Thomas (1980) placed conceptual abilities in the highest three 
levels of an increasingly complex eight-level ordinal scale of “intellective abilities.” (p. 459). 
Table 1.2 outlines Thomas’ hierarchy. Levels 1-5 include more basic stimulus-response learning 
from habituation to discrimination learning. Levels 6-8 outline a continuum of conceptual 
abilities from the ability to make class distinctions based on physical similarities, a skill present 
in many nonhuman animals. At the highest end of this continuum lies the capability to act on 
class distinctions based not on physical or functional similarities, but on relations-between-
relations that form the necessary foundation for analogical reasoning.  
Perceptual concept learning. If concepts are the “glue” that cements our mental lives 
(Murphy, 2002) then sameness is the metaphorical glue that holds together all concepts. 
Perceptual similarity and stimulus generalization are the roots of all conceptual behavior  
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Table 1.2.  
 
Thomas’ (1980) learning-intelligence hierarchy 
 
 
             Conceptual Complexity                       Example  
 
Level 8: Biconditional Concept Relational Concepts      RMTS  
        (if AA, choose BB, not CD) 
 
Level 7: Conditional Concepts Relational Concepts      Conditional S/D Discrimination 
  (if , choose AA, if , choose CD) 
 
Level 6: Class Concepts           Feature-based Concepts           Transpositional Learning 
                   (if  , choose , not ) 
 
 
Level 5: Discrimination Learning (multiple, concurrent S-R connections) 
Level 4: Chaining (two or more S-R connections) 
Level 3: Stimulus-Response Learning (Operant Learning) 
Level 2: Signal Learning (Classical conditioning) 
Level 1: Habituation 
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(Harnad, 1987). For example, the matching concept and identity matching-to-sample (MTS) 
paradigms require that one make a cognitive computation of perceptual equality between stimuli.   
Early studies requiring “matching-from-sample” in rhesus monkeys, Macaca mulatta,  
(Harlow, 1943) inspired investigations of the most basic of perceptual concepts. By mapping 
individual stimulus features from a sample, rhesus monkeys learned an important generalizable 
rule that applied to a wide variety of stimulus arrangements from one trial to the next. In addition 
to a matching rule (perceptual similarity), Harlow (1943) also trained his monkeys to choose an 
object containing no stimulus features in common with a sample, or an oddity rule. These rules 
of nonmatching and matching-to-sample (MTS) serve as important foundations for concepts. 
In an effort to examine concept acquisition for both sameness and difference, Zentall and 
Hogan (1976) investigated the generalization of the matching and nonmatching rule for pigeons 
(Columba livia). Pigeons initially trained to choose a shape that matched a sample (MTS) 
generalized the rule more rapidly to stimuli of novel colors on subsequent trials than did pigeons 
trained to choose shapes that were different from the sample (nonmatching-to-sample, NMTS). 
This first and most basic kind of concept learning is of perceptual concepts (Zentall, Wasserman, 
Lazareva, Thompson & Rattermann, 2008). Perceptual concept learning is accomplished when 
one sorts objects on the basis of shared physical features, akin to featural categorization. No level 
of abstraction is necessary; rather only a single cognitive computation of matching or stimulus 
generalization is needed. 
Pioneering work by Herrnstein in the 1960s with pigeons provided evidence for 
perceptual concept learning in nonhuman animals. Pigeons learned several different concepts 
(e.g., trees, people, water, fish) based on generalization of stimulus features included in 
photographic slides (see Herrnstein, 1985, for review). Pigeons successfully discriminated slides 
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from disparate classes by pecking when certain stimulus features were present. Further, these 
discriminations based on stimulus features in common generalized to sets of novel photographs.  
Whereas all concepts are initially based on perceptual judgments such as these, it is likely that 
perceptual similarity guides several levels of conceptual behavior, including applications in 
analogy. 
 Whereas a go/no-go paradigm such as the one used by Herrnstein (1985) provides evidence 
for generalized knowledge of a single stimulus feature, concurrent knowledge of several stimulus 
features specific to different perceptual categories is indicative of both within and between 
conceptual knowledge. In an experiment that required pigeons to peck at one of four colored 
keys arbitrarily designated as the correct response when viewing a photographic slide from one 
of four categories (cats, flowers, cars and chairs), Wasserman and colleagues provided evidence 
for this between and within-class conceptual knowledge in a nonhuman animal (Bhatt, 
Wasserman, Reynolds & Knauss, 1988). Of course, true conceptual understanding cannot be 
proven without generalization to novel stimuli from the same classes.  Because generalization to 
novel slides was not achieved at levels significantly above chance when pigeons viewed ten 
exemplars of each class, further investigations revealed that a more difficult training regime 
increased accuracy in generalization to novel stimuli. By increasing the number of training 
exemplars, Wasserman and Bhatt (1992) believed the likelihood of resemblance between training 
and generalization stimuli was increased, thus enhancing overall conceptual knowledge. Whereas 
accurate generalization of behavior toward novel stimuli provides evidence for knowledge of 
perceptual concepts one might argue that it is no different from a simple matching concept.  
 Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) investigated concept acquisition at varying levels of 
abstraction in three different species: humans, pigeons, and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). 
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Utilizing concepts at three levels of abstraction similar to those described above (Thomas, 1980) 
Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) employed a two-choice discrimination task that required animals 
to differentiate one slide from another. Subjects viewed photographic stimuli of animals within 
predetermined categories, choosing keys corresponding to in-category and not-in-category. 
Slides were presented two at a time to the animals. Humans, not surprisingly, were able to 
acquire concepts at the basic, low-abstraction, as well as the high-abstraction levels. Humans 
correctly chose the in-category slides with around 90% accuracy for all three levels. Monkeys 
and pigeons, however, were less successful at certain levels of abstraction. Monkeys were 
significantly better at making the discriminations at low (e.g., kingfisher vs. other bird) and high 
(e.g., animal vs. nonanimal) levels.  Pigeons only successfully acquired the most basic concept: 
they discriminated only kingfishers from all other slides.  When the problem was made more 
abstract by requiring subjects to identify birds in general, or animals in general, the category may 
have become too broad or abstract for the subjects to learn a simple rule for identifying 
individual exemplars (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988).  These findings support the theory that 
nonhuman animals, and to the greatest extent pigeons, learn concepts by responding to a small 
set of features in pictures that look similar (Premack, 1983; Zentall, Edwards, Moore & Hogan, 
2002).  
Associative concept learning. Associative concept learning is a second type that relies 
on qualities other than equating or generalization of stimulus features.  Without reliance on 
perceptual features on which to base judgments of identity, how is it that one identifies objects as 
belonging to the same class?  The sameness that holds together members of associative concepts 
is arbitrary (Zentall, et al., 2008). Associative concepts are of interest in consideration of 
symbolic representation. For instance, spoken and written words are arbitrary designations for 
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concrete objects that they name and thus are associatively in the same class as that object. This 
utility of arbitrary stimuli belonging to the same associative class as a concrete object allows 
them to serve as symbols, representing all others in class whether present or not.  
In many-to-one associative concept learning paradigms (i.e., Katz, Wright & Bodily, 
2007), several stimuli are paired with one arbitrary stimulus, thus creating a discriminative cue. 
Through the common mapping of stimuli to a discriminative cue, all stimuli eventually come to 
represent the others that share an associative history with the same discriminative stimulus. For 
instance, by requiring the selection of circles and triangles when shown a patch of gold color and 
rectangles and ovals in the presence of a patch of blue color, an experimenter can effectively 
create associative classes of these rather arbitrary geometric shapes. 
The treatment of two arbitrary stimuli as functionally similar is the foundation for 
stimulus equivalence (Cook, Katz & Cavoto, 1997; Harlow, 1943; Herrnstein, 1990). By 
establishing equivalence between stimuli, one can begin to understand the relations instantiated 
between them, an essential aspect of analogy that will be discussed at length in the next section. 
Formalized stimulus equivalence, according to Sidman and Tailby (1982) requires three 
properties: reflexivity (generalized identity matching – acquisition of the matching concept as 
discussed previously), symmetry (bidirectionality) and transitivity (mediated learning). These 
three properties specifically allow for what Sidman and Tailby (1982) refer to as emergent 
relations. For instance, by separately training an A-B association and an A-C association, 
subsequently finding an emergent B-C association provides evidence for an implicit relation, 
akin to transitive inference. An associative concept including all three stimuli has been created 
with only two explicitly trained and one implicit relation.  
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Step two: relational concepts 
As is the case with associative concepts, relational concepts are not derived from the 
physical characteristics or perceptual properties of stimuli themselves. Unlike both physical and 
associative concepts, singular stimuli cannot be sorted into a relational class. Rather, relational 
concepts require the existence of at least two items. Relational concepts, such as same/different 
and above/below involve a comparison of the relationship between (or among) two or more 
objects. These concepts do not depend on any absolute perceptual properties of stimuli (Zentall 
et al., 2008), but rather are entirely based on the relation between them. Unlike most natural 
concepts, relational concepts are abstract in that classification based upon shared physical 
features of stimuli is impossible (Katz & Wright, 2006).  
For the majority of this dissertation the relational concepts of same and different will 
remain the focus of attention because of their frequent utilization in problems of analogy. Like 
other relational concepts, same and different cannot be accounted for by associative learning 
alone. A particular stimulus can be used as part of either a same pair or a different pair, and thus 
cannot alone provide cues for relational concept learning. Only the relation between stimuli can 
define a relational concept. Because the relational classification of items requires a level of 
abstraction beyond that which one might need for other types of concept formation, successful 
discrimination of same from different has proven difficult for several nonhuman animal species 
from pigeons to chimpanzees (e.g., Fagot et al., 2001; Thompson & Oden, 1996; Vonk, 2003; 
Wasserman, Frank & Young, 2002; Wright & Katz, 2006; Young & Wasserman, 1997).  
Same vs. different or uniformity vs. chaos.  In one of the first investigations of 
same/different relational concepts utilizing multiple-item arrays, Wasserman et al. (1995) 
provide evidence that pigeons couldlearn the relational concept by generalizing the rule to novel 
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stimuli. Pigeons viewed arrays of 16 computer icons and responded to one of two keys 
designated for either same or different. Whereas the inclusion of 16 icons in each array is more 
than the amount of perceptual information necessary for a relational concept, the successful 
discrimination of these displays still provided convincing evidence that a perhaps more 
generalized concept for sameness and difference has been learned.  
Katz et al. (2007) argued against a conceptual interpretation of these data. They believed 
a more parsimonious explanation to be a strategy in which pigeons based their judgments on 
global perceptual features of stimulus arrays such as orderliness. Katz and colleagues claimed 
that rather than a concept of same, it was more likely that the pigeons perceived and 
subsequently discriminated orderly from disorderly spatial organization of the visual arrays. If 
this argument were true, however, pigeons would not show any decrements in performance in 
transfer trials with novel stimuli.  Pigeons did show small decrements in performance on transfer 
trials, indicating that along with a generalizable S/D rule their behavior was also guided to a 
small extent by memorization of individual icons (Wasserman et al., 1995).   
Wasserman and colleagues conducted several experiments over the next decade designed 
to refute these spatial organizational arguments by presenting the pigeons with arrangements of 
icons that were spatially more random (Young & Wasserman, 1997), that were staggered and 
rotated (Young & Wasserman, 2001), and that were somewhat occluded via Gaussian blur 
(Young, Wasserman & Ellefson, 2007). Pigeons in all of these studies succeeded in making S/D 
discriminations without any decrement in performance predicted by alternate interpretations. 
Wasserman and colleagues then turned their collective attention to the display variability as a 
controlling factor in these S/D discriminations. 
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Variability refers to a computed amount of change in uniqueness from one stimulus to 
another rather than their spatial organization. A more plausible explanation of pigeons’ behavior 
is that they show a graded change in discriminative responding as the amount of sameness and 
difference varied along a continuum.  During their investigations of defining characteristics for 
categories, Shannon and Weaver (1949) quantified the amount of change within a categorical 
variable with a term they called entropy.  Entropy, the amount of change between stimulus 
boundaries in a given display, is a measure of variation within in these relational categories.  For 
stimulus-stimulus comparison purposes, it is calculated on a logarithmic scale by the number of 
discrete pieces of information necessary to predict the conceptual nature of that relational 
category, where H(A) is the entropy of the categorical variable, or in this case, same/different 
stimulus array and pa is the proportion of observed values within that category: 
 
Thus, all displays of identical images, no matter the number, have entropy equal to zero; 
there is no change from one stimulus to another no matter how many are present within the array.  
Displays of all nonidentical images have entropy that increases on a logarithmic scale as the 
number of items contained within them increases (i.e., 2 nonidentical, entropy = 1.0; 4 
nonidentical, entropy = 2.0; 6 nonidentical, entropy = 2.5). Discrimination tasks involving 
comparisons of entropy-infused same and different displays often receive criticism as subjects 
may detect general orderliness or disorderliness of the display rather than extracting relational-
conceptual information, making a two-item S/D discrimination (entropy = 0, same vs. entropy = 
1, different) the most plausible truly “conceptual” strategy.  
Whereas humans (Young & Wasserman, 2001) and great apes (Vonk, 2003) appear less 
sensitive to and not dependent upon entropy of stimulus displays for the mental representation of 
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relations, pigeons, baboons (Papio papio) and rhesus monkeys are all species for which entropy 
is critical.  Pigeons appear to be especially sensitive to changes in entropy in the acquisition of 
the S/D concept (e.g., Wasserman & Young, 1997). That pigeons appear to have considerable 
difficulty discriminating same from different with low levels of entropy contrast suggests a 
predisposition to attend to perceptual stimulus features over the conceptual. Rather than 
discriminating displays on the basis of their relational identity/nonidentity, pigeons default to a 
more item-specific strategy of attending to and perhaps memorizing large sets of individual 
stimulus features (Wasserman et al., 2002). Young, Wasserman and Garner (1997) decreased the 
number of items in each stimulus array to discover incremental depreciating effects on the 
pigeons’ performance. Pigeons demonstrated marked difficulty in discriminating at all displays 
of less than 8 icons each. Entropy accounted for this variation in performance at each 
successively lower level. With each lower level of entropy contrast in discrimination of same 
from different, decrements in performance were observed to the point where with 8-item arrays 
responses were consistent with chance. In another study (Young & Wasserman, 1998), pigeons 
even ceased responding to trials containing entropy contrasts of 1 [2 nonidentical, entropy = 1.0; 
2 identical, entropy = 0]. In addition, pigeons showed strongly asymmetric rates of acquisition 
for same displays over different displays (Young & Wasserman, 2002) and higher rates of 
overall success when discriminating same (S+) from different (S-) as compared to the reverse 
(different – S+, same S-). 
Baboons also have been shown to exhibit sensitivity to entropy in the discrimination of 
same from different visual displays (Wasserman, Young & Fagot, 2001). Baboons tested on the 
multiple-item array S/D discrimination task were detrimentally impacted by a reduction in the 
number of icons from 16 to 8. Like pigeons, they mastered the task with 16, 12, and 10 icon 
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arrays and transferred their knowledge of the relational concepts to novel stimulus arrays. With 
arrays containing less than 8 items however, their discriminative performance was at chance 
levels. One considerable difference in the behavior of baboons was that they did not exhibit 
asymmetric discriminative preferences. That is, baboons were equally accurate on both same and 
different trials, indicating that their knowledge of the S/D concept was symmetrical albeit with 
strong perceptual dependency. 
2 is better than 16?  Wasserman and Young (2010) contended that a “single root 
process” (p. 11) guides the same/different discriminative abilities of pigeons and baboons. The 
graded decrement in discriminative behavior along with a reduction in item number gives no 
reason to believe that subjects employ any strategies of a different kind, but rather that their 
ability to use a strategy of variability detection is dependent upon a contrast of higher entropy 
distinction. Another argument (Katz et al., 2007) is that any same/different concept learning 
involving multiple-icon arrays cannot be attributed to conceptual learning because sameness and 
difference must be able to be defined between two items. Judgments based on more than two 
items are simply detections of perceptual entropy.  
Wright and Katz (2006) reported that rhesus monkeys, capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), 
and pigeons understand sameness and difference without the use of entropy-infused stimulus 
arrays. Both the primate and avian species used matching and nonmatching rules to judge 
relational sameness or difference and generalized these rules to novel stimulus sets with varying 
rates of acquisition, dependent on measures such as training set size, test stimuli and 
contingencies. The methodology used in this study required only a simple match or nonmatch 
rule in each subsequent trial. Whereas this study shed light on the employment of 
match/nonmatch rules independent of one another (see also Shields, Smith & Washburn, 1997), 
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the simultaneous discrimination of identical from nonidentical pairs of stimuli within a trial more 
was more difficult and more directly addressed conceptual knowledge of relations as opposite 
sides of the same coin. 
Also in contrast to other S/D discrimination studies with pigeons (e.g., Wasserman et al., 
2001), Blaisdell and Cook (2005) provided evidence for simultaneous 2-item S/D discrimination 
in pigeons.  Performance was likely attributable to the use of geometric stimuli void of 
perceptual complexity that encouraged a focus on the relational information present, rather than a 
focus on specific stimulus features as might occur with more intricate clipart icons used in 
previous investigations. Blaisdell and Cook (2005) presented only 6 different geometric shapes 
of 6 different highly-discriminable colors. By creating 12,960 unique displays, memorization of 
specific stimulus combinations was considered impossible. Each pigeon was trained to peck only 
at same or different pairs within a testing session; nonetheless, they successfully discriminated 
same from different pairs, albeit not as opposite complimentary concepts. By simplifying the task 
and removing many perceptually-bound discrimination strategies, it is perhaps the case that 
relational information was more salient and thus conceptual strategies began to emerge. The 
utilization of trial-unique stimuli and a methodology encouraging a shift in attention away from 
perceptual features of stimuli likely allowed for the emergence of more conceptually-guided 
behavior. This brings to light questions of effects of the number and kind of exemplars utilized in 
the attainment of relational concepts. 
Katz, Wright, and Bachevalier (2002) identified training stimulus set size as crucial to 
S/D abstract concept learning for both pigeons and nonhuman primates. An increased set size has 
the advantage of drawing attention away from aspects of individual exemplars and placing 
emphasis on the relation between them. With small set sizes, individual features of objects may 
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become the controlling cue, whereas in large stimulus sets individual features change frequently 
enough that stimulus relationships such as the S/D distinction are able to emerge as the basis for 
further discrimination (Katz et al., 2002). For both pigeons and monkeys, a larger training set of 
exemplars allowed for much greater success in the generalization of matching/nonmatching rules 
on subsequent novel transfer trials. However, the reverse is true for the speed of acquisition. 
With smaller stimulus training sets, rate of acquisition of matching/nonmatching rules was more 
rapid relative to larger sets. Regardless, generalization of the rule is the only measure that 
verifies conceptual acquisition.  
Wasserman and Young (2010) argued, consistent with Goldstone and Barsalou (1998), 
that it is most appropriate to view S/D discrimination tasks as falling somewhere on a perceptual-
conceptual continuum rather than being purely conceptual or perceptually-bound tasks. 
Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) stated that many phenomena we view as conceptual actually may 
be the result of perceptual processes becoming less bound to the perceptual features of the 
stimuli.  Therefore, the degree to which a process is conceptual is dependent upon the degree to 
which it cannot be accounted for by perceptual features alone (Wasserman et al., 2002). In the 
case of same and different, conceptual control requires maintenance of the discriminative rule to 
persist even for two-item sets, with a minimal amount of perceptual sameness and difference 
present. Ideally, subjects could use the amount of perceptual variation in multiple icon arrays 
(higher entropy contrast) and flexibly apply a same/different rule to two-item sets if what was 
learned was truly relational in nature, rather than being bound to perceptual variation. However, 
there is great variability across species with regard to this ideal outcome.  Figure 1.1 presents a 
taxonomic organization of species along which they likely fall along a perceptual-conceptual 
continuum in their ability to match relations.
  
 
21 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Continuum of mechanisms used in analogical reasoning and tasks of analogical prerequisites by human and nonhuman 
animals (Papini, 2008, p. 182; 659-690). Conceptually-mediated mechanisms such as representation and/or labeling of relations are 
inferred in species passing 2 x 2 relational matching to sample tasks. Conceptually-mediated mechanisms begin to emerge in capuchin 
monkeys and those primates sharing more recent common ancestors with humans. Perceptually-mediated mechanisms such as 
discrimination of relations and relational matching via perceptual variability emerge from avians onward.
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Until recent studies (Fagot & Parron, 2010; Kennedy & Fragaszy 2008; Spinozzi et al., 
2004) provided suggestive evidence that non-apes were capable of reasoning by analogy, failure 
to match relations in a same/different RMTS task by monkeys was attributed to a general 
cognitive discontinuity between their perceptual and categorical conceptual abilities. The 
hypothesized disconnect to process relational information, wherein formation of relational 
concepts is hampered by a natural predisposition of monkeys to attend to the perceptual qualities 
of the stimuli appears causal in their inability to match relations. This hypothesis is supported by 
the evidence from preferential handling and gaze studies that abstract relational properties are 
implicitly more salient for chimpanzee and child even at an early age than is the case for 
monkeys for whom physical elemental properties are more salient (Oden, Thompson, & 
Premack, 1990; Tyrrell, Stauffer & Snowman, 1991; Vauclair & Fagot, 1996). However, even 
for chimpanzees and children, these relational properties emerge from a reinterpretation of 
lower-order physical properties. 
Whereas monkeys do not seem spontaneously to perceive 2-item relational sameness and 
differences, both chimpanzees (Oden et al., 1990) and 4-year-old human children (Tyrell et al., 
1991) preferentially attend to stimuli consisting of novel relations when habituated to another 
(e.g., different when habituated to same). Subsequent failures on the part of infant chimpanzees 
and 4-year-old human children seem not to reflect an inability to detect such relations, but rather 
are indicative of a failure in the application or voluntary accessibility of their existing perceptual 
competencies (Fodor, 1983; Oden et al., 1990). Thompson and Oden (2000) concluded from 
these results that monkeys are paleologicians; their conceptual categories are based on shared 
predicates – absolute and relational features bound by perceptual and/or associative similarity, 
whereas symbol-trained apes are analogical in the sense that they perceive abstract propositional 
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similarities spontaneously. That some monkeys might appear to behave analogically may not, 
however, be attributable to reasoning by analogy proper. 
Analogy: Same is the same as same 
Whereas analogy is an extension of sameness (“choose the same relation as exemplified 
in the sample”) there is a significant gap in cognitive distance from physical similarity to 
analogy. A generalized ability to discriminate the relations of same and different is essential, 
albeit only the first step, in reasoning by analogy. As stated previously, analogy is dependent 
upon knowledge of first-order relational concepts, but requires an additional level of cognitive 
computation: that of relations-between-relations (Premack, 1976; Flemming, Beran, Thompson, 
Kleider & Washburn, 2008; Thompson & Oden, 1996; Thompson & Oden, 2000). The argument 
outlined here is not that this judgment is different in kind, but rather in degree, rendered difficult 
for nonhuman animals due to strategies that otherwise might be more accessible. For example, 
monkeys may have the cognitive capacity to perceive relations-between-relations, but they may 
instead employ a more accessible strategy of focusing their attention on local perceptual features 
of stimuli.  
In addition to differences in attentional focus, Thompson and Oden (1996) further 
suggested that a relational matching-to-sample task is cognitively more demanding than either 
conditional or simultaneous relational S/D discriminations. In RMTS, there is required a greater 
number of both matching/nonmatching operations and number of encoded abstract relations to be 
retained for successful completion of a trial. In the RMTS task, the animal must first compare the 
physical properties of each item within the sample to identify the categorically abstract relation 
they represent (Premack, 1983; Thompson & Oden, 2000). It must then retain the encoded 
outcome of that operation while performing the same comparative operation on each comparison 
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stimulus pair and encoding those outcomes. Finally, the animal must compare the encoded 
abstract representations resulting from all of the former operations and judge these abstract 
representations to be the same or different before executing its decision response.  
Representation in analogy. Hence, in order to make explicit same/different judgments 
of abstract relations as in analogical judgments, one must represent the abstract concepts in some 
way (Oden, et al., 1990; Premack, 1983). Little is known of the modality of such representations 
for nonhuman animals but one possibility is that the provision of physical symbols affords 
chimpanzees and children, if not monkeys, the opportunity to encode abstract S/D relations as 
iconic representations thereby functionally reducing the RMTS task to a covert physical 
matching problem (Penn et al., 2008; Thompson & Oden, 1996, Thompson & Oden, 2000; 
Thompson et al., 1997). Symbol systems appear to provide apes and humans the representational 
scaffolding for manipulation and expression of propositional knowledge in RMTS and related 
nonverbal analogy tasks (Gillan et al., 1981; Oden, Thompson & Premack, 2001). There is no 
evidence as yet that physical conditional cues associated with specific conceptual relations 
similarly acquire symbolic meaning for monkeys (Flemming et al., 2008).  
The concepts of sameness and difference make possible analogies such as those in 
relational matching-to-sample (Premack, 2010). Moreover, whereas the computation of relational 
matching is of the same type, it must be processed concurrently with those of relational sameness 
or difference. The relational matching computation does however require a level of abstraction 
that other judgments of relational sameness and difference do not: no physical consistencies 
exist. As judgments of relation, these relations-between-relations are likely learned on a 
perceptual basis. Premack (1986) reported that although chimpanzees do not spontaneously 
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employ analogy, the animals gradually learned a relational matching-to-sample task with 
absolutely no feedback within 400 training trials. 
An alternate belief (e.g., Penn et al., 2008) is that whereas perceptual similarity is based 
on relations between observed features, judgments of conceptual relational similarity are based 
only on the correspondence between symbols that abstractly represent the elements involved. 
This interpretation does not allow for the employment of perceptual comparison beyond the first 
computation of relational identity or nonidentity. Penn et al. (2008) stand alone both in their 
belief that analogy requires an altogether different cognitive faculty and that the ability to reason 
by analogy is uniquely human. With the recent evidence for “analogical animals” largely 
determined by how liberally one defines analogy, a discussion of alternate views on how 
analogical reasoning is accomplished is warranted.  
Theories of analogy.  In an attempt to define better what is meant mechanistically by 
analogy, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) proposed a multiconstraint model that, as its name 
implies, outlines several cognitive limitations that guide our use of analogy: similarity, structure 
and purpose. First, analogy is aided by a direct comparison of similarity of the elements 
involved. So, if there is any consistency between stimuli in base and target relations, a subject’s 
propensity to identify similarities between them may aid in the mapping of one relation to 
another. Second, the constraint of structure that helps guide analogy implies a pressure to 
identify parallels between base and target. That is, with all other options in a problem-solving 
process exhausted, a search for structural commonalities must take place. Like an extension of a 
search for similarity within sets, the same search for similarity between sets is an initiating force 
in the employment of analogy. Finally, and perhaps most noteworthy, there must be an inherent 
purpose to drive the goals of the thinker. In the case of nonhuman animals, this purpose might 
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take the form of motivation. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) state that this purpose serves to bias 
attention so as to favor the goal state. The role of motivation for nonhuman animals and the 
associated attentional shift will be discussed later. 
Not entirely removed from the idea of a proposed shift in attention is Rattermann and 
Gentner’s (1998a; see also Gentner, 1988) notion of a relational shift whereby subjects during 
development accomplish analogy only when terms of object similarity can be put aside in favor 
or relational similarity.  Whereas 7-month old human infants spontaneously detect same and 
different relations (Tyrrell et al., 1991), the mapping of those relations emerges much later in 
development. Because several errors in analogical mapping by 4- and 5-year-old children were 
due to a focus on object-based similarity (i.e., attempted matching due to similar physical 
features of base and target), Rattermann and Gentner (1998a) contend that surface similarities 
drive reasoning skills until a point at which knowledge of the objects or situations therein is 
mastered, giving way to the search for possibilities beyond that which is already known.  This 
relational shift from object properties to common relational structures is itself a shift in attention 
enabled by more generalized object expertise. Because the shift is dependent upon the amount 
and kind of knowledge a subject possesses in each specific domain, the point at which subject 
“becomes analogical” varies by content.  
To re-examine the claims set forth by the relational shift hypothesis (e.g., decreased 
levels of responding based on object similarity with age; increased relational responding with 
age) Rattermann and Gentner (1998a) presented 4 to 5 year-old human children with simple 
word analogies. All choice alternatives were specifically created to analyze object- and relation-
based responding. In all analogy problems, choices were either (1) correct – both object and 
relation, (2) wrong object/correct relation (3) correct object/wrong relation, (4) mere appearance 
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only / wrong object, but similar on at least one dimension. As predicted by the relational-shift 
hypothesis, the proportion of correct responses indeed increased with age and choice of mere 
appearance decreased with age. The proportion of incorrect choices by wrong object/correct 
relation remained relatively constant although rates of this choice were low for children at both 
ages. Finally, and consistent with their hypothesis, Rattermann and Gentner (1998a) observed a 
decline in correct object/wrong relation responses, although this was still the most common 
incorrect choice for children of both ages. Object-based selections overall declined with age 
presumably due to an emergence of preferential attention to relations. 
Whereas the relational-shift helps to elucidate the development of skills in analogical 
reasoning, it may not fully explain the mechanisms of responding (e.g., nature of representations 
or symbols/language) for adults. In the structure-mapping model of analogy originally proposed 
by Gentner (1983), the mapping of knowledge from one domain to another is central to the 
assumption that there exists a relation held constant from one domain to the other. Thus, a focus 
on relational commonalities apart from the objects involved in them is required. Whereas this 
theory assumes the formation of mental representations (a contention in studies of animal 
cognition) of base and target relations, it is the mapping of these mental representations (in 
whatever form they may take) from base to target pair that is the critical process in analogical 
reasoning. Because the structure-mapping model relies heavily on the concrete formation of 
mental representations, it is not perhaps the best representation of analogy for nonhuman 
animals. 
An important consideration of analogy by structure-mapping in nonhuman animals is this 
notion of representation that Penn et al. (2008) believed to be limited in principle alone to 
humans.  Their view is that only humans can possess the representational capacities necessary to 
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reinterpret first-order perceptual relations as is apparently required for reasoning by analogy (the 
relational reinterpretation (RR) hypothesis). However, as Thompson and Flemming (2008) 
pointed out, not only is there an abundance of compelling evidence for representational 
capability by chimpanzees (e.g., Premack, 1976; 1983; Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith & 
Lawson, 1980) but there is also recent suggestive evidence for proto-symbolic treatment of 
relational information by monkeys wherein bidirectional associations between cues and paired 
relational stimuli are formed. 
Because the nature of mental representation by nonhuman animals is contested (and 
believed by some not to be essential to reasoning by analogy), a new theory for analogy as 
relational priming (Leech, Mareschal & Cooper, 2008) is being embraced by comparative 
psychologists. Stating that analogy is driven largely by priming and transformations, Leech et al. 
(2008) propose that exposure to a situation primes relational knowledge of that situation that can 
then be applied to new instances via a transformation of the same type. Knowledge of relational 
information within a base (sample) acts to prime the employment of that same relational 
knowledge between base and target (choice/s). Leech et al.’s (2008) theory suggests that 
analogical abilities may in fact emerge from basic functions of a memory system provided 
concurrent increases in domain knowledge. In their view, the notion that analogy is a special 
cognitive faculty is denied.  Instead, the seemingly complex reasoning skills arise from relatively 
more simple mechanisms. This employment of simpler mechanisms is especially appealing to 
comparative psychologists searching for analogical precursors in nonhuman animals within the 
constraints of parsimony. 
Analogical-like behavior in birds and monkeys.  Köhler’s (1938) pioneering discovery 
of what he called transposition learning speaks to the application of relational knowledge that is 
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integral to so-called higher level reasoning by analogy. Köhler trained chickens to peck at boards 
of various shades of the same color, in effect instructing a relation for the “lighter” of two shades 
of a color. For example, chickens were required to peck a gray board when paired with a black 
board, then at a white board when paired with a gray board.  He reasoned that they were able to 
see the relationship between the stimuli, instead of simply learning a single task or simply 
learning a specific stimulus-response-outcome association (Köhler, 1938).  
Investigations of analogical reasoning via simple cognitive mechanisms in birds and non-
ape primate species often lead researchers to a common conclusion that the behavior of their 
animals is in the very least a precursor to formal analogical reasoning. Wasserman and 
colleagues (Cook & Wasserman, 2007; Fagot et al., 2001) presented multiple icon arrays in a 
relational matching-to-sample paradigm to pigeons, baboons and humans. Using the same 16-
icon identical/nonidentical stimulus arrays (i.e., Wasserman et al., 2002) for both sample and 
choices, Cook and Wasserman (2007) demonstrated successful matching of same and different 
arrays. With a reduction in entropy of stimulus arrays in RMTS, as in discrimination tasks, 
chance performance was observed in pigeons. Much like their discriminative behavior with the 
relational concepts, pigeons relied on contrasts of perceptual variability for the matching of these 
arrays (Cook & Wasserman, 2007) suggesting more limited abstract conceptual abilities in birds.  
Fagot et al. (2001) presented the identical task to baboons with findings suggestive of a 
strategy somewhat less dependent on perceptual variability.  Two baboons completed the RMTS 
task successfully with both samples and choices composed of 16, 12, and 8 items, providing 
evidence that entropy detection guided their choices. In another variation, these baboons also 
successfully matched two-item arrays (choices) with 16-item arrays (sample), suggesting that 
whereas detections of variability within a display are certainly important, conceptual thinking is 
  30 
 
perhaps primed by an entropy-laden sample, encouraging sufficient conceptual extraction from a 
two-item choice array. According to the authors, the number of icons in the sample likely “exerts 
its effect on relational matching-to-sample performance quite independently” of the choices 
(Fagot et al., 2001, p. 327). For baboons, the recognition of and further application of relational 
concepts cannot be accomplished without detection of perceptual variability to at least prime 
further conceptual thinking (i.e., mental representations). 
Analogy proper in monkeys.  Fagot and Parron (2010) presented results that seem to 
indicate that variability is not a necessary component in relational matching for baboons. Using 
adjacent stimulus elements made of color patches, Fagot and Parron (2010) demonstrated the 
first evidence for two by two item RMTS. Six baboons were trained in an RMTS task involving 
compound stimuli made of two identical or nonidentical color blocks. During initial training, 
these compound stimuli were adjoined in what could be considered one stimulus sample (rather 
than a pair of images) and two choice stimuli (rather than two pairs of images), making it striking 
similar to an identity MTS task. In subsequent experimental phases, gaps between stimulus 
elements were introduced in incrementally larger sizes, effectively creating a true two by two 
item RMTS. The performance of baboons, which initially exceeded levels of chance, collapsed 
with increases in gap size between the stimulus elements, eventually falling to chance accuracy 
with a gap of just 30 pixels. This effect, which disappeared after 4,000 training trials, provided 
suggestive evidence for relational mapping of these identity/nonidentity pairs. Gaps of 60 pixels 
or larger between stimulus elements resulted in chance performance throughout the study, 
however, which is concerning because the acquisition of this supposed analogical rule lacks 
critical generalizability. 
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Fagot and Parron (2010) believed that this ability to match relations by monkeys had 
been previously masked due to local processing of stimuli that hindered monkeys’ ability to 
perceive the stimuli as pairs rather than independent objects. Given these findings, it is possible 
that previous failures by monkeys on RMTS tasks in spite of clear understanding of relational the 
S/D concept is due to the way in which monkeys perceive the task. Evidence from studies of 
local versus global visual processing by monkeys (Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Spinozzi, De Lillo & 
Truppa, 2003) strongly indicates that grouping of elements separated by gaps into a structure of a 
higher order is extremely taxing and sometimes impossible. Thus, solving the two- by two-item 
RMTS task requires that six stimuli be grouped into three distinct pairs. For monkeys, a local 
mode of processing, rather than a global one, dominates in this task.  Because the RMTS task is 
very highly demanding of attention for monkeys, it may be the case that demonstrations of 
failure of this task are due to attentional deficits rather than a lack of ability to reason by analogy. 
One such task that provides evidence for an “analogical monkey” in contrast to results 
often garnered from identity/nonidentity RMTS seems not to require such high levels of 
attentional demand. Spinozzi et al. (2004) presented capuchin monkeys with a very similar 
RMTS task, but not one involving the S/D concept at all, but rather inference of above and 
below. Concepts of above and below are relational, but pose no confound for within and between 
set comparison like same and different (e.g., sample = different, choose the pair exemplifying the 
same relation, choice = different). Stimuli presented to capuchin monkeys were composed of 
horizontal lines and dots positioned either above or below the line, beginning with configurations 
identical distances from the bar, transitioning in subsequent transfer trials to spatial 
configurations that varied widely from sample to choices. Transfer tests with novel images (stars 
and triangles positioned above and below lines of varying lengths) revealed a significant level of 
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correct responses in this RMTS task. These results would seem in contrast to the general 
agreement (see Thompson & Oden, 2000) of a lack of ability to reason analogically. Spatial 
relations, on the other hand, may simply be more easily processed by monkeys than relations of 
identity and nonidentity. Depy, Fagot and Vauclair (1999) suggested that, because of a 
specialized processing of categorical spatial relations, abstraction of these relations is perhaps 
less dependent on labeling than other relational concepts.  
Kennedy and Fragaszy (2008) investigated the ability of capuchin monkeys to match 
relations in a 3-dimensional search task involving hidden food under plastic cups of different 
sizes. This procedure is often used with children in developmental applications. A food reward 
was first baited under two sets of cups out of sight of the subject and then revealed by an 
experimenter in one set of cups. The other set of cups of different absolute sizes was available 
for the capuchin monkey to search under. Capuchins searched directly under one cup by lifting it 
to reveal either the presence or absence of reward, contingent upon matching relative size 
between subject and experimenter sets. One of four capuchin monkeys performed at levels above 
chance not only on a basic two-item task, but also on a series of transfer tasks with three novel 
stimuli and distracters. The authors hypothesized that the extensive problem-solving experience 
of this subject may have provided the scaffolding on which this newly emerging analogical 
reasoning was built.  
A three-dimensional search task has several advantages over RMTS. First, like studies by 
Spinozzi et al. (2004) and Fagot and Parron (2010) it does not allow for the employment of a 
strategy based on contrast in perceptual variability, strengthening the argument that success on 
this is exemplary of reasoning by analogy proper. Second, the concepts of sameness and 
difference within sets do not confound the search for sameness between sets. Finally, a three-
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dimensional search task is both interesting and advantageous in certain ways over an RMTS task 
when studying analogies because it adds a level of application and ecological validity for 
reasoning. Rather than matching pre-determined concepts (i.e., same and different) subjects in 
this task are free to attempt any number of strategies, only one of which ultimately provides 
reward. Subjects may make selections based on absolute size by searching under the cup that is 
most physically similar to the absolute size of the sample. Alternatively, one may choose based 
on the same relative spatial position as the sample. Although not rewarded, this choice behavior 
is also analogical. Finally, and consistent with the reward contingencies of the task, subjects may 
(and should) choose based on relative size of the sample to the alternate cups in the set. It is 
noteworthy that even attempts at the former strategies provide support for analogy. 
This species disparity is further supported by evidence from rhesus monkeys trained to 
choose geometric shapes associated with relational identity/nonidentity pairs (and the reverse) 
but subsequently failing to match relations (Washburn, Thompson & Oden, 1997). 
Unfortunately, the failure by these monkeys does not implicate symbol-training per se, but rather 
a more general qualitative difference in conceptual employment of monkeys and apes. 
Analogical reasoning in humans.  Studies of relational similarity and analogical 
reasoning are rarely free from consideration of language as a driving mechanism by which 
analogy is enabled. One such study, however, parallels the methodology used with pigeons and 
baboons (Young & Wasserman, 2001). If the relational matching strategies employed by humans 
are entirely disparate from those used by birds and monkeys, no decrement in performance 
would be observed with a reduction in the number of items in a same or different stimulus array 
as observed in both pigeons and baboons, implicating entropy (contrast in perceptual variability) 
as a controlling factor. Without every mentioning the words same and different in task 
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instruction, Young and Wasserman (2001) trained undergraduate students first to discriminate 
same from different 16-icon displays. Although never failing to complete any version of the task 
successfully, human responses were not entirely immune to effects of entropy: small decrements 
in performance and increases in reaction time were observed with each successively lower 
entropy contrast. Although it is usually believed that language plays an integral role in the 
mapping of one relation to another for humans (REF needed), other mechanisms in common 
with birds and baboons may also drive analogy for humans. 
Developmental studies with human children often reveal not only the importance of 
linguistic labeling for employment of analogy, but also the role of explicit instruction to seek out 
relational information. Relational mapping is often observed in typically developing children 
between the ages of 3 and 4 years old, during a period of rapid language development. 
Rattermann and Gentner (1998b) argued for the importance of labels in the alignment of 
relational concepts for human children have. Rattermann and colleagues presented children with 
a three-dimensional relational-size analogical search paradigm in which stickers were hidden 
under analogous sets of plastic boxes of different sizes. In this “family size relations” task, each 
object was labeled as the “daddy,” “mommy” or “baby” object to provide the child with a 
familiar relational structure. For children instructed with family labels, successful mapping 
increased to levels significantly above chance, implicating the necessity of linguistic labels for 
the employment of an analogical strategy. 
When surface similarities exist between old and new problems (e.g., using the same 
elements) analogical reasoning is more quickly applied to the new problem. However, if the 
similarities between previous experiences and novel problems are only structural (e.g., content) 
in nature, application of analogical reasoning skills is far less obvious and therefore not as salient 
  35 
 
a strategy. In experiments with both children and adult humans, surface similarities seem to be 
integral in whether participants recognize analogical similarity in order to solve a problem when 
not explicitly told to do so (Catrambone, 2002; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbes, 1993; Ross, 
1987).  
Gentner and Rattermann (1991) used an identical task to Rattermann and Gentner 
(1998b), but they included four distinct groups of objects to examine potential errors based on 
object similarity. Flower pots, houses, mugs and cars were arranged in decreasing size from left 
to right on a table top for both the child and experimenter. These sets often included distracter 
objects such as identical objects of the incorrect relative size to the sample (which were not the 
correct “relative size” choices) in order to determine whether the children relied on a strategy of 
object or relational similarity. For instance, if the experimenter’s set included a large car, 
medium house and small mug (S+), the set from which the child was required to select the 
smallest object might include a large mug, medium car and small house. At the onset of the trial, 
the experimenter demonstrated with her set of objects where a sticker was hidden. Half of the 
children were instructed to “use this information” to find a sticker hidden somewhere under his 
or her set. She then allowed the child to search his or her set to find the sticker. The correct 
choice was always to search under the object of the same relative size as the one lifted by the 
experimenter, a choice that was markedly difficult for 3-year-olds, but seemed to emerge 
gradually for 4-year-olds with this explicit instruction. Children that received no instruction often 
failed the task entirely. That 4-year-old children did not use analogy unless explicitly told to do 
so via focusing attention to the relational structure present further implicates the importance of 
attention and problem representation in analogical reasoning. Dunbar (2001) and Ripoll, Brude, 
and Coulon (2003) reported results from studies in which even adult human subjects failed to 
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solve a problem involving the analogical transfer of problem structure from one reading passage 
to another. As is the case with most investigations of analogical reasoning in human adults and 
children, these studies heavily rely on the use of language and thus present the intriguing idea 
that language and stimulus meaningfulness might play a critical role in the emergence of 
analogical reasoning (for comprehensive review of analogical reasoning in humans, see Gentner, 
2003; Murphy, 2002; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1989).   
Analogy-proper in apes.  Once considered a hallmark of human intelligence, most 
studies in analogical reasoning in chimpanzees were inspired by the idea that language played an 
integral role in the mapping of relations. Symbol or so-called “language-trained” chimpanzees 
presented a unique opportunity to investigate the role that this special cognitive faculty might 
play for analogy. In contrast to results from pigeons and monkeys, evidence from chimpanzees is 
highly suggestive of an “analogical ape.”   
One chimpanzee has provided perhaps the most extensive evidence for analogical 
behavior in a nonhuman (Gillian et al., 1981). After extensive training with plastic tokens for the 
words “same” and “different,” Sarah the chimpanzee was capable of completing and creating 
both standard item and functional analogies. In one study, she was provided with three terms of 
an analogy: two identical or nonidentical geometric chips to the left of her symbol for same, and 
one geometric chip positioned to the right of the same symbol. Sarah was then required to find 
the correct right-side companion chip to complete the analogy. If the chips on the left were 
identical, she would find the chip from a set of alternatives that was identical to the single chip in 
the right-side position. Likewise, if the left-side chips were nonidentical, she chose the 
nonidentically related companion for the right-side chip, matching the relation instantiated in the 
left-side pair. 
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Thompson and Oden (1996) also reported Sarah’s abilities to arrange four geometric 
chips from a randomized group and one of her tokens for same or different on an empty board in 
an analogical fashion. Thus, she not only completed analogical transformation, but she also was 
capable of constructing them with no predetermined samples provided. 
Not all of Sarah’s reasoning abilities were limited to the identity/nonidentity concept. 
Functional analogies provided further insight into her application of relational matching, 
indicating more generalized understanding of analogy.  Gillian et al. (1981) presented Sarah with 
pairs of objects that were related only in that they could function together. For example, when 
presented with a padlock and key as a sample pair, and a closed paint bucket as one choice, 
Sarah chose a can opener rather than a paintbrush, matching the “A is opened by B” relationship 
conveyed in the sample, rather than mere associative account do to probably proximity of the 
objects in space. 
This symbolic language-like training was thought to be responsible for all of Sarah’s 
success. Premack (1976; 1989), Gillian et al. (1981) and Thompson and Oden (1996) have all 
suggested that the critical role of her symbols for same and different was to provide her with a 
concrete means of encoding conceptual-relational information that was otherwise abstract. The 
task of matching then became one of covert symbol matching – mapping one mental 
representation to the other. At least in the case of abstract relations, acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge necessary for analogical reasoning is dependent upon these specific language-related 
skills. 
Other than this token-trained chimpanzee, evidence of analogical abilities by 
chimpanzees without prior training with symbols for same and different is sparse. Thompson et 
al. (1997) found evidence of relational matching from language-naïve chimpanzees, implicating 
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generalized token training as important to analogy. The chimpanzees in this study had a history 
of conditional discrimination training using tokens and multiple pairs of objects. For example, 
they viewed identically or nonidentically related pairs of stimuli and were rewarded for choosing 
one of two arbitrary tokens. The opposite (required for symbolic training) had not been tested. 
That is, they could choose the correct token in the presence of a relational pair, but it is not 
known whether they could choose the same relational pair in the presence of a specific token. 
Four of five chimpanzees spontaneously judged the conceptual equivalence of relations-between-
relations. The fifth chimpanzee differed in his learning history; he was naïve with respect to 
numeric problem solving and symbolic token training in addition to language training. Therefore, 
it seems that these tokens may have a functional role in the acquisition of abstract concepts.   
Inspired by Gentner’s (1989) notion of a developmental relational shift for children, 
Flemming et al. (2008) further examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical 
reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans, lexigram-trained chimpanzees, 
and Arabic-numeral-trained rhesus monkeys completed parallel relational matching-to-sample 
(RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. As Gentner (1989) suggested, 
the level of expertise for the objects involved mediates a relational shift in attention from 
physical traits to relational characteristics. Thus, it was potentially the case that the 
meaningfulness to participants of individual stimuli could allow for the expression of relational 
understanding and further application in analogy. Subjects were presented with a typical two- by 
two-item same/different RMTS task in which stimulus pairs were composed of either meaningful 
(humans – 3-7 letter words; chimpanzees – mastered lexigrams; rhesus monkeys – numerals 1-9) 
or nonmeaningful stimuli (humans – 3-7 letter nonword strings; chimpanzees – never-before-
seen lexigrams; rhesus monkeys – Latin alphabet letters). Meaningfulness facilitated the 
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acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among 
the chimpanzees indicated that meaning could either enable or hinder their ability to complete 
analogies, much like errors in surface similarities described by Gentner and Rattermann (1991). 
Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting 
that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent upon a dimension 
other than the representational value of stimuli, or that the stimuli used were not of equal 
meaningfulness to those used with chimpanzees and humans.  For a full account of the 
methodology and findings of this study, see Appendix. 
It is important to note that evidence to vouch for the “analogical ape” is taken from the 
performance of less than ten individuals, most with specialized training. Recent evidence from 
Haun and Call (2009) provides less convincing evidence for the strong propensity of apes to 
reason by analogy. Chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan paniscus), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) were presented with a series of tasks involving a search for 
reward under sets of three cups in which a relational strategy resulted in success, in a fashion 
similar to Kennedy and Fragaszy (2008). In the first two conditions, correct choices of cups were 
physically connected to each other with plastic tubes or lines painted on the surface of the 
platform. In a final condition, no tubes or lines were present to connect correct choices, leaving a 
task in which correct choices are attributable to relational matching.  
Gorillas and orangutans showed little success in matching on the basis of relation when 
objects were connected only by lines and were farthest in proximity to samples. In the final 
phase of the experiment where objects were not connected, only chimpanzees performed above 
chance, albeit undetermined statistical significance. One may argue that with physical 
connections between sample and choice objects, subjects in this series of experiments need not 
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employ a relational strategy at all to succeed. Rather, physical connectedness and proximity 
seem a more parsimonious explanation. That chimpanzees had markedly more difficulty with the 
task when objects were not physically connected leaves uncertain their ability to use relational 
similarity to reason analogically.  
Whereas Premack (1976; 1986) emphasized the facilitative effect of formal language on 
analogical reasoning, several more recent studies with language-naïve apes and monkeys provide 
evidence to the contrary. Thompson and Oden (1993) propose a modified theory that even a 
more generalized training history involving the association between an arbitrary cue and abstract 
relation is sufficient for chimpanzees to successfully judge relations-between-relations. Why 
then is it the case that the same does not hold true for monkeys? Whereas monkeys can be 
trained to associate discriminative cues with same/different relations, their subsequent failure to 
match these same relations is likely a failure of another kind, implicating mechanisms simpler 
than symbol systems in analogy. Even with symbol training of this type (i.e., Flemming et al., 
2008; Washburn et al., 1997) cues themselves did not take on the same representational qualities; 
the cues could not acquire the referential meaning for the relations of same and different that 
Thompson and Oden (2000) consider crucial to the further judgment of second-order relations. Is 
it the case then that this referential quality of symbols is in fact unique to humans and 
chimpanzees? 
Closing the gap: An overview of this dissertation 
Considering comparative data from human children and symbol-trained monkeys and 
apes, it would seem that several factors could mediate the ability to reason by analogy. The 
mapping of relations is not one that operates via a singular cognitive mechanism, but rather 
multimodally, and such mapping may be hindered by deficits in areas other than language. The 
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oft-observed perceptual to conceptual “disconnect” between apes and monkeys perhaps can be 
closed by a variety of methodological scaffoldings, making a strong distinction between 
analogical and non-analogical primates unnecessary. 
Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) suggested that narrowing the gap between perception and 
concept use is easy given the mechanistic commonalities between perceptual and conceptual 
processes and a deep-rooted dependence on perception for abstract conceptualization. Both 
object similarity and higher order concepts have their cognitive foundations in perception; both 
rely on the same basic perceptual mechanisms for their implementation. Although abstract 
relations may seem far-removed from perception because of their generality and universal 
applicability outside of specific domains (unlike object similarity) Goldstone and Barsalou 
(1998) argued for implicit conceptual biases that likely emerge from learned perceptual 
similarities, explaining the continuity between the two processes. 
Learned perceptual similarities (i.e., object similarity and relational concepts) may be 
difficult to train, but once constructed may become automatic and difficult to break, explaining 
to the difficulty animals experience with relational matching. Flexibly moving from a similarity 
rule involving only two objects “A=A” (within pairs) to one involving an equivalence calculation 
between pairs “AA=BB” requires transformation of the rule (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998). 
These early similarity judgments serve to promote the transformation, but may require a shift in 
the focus of attention from perceptual to relational similarity as a jumping off point.  
Consider an analogy of analogy proposed by Goldstone and Barsalou (1998): jaw bones 
are to perceptually-based concepts as ear bones are to abstractions.  
… mammalian ear bones probably evolved from jaw bones. The sound-transmitting 
function of the jaw/ear bones was only selected for one the biting function of the jaw had 
already established the jaw bone’s basic shape. Likewise, the starting shape of our 
concepts may be perceptually-specific initially, but can be transformed in quite different 
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directions once developed. Later structures (ear bones and abstractions) depend on and 
grow out of earlier structures (jaw bones and perceptually-based concepts) for their very 
existence even as they acquire radically different functions. (p. 245) 
 
The evolution of concepts from perception produces sometimes drastically different functions, 
just as in biological evolution. Throughout the chapters of this manuscript, studies designed to 
systematically clarify the cognitive factors involved in closing the gap between perceptual and 
abstract conceptual processes for nonhuman primates will be presented.  
In Chapter 2, in which I examine the role of entropy and symbols for rhesus monkeys, the 
distinction seems wide between knowledge for relational concepts and their subsequent 
application in analogy. After repeatedly failing to perceive relations between pairs of stimuli in a 
two-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly learned to discriminate between 8-element 
arrays, owing success to the perceptual variability of stimuli. Subsequent tests with smaller 
arraysindicated that although initially important for acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a 
variable on which monkeys based their subsequent discriminative choices.   Not only did 
monkeys choose a corresponding relational pair in the presence of a cue, but they also chose the 
cue itself in the presence of the relational pair--in essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent 
failure on the RMTS task suggested a disparity between the ability to perceive and form mental 
representations of relations and the ability to use those mental representations instrumentally. 
Chapter 3 continues the study of entropy measures for rhesus monkeys and introduces 
new investigation of the S/D concept in a new world primate, the capuchin monkey. Utilizing a 
method of increasing entropy, rather than conventional procedures of decreasing entropy, the 
data demonstrate unique evidence that capuchin monkeys are capable of making 2-item 
relational S/D conditional discriminations, in contrast to suggestions that S/D discriminations are 
markedly more difficult and likely involve detections of higher entropy contrast for monkeys. In 
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another experiment, the supposed level of difficulty in making S/D discriminations is examined 
in rhesus monkeys. With sustained accurate performance of 2-item S/D discriminations, both 
experienced and task-naïve rhesus monkeys appeared quite ‘comfortable’ in their conceptual 
knowledge of same and different. Learning of the same/different relational concepts may be less 
“entropy-important” than originally hypothesized for nonhuman primates. 
In a return to the discussion of how these relational concepts are applied to problems of 
analogy, the study in Chapter 4 demonstrates unique success by rhesus monkeys to judge 
relations-between-relations due to a cognitive incentive. Rhesus monkeys completed a 
categorical (identity & nonidentity) relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task with differential 
reward (pellet ratio) and/or punishment (timeout ratio) outcomes for correct and incorrect 
choices. Monkeys in either differential reward-only or punishment-only conditions performed at 
chance levels. However, the RMTS performance of monkeys experiencing both differential 
reward and punishment conditions was significantly better than chance. Subsequently, when all 
animals experienced nondifferential outcomes tests, their RMTS performance levels were 
uniformly at chance again. The results of this study indicate that combining differential reward 
and punishment contingencies provide an effective, albeit transitory, scaffolding for monkeys 
explicitly to judge analogical relations-between-relations, potentially mediated by a re-focusing 
of attention. 
Chapter 5 presents a series of experiments with chimpanzees to further examine the 
employment of an analogical rule free from confounds of entropy or the relational concepts of 
same and different. Analogical strategies in three chimpanzees were examined using a 3-
dimensional search task modeled on the study by Kennedy and Fragaszy (2008). Food items 
were hidden under one of two or three plastic cups of varying sizes for the subsequent search by 
  44 
 
the subject under the cup of the same relative size in their own set of cups – reasoning by 
analogy.  Two chimpanzees initially appeared to fail the first relational phase of the task. Upon 
further inspection, it appeared that they were instead using a secondary strategy not rewarded by 
the contingencies of the task – choosing based on the same relative position in the sample. 
Although this was not the intended strategy of the task, it was nonetheless analogical. In 
subsequent phases of the task, chimpanzees eventually learned to shift their analogical reasoning 
strategy in some ways like Gentner’s (1983) relational shift to match the reward contingencies of 
the task and successfully choose based on relative size).  This evidence not only provides support 
for the “analogical ape” hypothesis (Thompson & Oden, 2000), but also exemplifies how 
foundational conceptually-mediated analogical behavior may be for the chimpanzee. 
Through this series of comparative studies, the distinction between analogical and non-
analogical beings is assessed, and the results will be interpreted from the position of a 
multimodal approach to the study of analogical reasoning. As discussed earlier, a multimodal 
approach for the employment of analogy allows for consideration of a variety of mechanisms by 
which the relational matching can be accomplished, rather than being resigned to a special 
faculty once thought unique to humans. I will argue in the discussion, on the basis of the 
evidence from the studies next presented, that the view of control for analogy by language alone 
is antiquated, counterproductive from a comparative perspective, and should be replaced with a 
more liberal view of other mediating factors through which a variety of species can accomplish 
the application of previously learned information in ways that afford analogical reasoning. 
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Chapter 2: Disconnect in concept learning by rhesus monkeys:  Judgment of relations and 
relations-between-relations2 
 
Abstract 
We investigated the role that entropy measures, discriminative cues, and symbolic knowledge 
play for rhesus monkeys in the acquisition of the concepts of same and different for use in a 
computerized relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task. After repeatedly failing to perceive 
relations between pairs of stimuli in a two-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly 
learned to discriminate between 8-element arrays. Subsequent tests with smaller arrays, however, 
suggest that, although important for the initial acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a 
variable on which monkeys are dependent.   Not only do monkeys choose a corresponding 
relational pair in the presence of a cue, but they also choose the cue itself in the presence of the 
relational pair--in essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent failure in the judgment of 
relations-between-relations, however, suggests that perhaps a qualitatively different cognitive 
component exists that prevents monkeys from behaving analogically. 
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2 This chapter previously published as: Flemming, T. M., Beran, M. J., & Washburn, D. A. 
(2007). Disconnect in concept learning by rhesus monkeys: Judgment of relations and relations-
between-relations.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33, 55-63. 
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Not all concepts are equal. In his learning-intelligence hierarchy, Thomas (1980) placed 
conceptual abilities in the final three levels of an increasingly complex eight-level ordinal scale. 
At the bottom of the conceptual part of the continuum lies the ability to make class distinctions 
based on physical similarities, a skill present in many nonhuman animals. At the other end of this 
spectrum lies the capability to act on class distinctions based not on physical or functional 
similarities, but on relations-between-relations that form the necessary foundation for analogical 
reasoning.  
Today, there is little debate over whether nonhuman animals exhibit at least basic 
conceptual abilities. But, how far are animals able to abstract these conceptual abilities in order 
to apply them to novel situations?  This range of potential conceptual abilities has been 
extensively investigated for several species of the animal kingdom (Herrnstein, 1990), with 
mixed results.  Many animals transfer learned discriminative performances to novel stimuli in 
tasks assessing identity matching and sameness/difference, which is the focus of the present 
article (e.g, Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Burdyn & Thomas, 1984; Cook, Katz, & Cavoto, 1997; 
Cook, Wright, & Kendrick, 1990; Herman, Hovancik, Gory, & Bradshaw, 1989; Hernnstein, 
1990; Pepperberg, 1987; Wasserman, Frank, & Young, 2002; Wasserman, Young, & Fagot, 
2001; Wright, 1991, 1997; Wright & Katz, 2006; Wright, Rivera, & Katz, 2003; Zentall, 
Edwards, Moore, & Hogan, 1981).  However, there is one conceptual task for which some 
researchers propose a major difference in the abilities of some animals and those of others.  
Premack (1983) argued that chimpanzees were unique in their ability to reason analogically, the 
highest degree of abstract conceptualization (and the highest level of Thomas’s (1980) learning-
intelligence hierarchy). In an analogy, a relationship must be established between the first two 
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elements in a series.  Then, and only then, can one observe the second set of elements and seek 
the same relation between them. By discriminating between two abstract relations, one is able to 
acquire the knowledge needed to complete and construct analogies, much like the chimpanzee 
Sarah did (Gillian, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981). Sarah was given a variety of analogical 
reasoning problems using arrays of meaningful plastic chips of different colors and shapes. Two 
tangible plastic objects that varied on one dimension (color, shape, or size) were placed to the 
left of a center chip that signified same.  To the right of the same symbol was placed only one 
object. The task thus required the chimpanzee to perceive the relationship between the shapes on 
the left and recreate its analog to the right of the center chip.  
Oden, Thompson, and Premack (2001) revisited analogical reasoning tests with Sarah in 
which she had to complete partial analogies from up to three alternatives and also construct 
analogical relations by placing geometric forms from a randomized group of up to five 
alternatives onto an initially empty canvas.  Sarah showed evidence for the acquisition of 
analogical reasoning skills, and she proved capable of seeking out unspecified relations, followed 
by judging their analogical equivalence. 
One task that mimics the use of analogies is the relational matching-to-sample paradigm 
in which subjects judge the relation between the items in a sample pair (either same or different) 
and select the choice pair in which the items are related in the same way. An example is a 
situation in which one learns “if AA, choose BB, not CD; if AB, choose CD, not EE.” Successful 
performance on a relational matching-to-sample task provides the necessary evidence that an 
animal has the most heightened degree of abstract conceptualization.  Evidence from a select few 
chimpanzees with specialized token and/or symbol training suggests that abstract 
  59 
 
conceptualization may not be a unique hallmark of human intelligence (Thompson, Oden, & 
Boysen, 1997).  
Fagot, Wasserman, and Young (2001) investigated whether baboons could discriminate 
same from different by judging relations-between-relations in a delayed relational matching-to-
sample task (RMTS). One 16-item array appeared on the computer screen as the sample, 
followed by a short delay and the presentation of two choice arrays, with only one of the choice 
arrays being of the same relational type as the sample. Two baboons successfully learned to 
perform the task by picking the choice display that involved the same relation among the icons 
(same or different) as in the sample display. However, performance deteriorated as the number of 
items in the arrays was decreased.  The performance decrement that occurred when the number 
of items in the arrays was reduced was asymmetrical, with performance on "same" trials 
remaining high regardless of icon number, whereas performance on "different" trials decreased 
with decreasing numbers of icons. Importantly, the task was still entropy-dependent, meaning 
that while matching the relation-between-relations, the judgments were based more on a 
perceptual sense of the arrays, rather than a cognitive concept same versus different. In other 
words, baboons perceived the amount of perceptual variance to be greater in different arrays than 
in same arrays.   
To date, no monkey species has been able to judge the relation between relations of pairs 
of stimuli at a level comparable to that of chimpanzees. It is often hypothesized that monkeys’ 
abilities lie lower on the conceptual continuum (Thompson & Oden, 1996; Thompson & Oden, 
2000; Thompson, 1995; Premack, 1983; Premack & Premack, 2003), and evidence pertaining to 
their relational matching abilities is limited.  As proposed by Thompson and Oden (2000), the 
monkey is best described as “paleological” meaning that it accepts identity based only upon 
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physical attributes, whereas the chimpanzee is “analogical” referring to its abilities to judge 
relations-between-relations.  
Thompson et al. (1997) hypothesized that the judgment of relations-between-relations is 
made possible by an animal’s representational capacity to re-encode abstract relations into 
iconically equivalent symbols. It should follow then, that symbol training produces a system for 
universal computation. Thus, the critical role of the tokens used with some symbol competent 
animals is to provide the animals with a concrete icon for encoding a propositional representation 
that is otherwise abstract. In the context of abstract relational matching-to-sample, the token may 
“objectify” a relationship or have the retrieval function of a word (Thompson et al., 1997). 
Thompson et al. (1997) also suggested that conceptual-relational matching is akin to covert 
symbol matching.  
To examine further the role of symbolic representation in conceptual reasoning, 
Thompson et al. (1997) presented language-naïve chimpanzees with a conceptual matching-to-
sample task. After being familiarized with a physical matching-to-sample task, five adult 
chimpanzees viewed pairs of random three-dimensional objects as samples to be matched to two-
dimensional choice stimuli presented on a touchscreen monitor. The goal was to indicate the 
choice pair that conveyed the same relation between the objects as the sample pair.  Four of five 
chimpanzees spontaneously judged the conceptual equivalence of relations-between-relations. 
The fifth chimpanzee differed in his learning history; he was naïve with respect to numerical 
problem solving tasks and had no symbolic token training. Therefore, it seems that these tokens 
may have had a functional role in the acquisition of abstract concepts.   
To summarize, a disconnect in concept learning exists between the analogical 
chimpanzee and the paleological monkey.  Although Fagot et al. (2001) reported relational 
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matching, stimulus sets had large numbers of elements, suggesting that entropy played a role in 
such performance.  We know that monkeys can respond to the sameness or difference of pairs of 
elements.  They do so when taught to pick an element that is the same as or different from a 
sample (e.g., Washburn, Rumbaugh, & Richardson, 1992), to make a response indicating 
sameness or difference in a pair of elements (e.g., Bhatt & Wright, 1992), or in response to a cue 
to choose sameness or difference (e.g., Burdyn & Thomas, 1984).  They do not, however, look at 
a pair of stimuli and note the relation between those stimuli as the relevant cue for which 
response to make to two other pairs of stimuli (one having identical elements and the other 
different elements).  This inability of monkeys to perform relational matching compared to the 
success reported for chimpanzees is a striking cognitive discontinuity given the general finding 
of shared cognitive capacities between apes and monkeys (albeit with apes sometimes 
performing quantitatively better than monkeys on specific tasks; Thompson et al. 1997).   
In an attempt to examine the nature of the relation-between-relations paradigm further, and to 
build on the successes of other research programs that have incorporated various features into 
conceptual tasks (e.g., entropy measures, discriminative cues), we presented rhesus monkeys 
(Macaca mulatta) with a series of same-different tasks. We sought ultimately to answer the 
question of why monkeys fail in a relational matching paradigm. Might there be task-related 
hurdles to overcome? Might monkeys first attempt a more procedural strategy that must in some 
way be circumvented methodologically? Might their concepts be more entropy-dependent? 
Might they require a discriminative cue or symbol-based training?  Through a progressive series 
of computerized tasks, we tested many of the above possibilities in an attempt to outline the 
meaningful failures that ultimately lead to failure by rhesus monkeys in the relational matching-
to-sample paradigm. 
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Experiment 1 
Before participating in Experiment 1, all monkeys were presented with a series of 
preliminary training tasks. It was their failure on these that led to the design of Experiment 1.  
Those tasks are outlined briefly.  Monkeys first failed to learn a computerized relational 
matching-to-sample (RMTS) task using trial-unique stimuli.  This was not unexpected given the 
lack of evidence to date for such skills in monkeys.  Next, we provided the monkeys with an 
easier task using a two-choice discrimination paradigm (removing any and all analogical 
components) in which pairs of identical and non-identical images were displayed.  The rewarded 
relation between the two stimuli (same or different) was designated at the beginning of a testing 
session, and animals needed to repeatedly choose that relation. However, the monkeys still failed 
on this task.  This suggested that perhaps they may have had difficulty perceiving and processing 
the pairs as consisting of two distinct elements. That is, they may have seen the pairs as one 
conglomerate of information, rather than two distinct images (whether physically the same or 
different) joined together to form a pair. Displays of eight clipart images then replaced the two-
element pairs we had previously used.   
The monkeys successfully completed this 2-choice discrimination task with arrays of 8 
images each: indeed within the first testing session of 500 trials, all animals achieved the 80% 
criterion that we had established. However, something interesting occurred after this initial 
successful session.  Although all monkeys succeeded in meeting criterion for the initial rewarded 
relation (no matter whether that relation was same or different) they then perseverated and never 
exceeded chance levels after the rewarded relation was reversed.  For example, if the computer 
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program randomly assigned same as the first S+, monkeys learned this discrimination by 
consistently choosing the stimulus set that included 8 identical items. However, after reaching 
criterion, different was rewarded, but the monkeys never learned to make that response. Instead, 
they continued to choose same for hundreds of trials after the reversal. Therefore, the entropy 
manipulation was successful in establishing initial same/different relational judgments, but we 
still were faced with finding a way to indicate on a block-by-block (or more ideally, a trial-by-
trial) basis which of the two relations was the S+.   
To aid in S+ reversal learning, discriminative cues are often used in similar paradigms to 
indicate which rule must be followed (Riopelle & Copelan, 1954; Burdyn & Thomas, 1984). In 
Experiment 1, we gave the monkeys a cue to indicate whether they needed to “choose same” or 
“choose different.” In order to convey this information, background colors were assigned to each 
relation type. These cues provided the relevant information the monkeys needed in order to 
discriminate the S+.  When the monkeys succeeded with arrays of 8 elements using these 
discriminative cues, we reduced the number of elements to investigate further the role of entropy 
(e.g. Young & Wasserman, 1997) in this performance.   
Method 
Subjects.  In all experiments, five male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) individually 
housed at Georgia State University’s Language Research Center in Atlanta, GA served as 
subjects.  The animals were Murph (age 10 years), Lou (age 10 years), Willie (age 18 years), 
Gale (age 20 years) and Hank (age 20 years).  These animals had extensive testing histories in 
which they responded via joystick movement to computer-generated stimuli presented on a 
monitor (Richardson, Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990).  All 
monkeys were familiar with, and proficient at completing, computerized matching-to-sample 
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(MTS) and delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) tasks in which choice stimuli were exact 
replicas of sample stimuli (e.g., Washburn et al., 1992).  
The monkeys were not food or water deprived during the course of the study, and they 
had continuous access to the computerized programs for blocks of time ranging from 4 hours to 
24 hours.  Therefore, they produced varying numbers of trials across sessions dependent on how 
long they were presented with the task.  During this time, the computer program controlled 
reward delivery and trial presentation. 
Apparatus.  The Language Research Center’s Computerized Test System (LRC-CTS) 
consists of an IBM-compatible desktop personal computer (described in Richardson et al., 1990, 
and Washburn et al., 1992). Each animal had access to its own testing station.  During tasks, 
monkeys controlled a cursor on a 17-inch SVGA monitor via a vertically mounted joystick. The 
monitor was positioned approximately 24 cm from their home cage behind a transparent Lexan 
plate. Speakers provided sound feedback for all tasks, including a low buzzing sound for 
incorrect responses and an increasing crescendo sound for correct responses. These sounds have 
been paired with these outcomes on many previous tasks.  For the current tasks, the increasing 
crescendo sound was always accompanied by the dispensing of a single 94-mg banana-flavored 
pellet. This same apparatus was used throughout all experiments. 
Design and Procedure.  Each monkey was tested while individually housed in its home 
cage.  On each trial, two sets of 8 clipart images (3 cm x 3 cm) were displayed: one set of 
physically identical objects and one pair in which each object was physically distinct.  These 
images were commercially available clipart images.  Arrays were located on the top and bottom 
of the computer screen, with the location of same and different pairs being randomly determined 
on each trial (see Figure 2.1).  
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Discriminative cues indicated to the monkeys which of the two relations (same or 
different) was the correct choice on a given trial.  These cues took the form of screen background 
colors.  If the background was colored pink, the correct response was to select the set with all 
identical elements.  If the background was colored black, the correct response was to select the 
set with all different elements.  Monkeys were required to move a cursor (via their joysticks) into 
contact with one of the arrays by touching any area in that section of the monitor (i.e., the top or 
the bottom). If the contacted array was correct (S+), a banana-flavored pellet was dispensed, 
followed by an increasing crescendo sound. If the contacted array was incorrect, no pellet was 
dispensed, and a low buzzing sound was played. Inter-trial intervals of 2 seconds (correct 
choices) and 15 seconds (incorrect choices) were imposed. This same reward/nonreward system 
remained consistent throughout all phases of this experiment.  
During Phase 1, the background color (and the rewarded relation) remained the same 
until the monkeys met a criterion of 80% correct for the most recent 50 trials.  A new rewarded 
relation then was randomly selected, and the background color changed accordingly.  This meant 
that sometimes the rewarded relation was reversed after criterion was met (e.g., from same to 
different) and other times it remained the same (e.g., remaining as same).     
Because all monkeys rapidly achieved criterion, and shifted their responses with shifts in 
the rewarded relation from the outset unlike in the pilot tests, we removed the consistency of the 
rewarded relation in Phase 2.  During Phase 2, the computer program randomly chose a rewarded 
relation on each trial, with an attendant shift in the background color to match the rewarded 
relation.  This meant that each trial offered a new cue as to the correct response, as well as new 
stimuli drawn randomly from the set of 500 items.  It is important to note that there was no way 
for any one stimulus to consistently appear as a member of same pairs or different pairs.  This 
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ensured that the animals could not learn anything about particular stimuli and how to respond to 
those stimuli (i.e., item-specific learning was controlled). 
During Phase 3, we gradually reduced the numbers of elements in each set.  First, the set 
was reduced to 6 elements, then to 4 elements, and finally to 2 elements.  Each reduction 
occurred after a monkey met a criterion of 80% correct over the last 200 trials.  During this 
phase, the rewarded relation was randomly determined on each trial as in Phase 2.   
Results 
As noted, all monkeys rapidly learned to select the correct relation in Phase 1.  All 
monkeys completed approximately 500 trials, with an average accuracy of 78.8% (Murph z = 
14.93, Lou z = 13.24, Willie z = 9.84, Gale z =13.68, Hank z = 12.70, ps < .01).  In Phase 2, the 
monkeys continued to perform at high levels (see Figure 2.2).  In Phase 2, each monkey (Murph, 
Lou, Willie, Gale, and Hank) selected the rewarded relation significantly more often than 
expected by chance on its first 1,000 trials (z = 19.22, z = 16.94, z = 22.89, z =18.72, z = 19.73, 
ps < .01, respectively).  Within the first 500 trials of Phase 3, each monkey selected the rewarded 
relation with 6-item sets at levels reliably higher than the 50% value expected by chance (z = 
16.19, z = 14.31, z = 18.33, z =14.58, z = 16.99, ps < .01, respectively). After the transition to 4-
item arrays, selection of the rewarded relation again exceeded chance levels for all monkeys (z = 
14.04, z = 12.16, z = 13.41, z =12.70, z = 14.22, ps < .01, respectively). When sets were reduced 
to 2 element pairs, 1,000 trials were required by each animal in order to reach criterion.  
Nonetheless, all five monkeys produced accuracy scores that differed significantly from the 50% 
expected by chance (z = 19.66, z = 21.69, z = 17.20, z =20.42, z = 18.28, ps < .01, respectively).  
To further ensure that the monkeys had not learned equivalence classes based on the 
identity of the stimuli themselves, we conducted transfer tests with novel stimuli for Phase 4 of 
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Experiment 1 (as well as Experiment 2). These transfer tests, conducted almost one year after the 
original studies were completed, were encouraging as evidence that the concepts of same and 
different were learned and that we did not need to consider item-specific learning as an 
explanation of the monkeys’ behavior. 
In transfer tests, a set of 1000 completely novel clipart images replaced the previous pool. 
All methods were identical to those in Experiment 1, with one adaptation. Stimuli were drawn 
randomly to compose pairs for each trial, as in Experiment 1. However, rather than remaining 
available for random selection in subsequent trials, the image file was discarded after being used 
once in one trial. Therefore, after an image was used in a stimulus display, it was never seen 
again in any subsequent trials, including those in transfer tests for Experiment 2. 
In transfer tests, two monkeys were tested with novel sets of stimuli and performed at 
levels reliably higher than the 50% value expected by chance within the first 225 trials. Murph 
completed 91.1% of 225 trials correctly (z = 12.33, p < .01). Gale performed 88.9% of 225 
transfer trials correctly (z = 11.67, p < .01). 
Addressing the possibility of asymmetric performance on same versus different trials, we 
conducted a post-hoc analysis examining levels of performance for all same trials and for all 
different trials. For Phase 1, performance did not differ between same trials and different trials, 
Murph χ2 (1, 1000) = 1.35, p > .05). Likewise, in phases 2-4, symmetrical performance was 
observed on same versus different trials (6 items, χ2 (1, 500) = 1.29, p > .05; 4 items, χ2 (1, 500) 
= 0.66, p > .05; 2 items, χ2 (1, 1000) = 0.39, p > .05).  For all other monkeys, asymmetric 
performance was not observed in any phase, p > .05.  
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Discussion 
Discriminative cues produced a substantial improvement in relational conceptual 
responding in these monkeys.  When given cues as to which relation would be rewarded, 
monkeys learned to transfer from choosing same sets to different sets, and the perseverative 
errors from the pilot studies disappeared.  Additionally, these cues provided scaffolding for the 
eventual reduction of the number of elements in the sets back to a level where the monkey now 
could respond on a trial-by-trial basis to either sameness or difference between 2-item arrays.  
Their performance was high, and they clearly now discerned the relation between only two 
elements on the screen.   Unlike the performance of baboons (Fagot et al., 2001), these rhesus 
monkeys were not constrained by entropy in their final performance in discrimination of sets of 
elements on the basis of the relation of those elements to each other.  However, entropy may 
have facilitated learning the task rules.  
Rather than concluding that the monkeys in our study show evidence of an abstract 
concept of relational sameness (or difference), we should consider another approach to solving 
the task. Thompson and Oden (2000) suggested that a monkey could solve this task purely by 
applying a single physical matching operation. Given that one cue is present, the correct response 
would be to choose the set in which one item physically matches the other (A is A).  Likewise, in 
the presence of another cue, the correct response would be to choose the other set (implying no 
conceptual knowledge of difference).  This type of strategy would allow monkeys to succeed on 
the task without knowledge of conceptual relations between stimuli.  Thompson and Oden 
(2000) suggested that an organism that understands conceptual relations must also be able to 
abstractly recode those relations so that they can be applied in different experimental paradigms.  
For example, if the monkeys in the present study understand sameness and difference, they 
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should also be able to examine a single pair of stimuli, encode the relation between those stimuli, 
and label that relation in some way.  Given that we had integrated discriminative cues into the 
paradigm, we believed that those cues might come to operate as the necessary labels that would 
allow the monkeys to report the relation between pairs of stimuli.  If those color cues did come to 
operate at some level as indicators of the abstract concepts of sameness and difference, then 
perhaps the cues could operate in a bi-directional manner akin to that reported for chimpanzees 
in symbol acquisition projects (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986).  This bi-directionality might 
approach the level of symbolic representation argued to be so important in providing animals 
with a concrete icon for encoding a propositional representation that is otherwise abstract (Gillan 
et al., 1981).  In Experiment 2, we assessed whether these color cues would operate in a bi-
directional manner as labels for relation concepts. 
Experiment 2  
 The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate further the nature of the discriminative cues 
assigned to the concepts of same and different. Given that the colors served as discriminative 
cues to choose either the pair exemplifying the concept of same or the concept of different for 
the monkeys, we asked whether the monkeys would choose the correct color in the presence of 
either a relation of sameness or difference.  If they would, this would indicate that the cues 
operated as labels or perhaps at a level similar to that of the symbols and tokens that have been 
learned by chimpanzees (e.g. Gillian et al., 1981; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986). 
Method 
Participants and Apparatus.  The same five monkeys participated, using the same 
computerized apparatus. 
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Design and Procedure.  In this variation of the task, two clipart stimuli were presented at 
the top of the screen.  They were either identical or non-identical, and this relation was randomly 
determined on each trial.  The monkeys first had to contact that pair of stimuli with the cursor.  
Next, two colored squares appeared in the bottom corners of the monitor.  One square was pink, 
and the other was black, and their positions (left or right) were randomly determined on each 
trial.  If the stimuli at the top of the screen were identical, the correct response was the pink 
square.  If the stimuli at the top of the screen were non-identical, the correct response was the 
black square (see Figure 2.3 for examples of each trial type).  At a functional level, monkeys 
were presented with trials produced by the following if-then statements: “if same, then pink is 
correct” and “if different, then black is correct.”  
 As in previous experiments, moving the cursor into contact with the correct colored 
square corresponding to the sample relation resulted in the automatic delivery of a 94-mg 
banana-flavored pellet, an increasing-crescendo sound, and a 2 s ITI. Choosing the incorrect 
color block, however, resulted in no pellet reward, a low buzzing sound, and a 7 s penalty ITI. 
Results 
In the first block of 100 trials, two monkeys (Murph and Gale) were 81% and 78% 
correct (z = 6.2, z = 5.6, ps < .01). The remaining three monkeys (Lou, Willie, and Hank) 
performed at chance (50%) levels for over 1,000 trials (z = 1.65, p = .10; z = 1.20, p = .23; z = -
.25, p = .80, respectively).  Although more than 1,000 trials might have led to the monkeys 
learning the association, this would not be indicative that the cues functioned as symbols but that 
they were relearned as part of the procedural rules of the present task, so the task was 
discontinued.  
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To discount the possibility of item-specific associative learning, transfer tests of 
Experiment 2 were carried out with novel stimuli. Like the replications for Experiment 1, we 
used a set of 1000 completely novel clipart images that were discarded after use in one stimulus 
display. On the first 100 trials (completed directly following the transfer tests conducted a year 
after Experiment 1) the two monkeys tested performed at levels significantly above the 50% 
expected by chance. Murph completed 94% (z = 8.80, p < .01) of the first 100 trials correctly; 
Gale completed 89% (z = 7.80 p < .01) of the first 100 trials correctly. See Figure 2.4. 
Discussion 
 Two monkeys matched the color cues to abstract relations between stimuli, in essence 
labeling those relations.  One could argue that the color cues may also function as symbols, at 
least in a limited sense. Not only did monkeys correctly choose the relational pair in the presence 
of the color, but they also correctly chose the color itself in the presence of the relational pair.  
 Symmetrical treatment of a relational pair and a discriminative cue would indicate that an 
individual has recoded the relational properties of the stimuli (Thompson & Oden, 2000). 
Successive presentations of the abstract relations should then evoke representations of these 
symbols. These evoked representations, then, should permit an individual to explicitly judge 
what would otherwise be only perceptually implicit (Thompson et al., 1997). That is, recoded 
relational knowledge should allow an individual to complete a relational matching task.  To see 
whether this might now be true in this group of animals, we returned the animals to the RMTS 
task.   
Experiment 3 
Although Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated various aspects of same/different knowledge 
in rhesus monkeys, we had not shown that they passed the “relations-between-relations” 
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paradigm set forth in the relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task. We speculated that after 
having the opportunity to learn the concepts of same and different through the use of entropy and 
acquiring a symbol-like system for the concepts themselves, monkeys now may be successful on 
such a task. Given that monkeys clearly judged sameness and difference in a way congruous to 
humans with pairs of items (Experiment 1), relational matching with pairs of objects should be 
within the realm of possibility for these animals.   
Method 
Participants and Apparatus.  The same five monkeys participated, using the same 
computerized apparatus. 
Design and Procedure.  In this task, the monkeys moved the cursor into contact with the 
sample in the top center of the screen.  This sample consisted of either two identical clipart 
stimuli or two different clipart stimuli, AA or CD.  When the sample was contacted, two 
additional pairs of choice stimuli appeared on the left and right sides of the monitor.  One pair 
contained two identical stimuli and the other contained two different stimuli, EE or FG (both 
comparison stimulus pairs contained stimuli different from those in the sample pair).  The two 
pairs were randomly assigned to the left and right positions on each trial. Selection of the choice 
pair matching the relation of the sample (same or different) led to food reward whereas selection 
of the choice pair that did not match the sample led to no food and a timeout period as in the 
previous experiments. 
Results and Discussion 
 None of the five monkeys (Murph, Lou, Willie, Gale, and Hank) completed the task at 
levels significantly better than chance (50%) after more than 10,000 trials. In addition, no 
changes in performance over time were observed. The accuracy scores for the final 1,000 trials 
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did not differ significantly from the value predicted by chance (z = 1.39, p = .16; z = .44, p = .65; 
z = -.14, p = .16; z = -1.34, p = .14; z = .70, p = .49, respectively).  
General Discussion 
 After several demonstrations of conceptual knowledge, monkeys still seem to lack the 
analogical reasoning skills necessary to complete the RMTS task successfully. Monkeys are able 
to perceive the relational concepts of same and different within pairs of items. Furthermore, 2 
monkeys successfully labeled the identically- or nonidentically-related pairs, suggesting that they 
mentally represented the concepts symbolically. With the ability to recode the concepts, we 
might expect the animals to pass the relation-between-relations paradigm (Thompson & Oden, 
2000). They did not, however, leaving us with the same disconnect between the analogical 
reasoning skills of chimpanzees (Premack, 1983; Thompson et al., 1997) and the apparent lack 
of such skills in monkeys when such reasoning is applied in judgments of pairs of stimuli.  
 This disconnect is not unique to nonhuman animals.  Gentner (2003) presented an explicit 
analogical reasoning task to 3- and 5-year-old children. Three-year-olds, thought to lack the 
capacity to referentially label real world objects, failed the reasoning task. Five-year-olds, who 
demonstrated understanding and use of labels, completed the task with no difficulty. However, 
when aided by the presence of labels, 3-year-olds successfully completed the analogical 
reasoning task. Immediately, their performance increased to a level comparable to that of the 5-
year-olds, suggesting that labels play a critical role in relational matching. This pattern is similar 
to that observed in symbolically and non-symbolically trained chimpanzees (Thompson et al., 
1997) as well as in other developmental studies with children (e.g., Ratterman & Gentner, 1998). 
 The RMTS task presented to our rhesus monkeys has a number of methodological 
components that may cause failure. The first of these is a constantly changing rule from one trial 
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to the next. In the RMTS paradigm, relational knowledge must be gleaned at the onset of every 
trial and applied only to the immediately presented trial. In essence, the rule may change on 
every trial unlike a standard matching-to-sample paradigm where the rule remains constant 
across all trials within a testing session even as the stimuli change. Macaques may be more 
procedurally rule-bound than chimpanzees (Thompson & Oden, 2000), making the task more 
difficult when rules change so frequently.  In our study, keeping the rule constant led to 
improved (although still restricted) conceptual responding during the early experiments, and yet 
the monkeys were successful with discriminative cues and pairs of stimuli when the rule changed 
on a trial-by-trial basis.     
Because the monkeys initially demonstrated a difficulty in extracting relational 
knowledge from a pair of same or differently related clipart images, we presented the monkeys 
with larger arrays to include an entropy component that may play a role in the discrimination of 
same from different (e.g., Wasserman et al., 2001).  Relations became instantly perceptible with 
the introduction of 8-object arrays. Initially, these results led us to believe that rhesus monkeys, 
much like baboons or pigeons, relied heavily on the amount of variety within a display in order 
to determine same from different.  However, our monkeys showed perseverative errors even with 
this entropy component, suggesting that more information was needed beyond just greater 
variability in the arrays.  In Experiment 1, with the advent of a discriminative cue presented to 
facilitate rule-switching, monkeys began to respond to the relations between arrays even with 
trial-by-trial shifts in the rewarded relation and a decrease in the number of elements back down 
to the critical 2-element pairs.  Unlike with baboons and pigeons, decreasing the number of icons 
in the displays did not affect rhesus monkeys’ ability to judge same from different. We believe 
that, rather than relying on the variety of a display as a means on which to base same/different 
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judgments, rhesus monkeys need only to use entropy in order to initially perceive same and 
different. Perhaps monkeys extract no relational information from pairs until being prompted by 
entropy-infused displays, at which time, the discrimination rule becomes generalizable to 
displays of any size. Given that success in Experiment 1 was dependent upon first experiencing 
the task with 8-item arrays, conceptual knowledge may better be described as a “uniformity 
versus chaos” distinction which quickly generalizes to a “same versus different” distinction in 
the way that we more broadly conceive it, although other researchers have found conceptual 
same/different distinctions with pigeons and great apes beginning with pairs of items, while 
skipping the entropy-infused phases (Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Edwards et al., 1974, Katz & 
Wright, 2006; Vonk, 2003). 
Experiment 1 also indicated the facilitative role of discriminative cues. As in Burdyn and 
Thomas’ (1984) study, monkeys in our study utilized such cues to control responding on the 
basis of the relation between stimuli. Further, in Experiment 2, we observed the bi-directional 
nature of this cue in two of five monkeys by requiring the monkeys to label presented relations 
with stimuli that shared perceptual features with the discriminative cues.  Those two monkeys 
immediately used the colored squares in an appropriate, and symbol-like, manner.  With this 
symmetrical-like function, the cues now may operate similarly to the tokens used by some 
chimpanzees.  Supporting this contention that these stimuli can act as symbols, two monkeys 
performed at high levels right from the outset of the transfer tests, despite the delay of almost a 
year during which time they were not exposed to the tasks.  And, the monkeys performed well 
both in using those colored stimuli as cues to the rewarded relation as well as labels for presented 
relations.  This suggests a symbolic aspect emerged from the integration of these cues into the 
series of tasks, with the symbols operating as representations of the concepts same and different.  
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If those stimuli do function as symbols, one should expect them to provide the necessary mental 
representations that manifest in successful judgments of relations between relations in 
chimpanzees (Premack & Premack, 2003; Thompson & Oden, 2000), yet clearly those 
judgments do not occur.  Therefore, although bidirectionality was present in these two monkeys, 
elevating these cues to the level of symbols may be premature. 
A distinction in the conceptual abilities of chimpanzees and monkeys has been imposed 
on the basis of their ability to label relations (Thompson & Oden, 2000). Previously, little 
evidence supported labeling by monkeys.  Our monkeys could label abstract relations of 
sameness and difference, but they still failed to match those relations.  If success on the RMTS 
task is not contingent on labeling related pairs of stimuli with symbols or tokens (Thompson & 
Oden, 2000), what is it contingent upon?  Likely, success on the RMTS task is not solely 
contingent upon being able to label related pairs of stimuli with symbols or tokens. 
Some capuchin monkeys have been shown to succeed on a spatial RMTS task (Spinozzi, et al., 
2004). In spatial RMTS, capuchins matched the relations above and below. Importantly, these 
relations were not contingent upon the physical identity/nonidentity concept, but rather the 
spatial organization of one item in relation to another. Moreover, stimuli components were 
physically the same in samples and both matches (e.g. if a star appeared above a horizontal line 
in the sample, choice relations consisted of differently positioned stars above and below 
horizontal lines). 
The sample in the RMTS task consists of two elements that could be recoded on the basis 
of their relation to each other. However, something prevents monkeys from recoding these 
elements in such a way that the representation is useful when having to find a pair of visually 
different but relationally identical elements. Perhaps there exists a qualitatively larger difference 
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between perceptual and conceptual strategies for rhesus monkeys than for humans and perhaps 
chimpanzees. That is, in a matching-to-sample format, perceptual processes may dominate 
conceptual judgments, preventing monkeys from using the relevant information in a stimulus 
pair.  As we observed in the pilot studies and in Experiment 1, conceptual strategies can emerge 
through the use of discriminative cues and entropy-infused displays that overcome the 
dominance of perceptual based responding.  In a matching-to-sample format, however, attending 
to configural patterns and physical elements may be dominant to use of concepts for rhesus 
monkeys as is observed in pigeons (Wright, 1997). 
In sum, the present study provides evidence that monkeys do possess conceptual 
knowledge of the identity/nonidentity relations that is not entirely dependent on entropy-infused 
displays and that these relations can be symbolically recoded.  However, even with this 
experience, monkeys still failed the RMTS task, lending support to the hypothesis that monkeys 
are not conceptually driven to the same extent as humans and chimpanzees.  Data have yet to 
reveal why it is that such relational matching fails to emerge for monkeys as it evidently does for 
other species.  We expect that continued methodological variations and differential experiences 
with concept formation tasks will shed some light on this disconnect, perhaps toward the end of 
finally demonstrating relational matching by monkeys. 
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Figure 2.1. Trials from the two-choice paradigm completed by monkeys in Experiment 1. Trials 
exemplified are those in which monkeys discriminated between rows of four or two clipart 
images. Background colors served as discriminative cues (i.e. black background = different S+; 
pink (lighter grey in this reproduction) = same S+). 
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Figure 2.2. Percentage of trials correct for all trial types (arrays composed of 8, 6, 4, and 2 
images) presented in Phases 2 and 3 of Experiment 1. Horizontal line represents chance 
performance. 
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Figure 2.3. Exemplary trials from Experiment 2. In this matching-to-sample (MTS) paradigm, 
choices consisted of color blocks used as discriminative cues in Experiment 1. In the presence of 
the same sample pair (A), correct response = pink (lighter grey in this reproduction). In the 
presence of a different sample pair (B), correct response = black. 
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Figure 2.4. Percentage of trials correct on discriminative cue transfer testing presented in 
Experiment 2. Horizontal line represents chance performance.  
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Chapter 3: Conceptual thresholds for same and different in old-(Macaca mulatta) and 
new-world (Cebus apella) monkeys3 
 
Abstract 
Learning of the relational same/different (S/D) concept has been demonstrated to be 
largely dependent upon stimulus sets containing more than two items for pigeons and old-world 
monkeys. In the present study, we investigate the threshold at which a new world primate, the 
capuchin (Cebus apella) may be able to make such a discrimination. Utilizing a method of 
increasing entropy, rather than conventional procedures of decreasing entropy, we demonstrate 
unique evidence that capuchin monkeys are capable of making 2-item relational S/D conditional 
discriminations. In another experiment, we examine the supposed level of difficulty in making 
S/D discriminations by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Whereas pigeons and baboons have 
shown marked difficulty discriminating same from different arrays at all when composed of less 
than 8 items each, rhesus monkeys seem to understand that pairs of stimuli connote sameness 
and difference just the same (Flemming et al., 2007). With sustained accurate performance of 2-
item S/D discriminations, both experienced and task-naïve rhesus monkeys appear quite 
‘comfortable’ in their conceptual knowledge of same and different. We conclude that learning of 
the same/different relational concept may be less “entropy-important” than originally 
hypothesized for nonhuman primates. 
Keywords: abstract concept; Cebus apella; concept learning; Macaca mulatta; monkey; 
same/different                                                         3 This chapter submitted for publication as: Flemming, T. M. Conceptual thresholds for same and 
different in old-(Macaca mulatta) and new-world (Cebus apella) monkeys. Behavioural 
Processes.  
  89 
 
The judgment of relational concepts of identity and nonidentity (same vs. different) has 
proven difficult for several nonhuman animal species from pigeons to chimpanzees (e.g., Fagot, 
Wasserman & Young, 2001; Flemming, Beran & Washburn, 2007; Thompson & Oden, 1996; 
Vonk, 2003; Wasserman, Frank & Young, 2002; Wright & Katz, 2006; Young & Wasserman, 
1997). Classification of items as the same or different from one another requires a level of 
abstraction (and perhaps abstract representation) beyond that which one might need for other 
types of concept formation.  
Relational concepts, such as same/different and above/below involve a comparison of the 
relationship between (or among) two or more objects. These concepts thus do not depend on any 
absolute perceptual properties of stimuli (Zentall, Wasserman, Lazareva, Thompson & 
Rattermann, 2008), but rather are entirely based on the instantiation of the relation between or 
amongst them. Unlike most natural concepts, relational concepts are abstract in that classification 
based upon shared physical features of stimuli is impossible (Katz & Wright, 2006). 
 Judgments of identity and nonidentity are not entirely disparate from matching or non-
matching to sample paradigm, but involve an additional level of assessment and computation. In 
a matching-to-sample (MTS) paradigm, subjects make one such equivalence computation 
(Thompson & Oden, 1996). In a same/different (S/D) discrimination task (make responses to 
identity but not nonidentity), one can use a similar singular equivalence computation. Finally, in 
a conditional S/D discrimination task wherein the subject makes responses to both identity and 
nonidentity based on specific discriminative cues present, two separate cognitive computations 
(one for identity and one for nonidentity) are required (Burdyn & Thomas, 1984). These 
computations, however, are no more complex individually as those utilized for matching to 
sample. 
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While the matching of specific stimulus features in common is not a viable strategy in 
abstract concept learning, perception has been shown to play an integral role. In one of the first 
demonstrations of the necessity of multiple icon arrays for the learning of the S/D concept, (and 
subsequent transfer to novel stimulus sets) Wasserman, Hugart and Kirkpatrick-Steger (1995) 
presented 16-icons arrays (same = 16 identical images; different = 16 nonidentical images) to 
pigeons (Columbus livius). There was observed relatively more rapid acquisition and stronger 
transfer of the S/D concept with these larger displays. Young & Wasserman (1997) continued 
this investigation by decreasing the number of items in each stimulus array to discover 
incremental depreciating effects on the pigeons’ performance. In addition, pigeons demonstrated 
marked difficulty in discriminating at all displays of less than 8 icons each. Entropy, they report, 
accounted for this variation in performance at each successively lower level. 
While humans (Young & Wasserman, 2001) and great apes (Vonk, 2003) appear less 
sensitive to and certainly not dependent upon entropy of stimulus displays for the extraction of 
conceptual information for identity and oddity, pigeons, baboons and rhesus monkeys are all 
species for which entropy plays a role. Entropy, the amount of variation within a display, is a 
measure of diversity in these relational concepts.  For stimulus-stimulus comparison purposes, it 
is calculated by the number of pieces of information necessary to predict the categorical nature 
of that relational concept (Young & Wasserman, 1997). Thus, all displays of identical images, no 
matter the number have entropy equal to zero. Displays of all nonidentical images have entropy 
that increases on a logarithmic scale as the number of items contained within them increases (i.e. 
2 nonidentical, entropy = 1.0; 4 nonidentical, entropy = 2.0; 6 nonidentical, entropy = 2.5). 
Discrimination tasks involving comparisons of entropy-infused S/D displays often receive 
criticism as subjects may well perceptually detect general orderliness or disorderliness of the 
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display rather than extracting relational-conceptual information, making a two-item S/D 
discrimination (entropy = 0, same vs. entropy = 1, different) the most plausible truly 
“conceptual” strategy.  
Investigations of the role of entropy in nonhuman animal relational S/D concept 
acquisition traditionally involve methods of reduction in the number of stimulus array items to 
discern the point of entropy at which subjects can no longer successfully extract relational 
information. Pigeons appear to be especially sensitive to changes in entropy in the acquisition of 
the S/D concept (e.g. Wasserman & Young, 1997). That pigeons have marked difficulty 
discriminating same from different with low levels of entropy contrast suggests a predisposition 
to attend to perceptual stimulus features over the conceptual. Rather than discriminating displays 
on the basis of their relational identity/nonidentity, pigeons default to a more item-specific 
strategy attending to (and perhaps memorizing large sets of) individual stimulus features 
(Wasserman, Frank & Young, 2002). In addition, pigeons show strong asymmetric preferences 
for learning same displays over different displays (Young & Wasserman, 2002) suggesting only 
partial learning of these concepts. Can it be said that one truly knows same from different if one 
only understands the concept of identity, but not nonidentity? 
Baboons (Papio papio) have also been shown to exhibit sensitivity to entropy in the 
discrimination of same from different visual displays (Wasserman, Young & Fagot, 2001). In a 
pattern much like pigeons, baboons are detrimentally impacted by a reduction in the number of 
icons from 16 in S/D stimulus arrays. One considerable difference in the behavior of baboons 
was that they did not exhibit asymmetric discriminative abilities. Baboons were equally as 
accurate on both same and different trials, indicating that their knowledge of the S/D concept was 
complete, albeit its strong perceptual dependency. 
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Capable of completing 2-item simultaneously presented S/D discriminations, rhesus 
monkeys (Macaca mulatta) utilize entropy quite differently (Flemming et al., 2007). Monkeys 
originally failed a 2-item (paired) S/D discrimination task for more than 10,000 trials. Within the 
first 500 trials of an 8-item S/D discrimination (entropy = 0, same; entropy = 3.0, different), 
rhesus monkeys completed the task successfully, achieving (sometimes greater than) 85% 
accuracy. Flemming et al. (2007) observed no decrement in performance of the rhesus monkeys 
with a reduction in the number of icons from 8 to 2 in the stimulus arrays; that is, immediate, 
spontaneous transfer was observed. In addition, like baboons, rhesus monkeys did not exhibit 
any propensity toward uniformity; their treatment of same and different was symmetric. 
Although monkeys were not initially able to extract conceptual-relational information from 
identical/nonidentical pairs, entropy would seem responsible for their ultimate ability to do so. 
Flemming et al. (2007) concluded that while entropy was certainly vital for early relational S/D 
concept learning, rhesus monkeys unlike both pigeons and baboons were not dependent upon 
entropy in the further employment of the relational rule. 
Recent evidence examining relational concept acquisition in new-world primate species 
provides support for knowledge of same and different on par with old-world species (e.g. 
Spinozzi, Lubrano & Truppa, 2004; Wright & Katz, 2006; Wright, Rivera, Katz & Bachevalier, 
2003). In an attempt to further investigate the conceptual boundaries of their relational concept 
knowledge as well as the nature of entropy in same and different for capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella), the present study utilizes a new methodology of increasing entropy whereby the 
minimum entropy necessary for S/D discriminations can be evaluated. In addition, conceptual 
thresholds, levels of difficulty with which subjects experience discriminations at successively 
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lower levels of entropy, are investigated in the rhesus monkey using a fluid method of entropy 
titration across trials for simultaneous S/D discriminations. 
1.0 Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to further address the role of entropy for capuchins (Cebus 
apella) in which knowledge of same and different are concurrently necessary in a conditional 
discrimination task that flexibly requires comparison of same vs. different relational information 
on a per-trial basis. A two-choice cued discrimination paradigm similar to the methodology of 
Flemming et al. (2007) previously presented to rhesus monkeys was utilized. One important 
difference here was that all capuchins were given the opportunity to complete a two-item (pair) 
discrimination before presenting displays of increased entropy. This experiment is unique in its 
design to increase entropy, rather than in a fashion of decreasing entropy. 
1.1 Method 
1.1.1 Subjects and Apparatus 
Six socially-housed brown tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) age 2 to 18 (3 
female) housed at Georgia State University’s Language Research Center in Atlanta, GA, served 
as subjects in Experiment 1.  For isolated testing, each monkey entered a small box through a 
door attached to the enclosure with access to a vertically-mounted joystick and visual access to a 
computer monitor. All monkeys had very recently completed computer joystick training (Evans, 
Beran, Chan, Klein & Menzel, 2008). The only training experience that monkeys completed 
relevant to the present task was a standard 1 to 1 item physical matching-to-sample task. 
The monkeys were not food or water deprived during the course of the study, and they 
had continuous access to the computerized programs for blocks of time ranging from 2 to 4 
hours.  Therefore, they produced varying numbers of trials (averaging 200) across sessions 
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dependent on how long they were presented with the task.  During this time, the computer 
program controlled reward (45-mg banana-flavored pellet) delivery and trial presentation. 
Speakers provided auditory feedback for all tasks, including a low buzzing sound for incorrect 
responses and an increasing crescendo sound for correct responses. These sounds had been 
paired with these contingencies on several previous tasks.   
1.1.2 Design and Procedure 
Capuchin monkeys completed either one or both of two testing phases in this experiment, 
each including transfer tests, based on their success in the phase 1. Beginning with the smallest 
stimulus relation set (2-item), monkeys completed a second phase beginning with a larger, 
entropy-infused stimulus array (4-item) if failure to achieve criterion in phase 1 was observed.  
On each trial, two sets of clipart images (3 cm x 3 cm) were displayed: one set of 
physically identical objects and one pair in which each object was physically distinct.  These 
images were commercially available clipart images.  All stimulus sets were composed of trial-
unique clipart images; no image was ever duplicated throughout the entire duration of the 
experiment. Arrays were located along the top and bottom edges of the computer screen, with the 
location of same and different pairs being randomly determined on each trial.  
Discriminative cues (background color) indicated to the monkeys which of the two 
relations (same or different) was the correct choice on a given trial allowing for random 
assignment of S+ on every trial. This meant that each trial offered a new cue as to the correct 
response, as well as trial-unique stimuli.  This flexible employment of alternating S+ in addition 
to the comparison between same and different choices concurrently on every given trial is a 
unique methodological innovation for this paradigm adapted from Flemming et al. (2007).  
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In both phases, if the background was colored pink, the correct response was to select the 
set with all identical elements.  Likewise, if the background was colored black, the correct 
response was to select the set with all nonidentical elements.  Monkeys were required to move a 
cursor (via their joysticks) into contact with one of the arrays by touching any area in that section 
of the monitor (i.e., the top or the bottom). If the contacted array was correct (S+), a banana-
flavored pellet was dispensed, followed by an increasing crescendo sound. If the contacted array 
was incorrect, no pellet was dispensed, and a low buzzing sound was played. Inter-trial intervals 
of 5 seconds (correct choices) and 15 seconds (incorrect choices) were imposed. This same 
reward/nonreward system remained consistent throughout all phases of this experiment.  
1.1.3 Phase 1 
Monkeys were first presented with the two-item (pairs of stimuli) two-choice (identical 
versus nonidentical) cued discrimination task. This phase was considered complete when an 
approximate 80% criterion was achieved within a testing session (200 trials). Monkeys then 
completed a transfer test session of 100 trials, again with trial-unique stimuli, to verify accuracy 
in performance. If subjects did not achieve 80% accuracy after 1000 trials in Phase 1, testing 
ended and Phase 2 began. 
1.1.4 Phase 2 
If failure to discriminate same from different 2-item displays occurred in Phase 1, 
monkeys were presented with 4-item [higher entropy, different] displays. All procedures of this 
phase were the same as Phase 1, only the composition of stimulus arrays differed. Monkeys 
began this phase with 4-item stimulus arrays. The training portion of this phase was considered 
complete if an 80% criterion was achieved within a testing session (approximately 200 trials). 
Once criterion was achieved, subjects completed two subsequent transfer tests. The first transfer 
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test was a 100-trial redundant 4-item array discrimination, again with trial-unique stimuli. A final 
100-trial 2-item transfer test identical to Phase 1 was completed on the next testing day. 
1.2 Results and Discussion 
Two capuchins spontaneously (within 200 trials) made judgments of same and different 
in the two-item (pair) phase of the task (entropy 0 [same] vs. entropy 1 [different]). See Figure 
3.1. 
All four remaining capuchins failed to make successful discriminative judgments with 
pairs of items, but succeeded in the 4-item phase within 200 trials. After successful completion 
and transfer to the 2-item phase, all four capuchins met an approximate 80% criterion within the 
first 100-trial block. See Table 3.1 for accuracy levels for each animal. 
That 2 capuchins succeeded in making 2-item conceptual-relational discriminations of 
same and different spontaneously (without entropy-infused training as in Flemming et al. (2007) 
with macaques) suggests a less integral dependence on perceptual driving mechanisms in 
concept learning for these capuchins. Although we cannot conclude that entropy plays no role for 
these new world monkeys, 4 additional monkeys required only a maximum of 4-item displays, 
compared to 8-12 items for old-world monkeys (rhesus - Flemming et al., 2007; olive baboons - 
Fagot et al., 2001). While it was previously concluded that relational-conceptual knowledge of 
same and different was largely entropy-important, but not entropy-dependent, we find that this 
may be true to an even lesser extent for some new world monkeys.  
2.0 Experiment 2 
It is typically assumed that judgments of same and different are more difficult the fewer 
items a relational array contains. The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine the level of 
difficulty associated with varying levels of entropy for rhesus macaques in a conceptual-
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relational two-choice discrimination task. Magnitude of reward decreased for each successive 
level of increasing entropy (larger displays) and allowed movement freely across entropy-level 
boundaries based on success in meeting or failure to meet criterion.  
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Subjects and Apparatus 
Six male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) housed at Georgia State University’s 
Language Research Center, age 5 to 26 completed Experiment 2. Two macaques (Hank and 
Gale, both age 26) had prior experience on a very similar battery of S/D tasks from Flemming et 
al., 2007. In these assessments, Hank and Gale successfully learned the 2-item S/D 
discrimination task in a paradigm of decreasing entropy beginning with 8-item sets. Although the 
tests were completed 4 years before the current experiment, it is worthy of mention with the 
current comparison to other macaques completely naïve to S/D procedures also included in the 
present experiment. Four macaques (Obi, age 5; Han, age 6; Luke, age 11; Chewie, age 11) naïve 
to S/D testing completed the same procedures in this experiment. The only training experience 
that these naïve macaques completed relevant to the present task was a standard 1 to 1 item 
physical matching-to-sample task. 
Subjects were not food or water deprived during the course of the study. All rhesus 
macaques had continuous access to the computerized programs for blocks of time ranging from 4 
hours to 24 hours.  During this time, the computer program controlled reward delivery (94-mg 
banana flavored pellet) and trial presentation. The Language Research Center’s Computerized 
Test System (LRC-CTS) consists of an IBM-compatible desktop personal computer (Washburn, 
Rumbaugh & Richardson, 1992). Each animal had access to its own testing station.  During 
tasks, macaques controlled a cursor on a 17-inch SVGA monitor via a vertically mounted 
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joystick. Speakers provided auditory feedback for all tasks, including a low buzzing sound for 
incorrect responses and an increasing crescendo sound for correct responses. These sounds have 
been paired with these outcomes on many previous tasks.  
2.1.2  Design and Procedure 
Testing sessions for all rhesus macaques began with cued 2-item S/D discriminations 
visually identical to presentation in Experiment 1 with capuchin monkeys. Macaques were able 
to move fluidly throughout the levels in 50 trial increments, moving up or down or remaining at 
the most difficult level based on their degree of success at the current level.  Under the 
assumption that macaques prefer a higher reward, it was expected that they always maintain or 
move up to the most difficult (highest payoff) level if they are capable of doing so. See Figure 
3.2 for a depiction of sample trial types. 
For these 2-item (pairs) discriminations considered most difficult, rhesus macaques 
received 4 pellets as reward. Thus, the incentive to complete these trials was relatively (4:1) 
high. To remain at the current level, macaques had to meet a criterion of 40 out of the last 50 
consecutive trials correct. If they performed at levels of chance (20 out of the last 50 consecutive 
trials incorrect) the computer would initiate a sequence of “easier” 4-item array discrimination 
trials. In this level of increased entropy, reward magnitude was decreased, such that reward 
contrast from the previous level was 2:1. If macaques met a criterion of 40 out of the last 50 
consecutive trials correct (80%), the computer would immediately initiate a sequence of 2-item 
discrimination trials with a higher reward payoff. Alternatively, if the macaques again performed 
near levels of chance (20 out of the last 50 consecutive trials incorrect) the computer would 
initiate a sequence of the “easiest” 6-item array discrimination trials. In this level of increased 
entropy, reward magnitude was again decreased, such that reward contrast from the previous 
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level was 2:1 (1 vs. 2 pellets). The same contingencies for moving up a level (decreased entropy, 
higher pellet magnitude) remained in place. 
All macaques completed one 500-trial block within which they moved back and forth 
throughout the varied entropy levels. Because this task is highly susceptible to learning and 
asymptotic leveling with prolonged training, the macaques’ spontaneous performance was of 
primary interest. To assess possible sustained performance and verify accuracy of results, one 
100-trial transfer test was completed 2-3 days after the initial 500-trial testing block. 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
All but one monkey (Luke –naïve) completed trials at the Level 3 (2-item) difficulty for 
more than half of the 500-trial session. All monkeys initially failed the two-item discrimination 
and dropped to the 4-item set, but only 2 monkeys (1 experienced, 1 naïve) failed the 4-item set 
trials to drop into the 6-item set discrimination. A main effect for entropy level (number of 
items) was observed using a one-way ANOVA F (2,15) = 32.90, p < .01 across all monkeys 
(both naïve and experienced). Tukey’s post-hoc analyses revealed that while the number of trials 
completed in Level 3, 2-item and Level 2, 4-item were distributed more evenly (p=.057), a 
significantly greater proportion of trials in the 500-trial session were completed in Level 3, 2-
item than Level 1, 6-item (p=.002) and in Level 2, 4-item than Level 1, 6-item (p=.006).  
Most notably, no significant effect of experience was observed at any entropy level ( p = 
.737;  p = .389; p = .759, respectively).  In addition, no position or relation biases (asymmetry) 
were observed. See Table 3.2 for a summary of level transitions, number of trials performed at 
each level and symmetric performance verifications. See Figure 3.3 for performance distribution. 
In a subsequent 100-trial transfer session under the same methodological conditions, all 
monkeys remained at the most difficult level and never dropped into a level of higher entropy 
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distinction. Percent accuracies ranged from 75%-93%, all significantly above chance. Accuracies 
for each monkey are displayed in Table 3.2. 
That macaques were able to retain successful performance for both 2- and 4-item S/D 
discriminations when given the option to perform perceptually easier trials suggests that 
nonhuman primates are less dependent on entropy than originally hypothesized (Flemming et al., 
2007; Fagot et al., 2001). More importantly, 4 macaques naïve to any S/D task completed trials 
with levels of success equal to (or better than in some instances) macaques with prior experience 
on the task. Whereas macaques in our previous study (Flemming et al., 2007) completed the task 
beginning with sets of 8-items, monkeys here garnered success with very minimal exposure 
(150-250 trials) to displays containing as few as 4 items, rendering 6- and 8- item training 
redundant and unnecessary. Thus, rhesus macaques are capable of learning the relational-
conceptual S/D discrimination task with entropy distinctions of only 2 (4-item different, entropy 
= 2; 4-item same, entropy = 0). Spending relatively fewer trials in contingencies of lower 
reinforcement and higher entropy (“easier”), these distinctions thus seem less “entropy 
important” than originally hypothesized. In addition, displays of lower entropy seem no more 
difficult for macaques to discriminate with success. Rather, the macaques appear quite 
comfortable in their knowledge of same and different without elevated levels of entropy.  
3.0 General Discussion 
Learning about same and different relational concepts may be less “entropy-important” 
than originally hypothesized. The general pattern of relational concept acquisition observed was, 
if not immediate for 2-item S/D discriminations, one of immediate transfer after performing trials 
correctly at a level of increased entropy distinction, even for animals completely naïve to S/D 
tasks. This study provides unique evidence that both rhesus and capuchin monkeys are capable 
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of making simultaneous same/different relational discriminations with arrays of as few as 2-4 
items [entropy contrast of 0:1-2]. The novel technique of gradually increasing entropy contrast 
rather than decreasing stimulus array number introduced in this study perhaps more accurately 
estimates the threshold at which nonhuman primates are capable of extracting true conceptual 
information about the relations of same and different.  
Because of findings in the pigeon (e.g. Young & Wasserman, 1997), baboon (Fagot et al., 
2001) and rhesus monkey (e.g. Flemming et al., 2007) literatures, it is often assumed that 
discriminations of lower entropy distinction are more difficult for the animal. With an assumed 
predisposition to attend to physical properties of stimuli (Flemming, Thompson, Beran & 
Washburn, in review; Thompson & Oden, 2000), it would stand to reason that judgments of 
conceptual relatedness would fall under increased cognitive control for many nonhuman animals. 
Perhaps it is the case that gaining this level of cognitive control is not as difficult a task for the 
monkeys in the present study. 
Wright and Katz (2006) also report an understanding of abstract sameness and difference 
for rhesus monkeys, capuchin monkeys, and pigeons without the use of entropy-infused stimulus 
arrays. Both primate and avian species used matching and nonmatching rules to judge relational 
sameness or difference and generalized these rules to novel stimulus sets with varying rates of 
acquisition, dependent on measures such as training set size, test stimuli and contingencies.  
While this study sheds light on the employment of abstract match/nonmatch rules independent of 
one another, the current study addresses conceptually relational knowledge of same versus 
different by requiring the simultaneous discrimination of identical from nonidentical pairs of 
stimuli within a trial. 
  102 
 
Also in contrast to other S/D discrimination studies with pigeons (e.g. Wasserman et al., 
2001), Blaisdell and Cook (2005) provide evidence for simultaneous 2-item S/D discrimination 
in pigeons. This recent discrepancy from aforementioned studies, but corroboration with present 
findings from capuchin and rhesus monkeys, might be attributed to the use of rather simple 
geometric stimuli that encouraged a focus on the relational information present, rather than a 
focus on specific stimulus features as might occur with more intricate clipart icons used in 
previous investigations. Blaisdell and Cook (2005) utilized only 6 different geometric shapes of 
6 different highly-discriminable colors. By creating 12,960 unique dimensional displays, pigeons 
were never given the opportunity to memorize specific stimulus combinations. By simplifying 
the task and removing many perceptually-based discrimination strategies, it is perhaps the case 
that relational information was simply more salient and thus conceptual strategies begin to 
emerge. Like the utilization of trial-unique stimuli in the present study, methodology 
encouraging a shift in attention away from perceptual features of stimuli allows for the 
emergence of more conceptually-guided behavior. 
Worthy of mention to future investigations of the application of these relations to 
analogical reasoning, that monkeys still are not successful on relational matching-to-sample 
paradigms suggests a qualitative difference in the types of cognitive computations necessary for 
the employment of relational concepts in analogy from the understanding of identity and 
nonidentity on a discriminative level. This further implicates a difference in kind for a 
mechanism for analogical reasoning (Thompson & Oden 1996). It should stand to reason that if 
monkeys are capable of making judgments of identity vs. nonidentity in paradigms such those in 
the present task, they could make those same evaluations between relations if they were 
qualitatively of the same type. Not only are animals making fewer cognitive computations of 
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identity and nonidentity in the present conditional discrimination tasks compared to tests of 
relational matching, but they also may not be employing the same mechanisms when computing 
relational identity/nonidentity between relations (as in RMTS). For instance, computing identity 
between two like images requires one type of evaluation. It may be the case that an identity 
evaluation between two pairs of similarly related images not only requires an additional 
evaluation, but one that is fundamentally different in mechanism. If these computations required 
the same type of underlying mechanism, we may expect those animals/species displaying a 
propensity for 2-item S/D discrimination to also match relations-between-relations, which is not 
the case. 
Are 2-item S/D discriminations markedly more “difficult” for a nonhuman primate as 
previously implicated? Given the ability of Macaca to sustain completion of these trial types 
when motivated to do so with increased reward contingency, it would seem not. Taken together 
with the results of Flemming et al. (2007) wherein no decrement in performance was observed 
with decreases in entropy contrast for S/D discriminations, it is likely that rhesus monkeys are 
equally capable of extracting relational-conceptual information from a 2-item pair as they are 
from a larger stimulus array. This pattern of performance seems to support the case that the 
conceptual-perceptual “divide” is often misrepresented. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) argue 
that many of the same underlying cognitive mechanisms may drive both perception and 
conception or in the very least work in parallel. The conceptual processes used by monkeys in 
the current study may be the emergent result of their perceptual processes simply becoming less 
bound to the perceptual features of the stimuli. 
 In conclusion, it is certainly the case that entropy plays a slight facilatory role for some 
Cebus individuals and Macaca in the acquisition of the relational concepts of both same and 
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different. However, contrary to previous findings, both the amount of perceptual contrast and 
duration of training need not be as substantial as suggested for these and other nonhuman animal 
species. With some new-world individuals (Cebus apella) discriminating pairs of S/D stimuli 
relatively spontaneously, it is likely that the employment of relational-conceptual knowledge is 
at the forefront of their cognitive reasoning skills. Are new-world monkeys less perceptually-
predisposed than previously hypothesized with old-world monkeys? If so, future studies with 
capuchin and other new-world primates may help to elucidate the supposed disconnect in 
perceptual-conceptual reasoning, even as it is applied in analogical reasoning. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Performance summaries for Cebus on S/D relational discrimination task 
 
Phase 1    # Trials # correct (% acc)     Z 
2 items                    
 
Logan       200  163 (81.5%)    8.84*  
Liam       200  155 (77.5%)    7.71* 
Nala       500  266 (53.2%)    1.39 
Wren       500  271 (54.2%)    1.83 
Lily       500  244 (48.8%)  -0.49 
Gabe       500  259 (51.8%)    0.76 
 
 
Phase 2  # Trials  # correct (% acc)     Z 
4 items     
 
Nala      200  166 (83.0%)  9.26* 
Wren      200  171 (85.5%)  9.97* 
Lily      200  160 (80.0%)  8.41* 
Gabe      200  157 (78.5%)  7.99* 
 
 
Transfer    4 items Z  2 items Z       Top/Bottom S/D 
100 trials  (% acc)  (% acc)          Symmetry      Symmetry 
 
Logan   -  -     85.0  6.9*  -1.5   1.3 
Liam   -  -     81.0  6.1*  -0.9  -0.3 
Nala   78.0  5.5*     86.0  7.1*   1.1   1.7 
Wren   84.0  6.7*     78.0  5.5*  -1.3   1.5 
Lily   84.0  6.7*     83.0  6.5*   1.3  -0.5 
Gabe   81.0  6.1*     77.0  5.3*  -0.7  -0.1 
 
*p<.01 
 
Note: 4-item training sessions not completed for Logan and Liam due to success with 2-item 
training session. Only 200-trial training sessions and 100-trial transfer tests were completed by 
Logan and Liam.
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Table 3.2. 
 
Performance summaries for Macaca on titrating S/D relational discrimination task 
Phase 1      ↑Entropy      ↓Entropy      ↑Entropy       ↓Entropy  Remain Remain Remain 
500 trials          2 to 4          4 to 2          4 to 6          6 to 4     in 2     in 4     in 6 
 
Han    2  2  0  0    260    240        0 
Obi    3  4  0  0    316    184        0 
Luke    4  3  1  1    138    270      92 
Chewie   1  1  0  0    328    172        0 
§ Hank    3  2  1  1    275    152      73 
§ Gale    2  2  0  0    293    207        0 
 
 
Phase 2   Remain % Correct   Z      Top/Bottom S/D 
100-trial Transfer     in 2            Symmetry          Symmetry 
 
Han      100      82.0  6.3*   0.7   1.3 
Obi      100      78.0  5.5*  -0.3  -0.5 
Luke      100      75.0  4.9*   1.1   0.5 
Chewie     100      93.0  8.5*   0.9   0.1 
§ Hank      100      79.0  5.7*   0.7  -1.1 
§ Gale      100      86.0  7.1*   1.3   0.5 
 
 
* p < .05;  § indicates a monkey with substantial experience on S/D relational discrimination tasks (Flemming et al., 2007) 
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Figure 3.1. Performance summaries for Cebus across phases. Dashed line represents chance 
performance. If criterion (80%) was met in phase 1 (Logan and Liam) phase 2 was not 
completed, only 2-item transfer tests were presented subsequently. 
* p < .01 
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Figure 3.2. Depiction of titrating S/D discrimination task presented to Macaca. All macaques 
began the experiment with 2-item discrimination trials. Based on accuracy, trials from the next 
level of increased entropy were presented. Subjects could be moved to the next level of increased 
entropy for performance consistent with chance or back to a level of decreased entropy for 
performance significantly better than chance. Absolute reward magnitude (number of pellets) is 
presented with each corresponding level of entropy. 
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Figure 3.3. Proportion of 500-trial session performed in each entropy level by Macaca on a 
titrating S/D relational discrimination task. Dashed line represents chance distribution.  
* p < .01 
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Chapter 4: Analogical reasoning and the differential outcome effect: Transitory bridging of 
the conceptual gap for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)4 
 
Abstract 
Monkeys unlike chimpanzees and humans have a marked difficulty acquiring relational 
matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks that likely reflect the cognitive foundation upon which 
analogical reasoning rests. In the present study, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed a 
categorical (identity & nonidentity) relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task with differential 
reward (pellet ratio) and/or punishment (timeout ratio) outcomes for correct and incorrect 
choices. Monkeys in either differential reward-only or punishment-only conditions performed at 
chance levels. However, the RMTS performance of monkeys experiencing both differential 
reward and punishment conditions was significantly better than chance. Subsequently when all 
animals experienced nondifferential outcomes tests, their RMTS performance levels were 
uniformly at chance. These results indicate that combining differential reward and punishment 
contingencies provide an effective, albeit transitory, scaffolding for monkeys explicitly to judge 
analogical relations-between-relations. 
Keywords: ANALOGICAL REASONING, DIFFERENTIAL OUTCOME EFFECT, RHESUS 
MONKEYS, RELATIONAL MATCHING, SAME/DIFFERENT, VISUAL PROCESSING OF 
CONCEPTS 
 
                                                         4 This chapter submitted for publication as: Flemming, T. M., Thompson, R. K. R., Beran, M. J. 
& Washburn, D. A. Analogical reasoning and the differential outcome effect: Transitory 
bridging of the conceptual gap for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes. 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Thompson and Oden (1996, 2000) pace Premack, (1983) argued that there is a ‘profound 
disparity’ between chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and monkeys in their capacity for analogical 
reasoning which is often referred to as a hallmark of human reasoning (e.g., Gentner, 2003). 
Thompson & Oden (2000) based their strong conclusion on the respective success and failure of 
apes and monkeys in categorical relational matching-to-sample tasks (RMTS) that require 
animals to judge abstract relations (e.g., relational identity and nonidentity) in comparison 
stimulus pairs as being relationally the ‘same’ as or ‘different’ from that represented in the 
sample.  
In a typical categorical RMTS task two items that are either identical (e.g., AA) or 
nonidentical (e.g., BC) are presented simultaneously as the relational sample against which 
another two pairs of relational stimuli (e.g., DD & EF) are to be compared. The animal is 
rewarded for choosing the comparison stimulus pair that is relationally identical to the sample. 
Hence, if the sample consists of an identical pair (AA) then the animal is rewarded for choosing 
the (DD) comparison stimulus pair that is relationally the same as the sample. Conversely, if the 
sample consists of a nonidentical pair (BC) then it is rewarded for choosing the (EF) pair which 
instantiates the same relation as the sample.  
Importantly, as in the above example, no single stimulus element within a pair (sample 
and the two comparisons) is present in either of the other two pairs. Hence, successful matching 
performance with sets of novel stimulus pairs is taken as evidence that the animal is making 
explicit relational judgments. That is, the animal judges the relation of ‘identity’ or ‘nonidentity’ 
in the comparison pairs to be the ‘same’ or ‘different’ relation as that instantiated by the sample. 
In short, the animal is judging relations-between-relations to be the same or different, and this 
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ability is arguably the cognitive foundation for analogical reasoning (Gillian, Premack & 
Woodruff, 1981; Thompson & Oden, 1993, 2000).  
Interestingly, despite their failure on RMTS tasks, macaque monkeys like baboons 
perform above chance and generalize to novel stimulus sets on a relational matching task when 
the samples and comparison stimuli representing identity or nonidentity are comprised of not two 
but multiple icon arrays (Fagot, Wasserman & Young, 2001; Wasserman, Young & Fagot, 
2001). Nevertheless, the monkeys’ performances decrease as the number of icons within each 
array is systematically decreased from an initial 16 icons and is at chance levels with only two 
icons within each array. The pattern of results displayed by the baboons (Fagot et al., 2001) and 
interestingly 20 percent of human subjects (Young & Wasserman, 2002) reflects their learning to 
discriminate identity and nonidentity in the RMTS task along the perceptual dimension of 
relative entropy (i.e., variability vs. uniformity) rather than on a categorical basis.  
Alternatively, some rhesus monkeys (Flemming, Beran & Washburn, 2007) and pigeons 
(Blaisdell & Cook, 2005) have proven successful in two-item same/different discrimination 
tasks, leaving ambiguous the mechanism by which these choices are made: perceptually or 
conceptual/categorically. Without abstract representation, nonhuman animals may rely on 
entropy measures in order to discriminate relations between relations. Fagot et al. (2001) 
presented baboons with arrays of 16 icons in a relational match-to-sample paradigm. Baboons 
successfully learned to match arrays of identically and nonidentically related icons. By varying 
the number of icons composing the displays, Fagot et al. (2001) provided evidence that entropy 
plays a key role in the conceptual behavior of monkeys and some of the first evidence that 
animals other than humans and chimpanzees can discriminate relations-between-relations. One 
striking difference between the behavior of baboons and that of human participants completing 
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the same task is the cutoff point in entropy of the displays; baboons require a significantly 
greater amount of perceptual difference and sameness within displays in order to make 
analogical judgments. We may therefore infer that analogical thinking for a nonhuman species is 
more closely tied to and dependent on perception than abstract conceptualization. In fact, these 
entropy-dependent behaviors often regarded as “analogical” are likely perceptually grounded. 
One might well wonder why monkeys have consistently failed to acquire the categorical 
two-item RMTS task given their success on simultaneous same/different discriminations and 
performance levels more or less equivalent to that of chimpanzees in conditional same/different 
tasks (cf., Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Flemming, et al., 2007; Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider 
& Washburn, 2008; Katz & Wright, 2010; Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997; Wright & Katz, 
2006). Flemming et al. (2007) hypothesized that the monkeys’ failure to acquire RMTS is due to 
a cognitive “disconnect” between their perceptual and categorical conceptual abilities to process 
relational information, wherein abstract conceptualization of relations is hampered by a natural 
predisposition of the animals to attend to the perceptual qualities of the stimuli. This hypothesis 
is supported by the evidence from preferential handling and gaze studies that abstract relational 
properties are implicitly more salient for chimpanzee and child even at an early age than is the 
case for monkeys for whom physical elemental properties are more salient (Oden, Thompson, & 
Premack, 1990; Tyrrell, Stauffer & Snowman, 1991; Vauclair & Fagot, 1996). Thompson & 
Oden (2000) concluded from these results that monkeys are paleologicians; their conceptual 
categories are based on shared predicates – absolute and relational features bound by perceptual 
and/or associative similarity, whereas symbol-trained apes are analogical in the sense that they 
perceive abstract propositional similarities spontaneously. 
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Apart from these differences in attentional focus on either physical or conceptual 
stimulus properties, Thompson & Oden (1996) further suggested that a major contributing factor 
to the difficulty of the RMTS task is that it is cognitively more demanding than either conditional 
or simultaneous relational same/different discriminations with respect to the number of 
matching/nonmatching operations and number of encoded abstract relations to be retained for 
successful completion of a trial. In the RMTS task, the animal must first compare the physical 
properties of each item within the sample to identify the categorically abstract relation they 
represent. It must then retain the encoded outcome of that operation while performing the same 
comparative operation on each comparison stimulus pair and encoding those outcomes. Finally, 
the animal must compare the encoded abstract representations resulting from all of the former 
operations and judge them to be the same or different before executing its decision response.  
Hence, in order to make explicit same/different judgments of abstract relations as in 
analogical judgments, one must represent the abstract concepts in some way. Little is known of 
the modality of such representations for nonhuman animals but one possibility is that the 
provision of physical symbols affords chimpanzees and children, if not monkeys, the opportunity 
to encode abstract same-different relations as iconic representations thereby functionally 
reducing the RMTS task to a covert physical matching problem (Thompson & Oden, 1996, 2000; 
Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997). Symbol systems appear to provide apes and humans the 
representational scaffolding for manipulation and expression of propositional knowledge in 
relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) and related nonverbal analogy tasks (Gillan, Premack & 
Woodruff, 1981; Oden, Thompson & Premack, 2001) there is no evidence as yet that physical 
conditional cues associated with specific conceptual relations similarly acquire symbolic 
meaning for monkeys (Flemming et al., 2008).  
  119 
 
In the present study we examined the possibility that differential expectancies of reward 
and punishment associated with specific relational matching choices might provide a functional 
alternative ‘scaffolding’ effect for attention to and representation of abstract relations analogous 
to that of conceptual symbols for ape and child.  Our choice of the differential outcomes 
procedure was prompted by evidence for differential outcome effects (DOE) in which rates of 
acquisition and terminal accuracy are increased when response outcomes are inequitable across 
different stimulus types (e.g., Meyer, 1951; Trapold, 1970).  Evidence for the strength of the 
DOE in conditional learning procedures has been provided for rats (Ludvigson & Gay, 1967), 
pigeons (Kelley & Grant, 2001) and for young children in classroom settings (Maki-Kahn, 
Overmier, Delos & Gutmann, 1995; Estevez et al., 2001).  However, this effect is not ubiquitous, 
with some reports of mixed results for pigeons in several studies (Brodigan & Peterson, 1976; 
Williams, Butler & Overmier, 1982).   
Thorndike (1911), in his early learning theory, proposed that the sole purpose of 
reinforcement was to “stamp in” an association between the stimulus and response. In 
instrumental learning conditions, however, stimuli preceding reinforcement can evoke the 
expectation of that reinforcement (Spence, 1956). These expectancies likely influence the 
strength of the SR association and in turn the rate of or latency in responding.  Thus, subjects 
learn stimulus-type specific representations or expectancies of the reinforcing/punishing event 
(i.e. Spence’s, 1956, incentive motivation mechanism). Although associated with the 
instrumental response, this expectancy is acquired independently of the response itself but retains 
partial control over the behavior due to the interaction that exists with the SR association 
(Trapold, 1970). The mechanism that drives the increased speed and accuracy in differential 
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reward contingencies (DRC) is posited to be the hedonic value of the reward (Astley, Peissig & 
Wasserman, 2001).   
In another study illustrating the DOE, Trapold (1970) rewarded rats differentially with a 
food pellet or sucrose solution for bar presses across several schedules of reinforcement. Subjects 
were required to choose one of two bars (right bar always designated correct) and commit to 10 
responses on that bar in order to end a trial after the initiation of a tone. Rats consistently made 
more correct responses when a different reinforcer was used for the two separate stimulus-
response components than when the same reinforcer was used for each. Trapold concluded that 
the rats had developed different expectancies for food and for sucrose which in turn produced 
distinctive stimulus properties allowing for a similar function as any other stimuli. 
Although the expectation generated by a differential outcome procedure has traditionally 
proven effective as a cue for choice behavior, the nature of this anticipation has not been 
extensively explored. Recent evidence suggests that the DOE is not dependent on differences in 
hedonic value, but rather that different stimulus representations can serve as a cue to guide 
comparison choice behavior. Miller, Friedrich, Narkavic, and Zentall (2009) presented pigeons 
with a matching-to-sample task in which the differential outcomes effect was created using 
hedonically nondifferential outcomes. Using differently colored houselights following correct 
responses rather than hedonically-weighted rewards, Miller et al. (2009) found facilitated 
retention for correct choices. 
Astley, Peissig and Wasserman (2001) provided evidence that hedonic reward 
expectancies associated with hedonic values drive these differences in performance. Pigeons 
were trained with different keys yielding differential amounts of reinforcement (1 or 5 pellets) 
and different delays of reinforcement (1 or 15 s). For test trials, these keys were used both as 
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samples or comparison stimuli in a conditional discrimination. Pigeons tended to match those 
keys associated with similar hedonic outcomes: 1 pellet key matched with 15 s key, 5 pellet key 
matched with 1 s key. This study not only provided evidence that hedonic value may drive 
differential responding, but also that there may exist a vague representation of said hedonic value 
which is stored and can later be used when matching associated stimuli. 
Several studies have concluded that functional-equivalence class formation can be 
accomplished via association with unique outcomes for humans and animals (Dube, McIlvane, 
Mackay & Stoddard, 1987; Edwards, Jagielo, Zentall & Hogan, 1982). Further, assigning 
different hedonic values has been shown to effectively create equivalence classes of perceptually 
dissimilar stimuli (Astley & Wasserman, 1999). Through the employment of differential 
outcomes for each equivalence class, Astley and Wasserman (1999) provided unique feedback 
for pigeons substantial enough to allow for the formation of superordinate categories. In a go/no-
go paradigm, pigeons pecked images from 4 large sets of perceptually complex 
multidimesionally related stimuli, receiving 1 s or 15 s delay to reinforcement after pecking 
correct images from within their category. All 8 pigeons pecked at levels significantly above 
chance to within-category perceptually-distinct novel images because of associations established 
with a common delay of reinforcement during training phases, giving credence to the use of 
differential outcomes as a successful learning tool beyond more basic S-R associations (Astley & 
Wasserman, 1999). 
Beyond single stimuli, human judgments of relations have been shown to be enhanced by 
differential outcome procedures (Estevez, et al., 2007). Participants viewed mathematical 
“greater than” and “less than” relational statements (e.g. 5.88 > 5.31) and were asked to indicate 
whether the statement was true or false. Upon their choice, participants were given one of two 
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different outcomes: a melodic tone or the word “great.” Response times were shorter for those 
participants in the differential outcomes condition. Further, with increased task difficulty (the 
inclusion of two negative numbers) participants in the differential outcomes condition not only 
showed improved response times, but also performed at rates of higher accuracy.  
Given this evidence of differential outcome effects with single and categorical physical 
stimuli we hypothesized that a similar effect might be obtained also with abstract relational 
stimuli in the RMTS task to instantiate a novel rule: analogical-relational matching. We 
attempted to emphasize the conceptual relational nature of the stimulus pairs over the physical 
properties of physical elements within pairs by consistently associating different hedonic values 
with each exemplar of a given relation following correct matching responses. We further 
attempted to bias attention to the conceptual content of the stimuli by differentially punishing 
incorrect response choices that reflected attention to nonconceptual stimulus properties. 
Specifically, we presented rhesus monkeys with a relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) 
task with pairs of identical/non-identical images serving as the sample and match stimuli. A 
given monkey was tested in one of 3 conditions: Differential reward (DR), differential 
punishment (DP), and differences in both reward and punishment (DB). With the inclusion of the 
“both” condition, we were able to assess the relative magnitude in differential strength required 
to observe the DOE. After completing trials under differential outcome conditions, monkeys then 
completed sessions with non-differential outcomes to determine the retention or permanence of 
these learned choices. Finally, monkeys returned to their original DR/DP/DB condition to 
investigate a possible rebound effect for choice behavior and/or dependence on these conditions 
to guide behavior. 
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Method 
Subjects 
Six male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) aged 5 to 20 years and housed at Georgia 
State University’s Language Research Center in Atlanta, GA, served as subjects for all phases of 
this experiment. All monkeys had extensive testing histories responding via joystick-guided 
cursor movement to computer-generated stimuli presented on a monitor (Washburn, Rumbaugh 
& Richardson, 1992). All monkeys also successfully passed tests of matching- and delayed 
matching-to-sample in which correct choices were identical matches to computer-generated 
sample stimuli (e.g., Washburn et al., 1992).  
Further, three of the monkeys previously participated in relational matching-to-sample 
tasks (e.g., Flemming et al., 2008). The remaining three monkeys were naïve to relational tasks. 
Monkeys were pseudo-randomly assigned to one of three differential outcome testing conditions: 
differential reward only (DR), differential punishment only (DP), and both differential reward 
and punishment (DB) assigned. Monkeys that had previously participated in the Flemming et al. 
(2007, 2008) tasks were each assigned to one of the outcome conditions as was one other 
monkey in that same condition from the naïve group. Monkeys were each then randomly 
assigned one relation (identity vs. nonidentity) to be “emphasized” for the entire duration of the 
differential outcome sessions as described below. 
Each monkey was tested while individually housed in his home enclosure.  They had 
continuous access to the computerized program for blocks of time ranging from 4 to 8 hours, 
completing 1 of 4 500-trial blocks per session (total of 4 sessions per condition per phase per 
animal). During testing, the computer program controlled all stimulus presentations and reward 
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delivery. No animals were food or water deprived for any portion of testing; all procedures were 
approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of Georgia State University. 
Design and Procedure 
Monkeys first completed 2,000 trials in their pseudo-randomly assigned DO condition, 
then two sets of test sessions (2,000 trials each) with equalized outcomes, and subsequently 
another 2,000 trials in their originally assigned DO condition.  
Within each trial, monkeys first saw a sample pair instantiating either the identical or 
nonidentical relation (AA or BC). Bringing a joystick-guided cursor in contact with that pair 
revealed two choice pairs: a novel identical pair (DD) and novel nonidentical pair (EF). Monkeys 
then selected a choice by contacting the pair with the cursor. Stimuli consisted of trial-unique 
clipart images so that after inclusion in one pair, either the sample pair or the choice pairs, it was 
discarded and not used in any other relational pair throughout all phases of the experiment. 
Outcome schedules. In the first phase (A1), monkeys completed RMTS trials in 1 of 3 
DO conditions. Two monkeys (Willie and Luke) were assigned to differential reward-only (DR), 
two monkeys (Hank and Han) to differential punishment-only (DP), and two monkeys (Gale and 
Obi) to both differential outcomes (DB). Each monkey was also randomly assigned to either 
identity or nonidentity as their relation of “better” hedonic value. For example, if assigned to 
identity, the better (i.e. great number of pellets) payoff followed correct choices only if the 
sample was identical and choice pair selected was identical.  
Rewards differed in magnitude of pellets delivered for correct responses. In the 
differential reward only (DR) condition, correct choices of the assigned higher hedonic relation 
resulted in the delivery of 4 pellets whereas correct choices of the other relation resulted in the 
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delivery of only 1 pellet. Any incorrect match resulted in a 5s inter-trial interval (ITI) for both 
relations.  
Punishments (penalties) differed in the duration of ITI following incorrect choices. In the 
differential punishment only (DP) condition, correct responses resulted in the delivery of just 1 
pellet regardless of relation type. If monkeys chose incorrectly on a trial of the more heavily 
punished relation (e.g., choosing a nonidentical pair in the presence of an identical sample pair) 
they experienced a 45 s ITI as compared to a 10 s ITI following the incorrect selection of the less 
heavily punished relation. 
In the both (DB) condition, correct responses to the emphasized relation led to delivery of 
4 food pellets whereas incorrect responses to the other relation resulted in only 1 pellet. 
Additionally, incorrect responses to the emphasized relation were followed by a 45 s ITI and 
incorrect responses to the other relation were followed by a 10 s ITI. See Figure 4.1 for an 
example depiction of the DB trial type for Gale (same emphasized). 
In the next phase (B1), monkeys completed all trials with equalized outcome (EO). A 
condition with equalized outcome following a potential DOE for all six animals was conducted 
to examine possible carry-over effects from Phase A1 including the possibility that perhaps any 
observed DOE effect from Phase 1 might facilitate continued relational matching in the absence 
of differential outcome procedures. It is perhaps the case that the DOE results in a lasting learned 
rule for the RMTS. In this phase, all correct choices resulted in delivery of 1 pellet while 
incorrect choices resulted in a 10 s ITI.  
Following Phase B1, all six monkeys completed an additional phase of equalized 
outcome (Phase B2) where correct choices resulted in the delivery of 4 pellets (EO 4) in contrast 
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to only a single pellet to determine if any observed effects in Phase 1 may be attributed to the 
sheer magnitude of the larger reward per se as opposed to a true differential outcome effect.  
In the final phase (A2), monkeys completed a second set of 2,000 trials in their originally 
assigned DO condition from A1. This phase was conducted to examine possible rebound effects 
from potential loss of the DOE in phases B1 and B2. 
Results 
Experimental Phase A1 – Differential Outcome. In DR and DP conditions, no effects due 
to differential outcome were observed. Luke, Han and Hank completed the final 500 trials of 
their sessions with an average accuracy of 50.8% (chance = 50%; see Table 4.1). One monkey 
performed significantly better than chance in the DR condition (73.4%).  However, this was due 
to an asymmetrical selection5 of the emphasized relation only (Willie, z = 10.42, p < .01).  This 
monkey chose the correct relation significantly above chance levels only when the sample was of 
the assigned emphasized relation. Of the trials that were completed correctly, 85.2% were 
matches of same to same relation, rather than distributing his responses evenly, χ2 (1, N=1424) = 
400.73, p < .01. Performance for all other monkeys was symmetric in the DR and DP conditions 
(see Table 4.1). 
In the DB condition (Phase A1), in which both reward magnitude and punishment 
duration differed across relations, both Gale and Obi performed significantly above chance with 
accuracies of 84.1% and 86.3% respectively  (Gale, z = 15.25; Obi, z = 16.23, ps  <  .01). This 
                                                        
5 Assessing the possibility of asymmetric performance on same versus different trials, we 
conducted post hoc analyses examining performance for all same and different trials that were 
completed correctly. Achieving levels of significance (above chance) was possible by garnering 
higher success rates of one trial type over another. One could potentially succeed on a very high 
percent of only one trial type and perform at below chance levels on the other, still providing 
overall levels of performance significantly above chance. 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marks the first success in an RMTS task by rhesus monkeys.6  Symmetrical performance was 
also observed for both monkeys, indicating that performance on same and different trial types 
was equally high (see Table 1). 
Experimental Phases B1 & B2 – Equalized Outcome. In both equalized outcome (EO 1 
and EO 4) phases, regardless of pellet magnitude, performance did not differ significantly from 
chance (50%) for any monkey. Symmetrical performance was observed for every monkey. See 
Table 1 for a summary of results.  
Experimental Phase A2 – Differential Outcome.  In Phase A2, a pattern of results similar 
to A1 was observed. In DR and DP conditions, no effects due to differential outcome were 
observed. Willie, Han and Hank completed the final 500 trials of their sessions with an average 
accuracy of 51.8% (chance = 50%; see Table 1). While one monkey in the DR condition 
performed at a level significantly chance, 75.1% (Luke, z = 11.23, p < .01), his performance was 
not symmetrical and therefore an artificial reflection of successful relational matching χ2 (1, 
N=1424) = 327.53, p < .01. Performance for all other monkeys was symmetric in the DR and DP 
conditions (see Table 1). 
In the DB condition (A2), in which both reward magnitude and punishment duration 
differed, both Gale and Obi performed significantly above chance with accuracies of 87.5% and 
89.2% respectively  (Gale, z = 16.68; Obi, z = 17.49, ps < .01). Symmetrical performance was 
also observed for both monkeys (see Figure 4.2 for performance summaries). 
                                                         
6 Monkeys who have previously performed similar RMTS tasks with equalized outcome in 
Flemming et al. (2007, 2008) were Willie, Gale, and Hank. All other monkeys were completely 
naïve to RMTS tasks. Important to note is the fact that of the experienced monkeys, although 
none had prior success on similar tasks, 1 monkey now performed at levels above chance. 
Additionally, 1 naïve monkey performed at levels above chance in the current task, negating the 
possibility that prior performance on similar tasks had any effect on current task performance. 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Discussion 
Results from the present experiment provide the first evidence that macaque monkeys 
(Macaca mulatta) are capable of making explicit categorical-conceptual two-item (2x2) 
judgments of analogical relations (same or different) between relations (identity or nonidentity) 
with trial unique stimulus pairs. Interestingly, however, the monkeys did so only under 
conditions of differential outcomes of both reward and punishment in the relational matching-to-
sample task (RMTS).  With differential scaffolding provided, rhesus monkeys seem to have at 
least in a transitory manner “bridged the conceptual gap” oft ascribed in their representational 
abilities (Flemming et al., 2007; Premack, 2010; Thompson & Oden, 1993, 2000). Importantly, 
these results extend the evidence for differential outcome effects (DOE) beyond conditional 
discriminations involving perceptual physical and relational stimuli to those involving 
categorical relations-between-relations (cf., Brodigan & Peterson, 1976; Friedrich & Zentall, 
2010; Schmidtke, Katz & Wright, 2010; Trapold, 1970). 
As hypothesized, differential outcomes allowed for the expression of the requisite trial-
unique abstract conceptual skills forming a cognitive foundation for analogical reasoning. 
However, contrary to our expectation, these skills depended upon sustained differential outcomes 
and did not transfer under conditions of nondifferential reinforcement and punishment. No 
monkey successfully completed RMTS trials at levels above chance with equalized outcome 
(EO) receiving 1 pellet. Hence we conclude that differential outcomes were likely the cause of 
success in the both (DB) condition of phase A1. Moreover, given the lack of the animals’ success 
on trials in which they received 4 pellets, we can rule out the possibility that heightened 
performance in Phase A1 (DB) is attributable to simple magnitude effects resulting in a 
preference for one type of trial configuration. 
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Not unlike 3 to 5 year-old children or chimpanzees given referential labels for relations 
(Premack, 1983; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998a) explicit judgments of analogical relationships 
by the rhesus monkeys were significantly facilitated by the conceptual scaffolding provided by 
differential outcomes. However, the transitory nature of the DOE effect observed in the present 
experiment notably differs from the sustained facilitative and priming effects of symbol training 
and linguistic labeling on RMTS and related analogical task performances of, respectively, 
chimpanzee and child even in the subsequent absence of those cues.  We suspect it is unlikely 
that possible outcome expectancies associated with the identity and nonidentity relations 
function as proto-symbols analogously to the hypothesized representational role of physical 
tokens/symbols or verbal labels. (Oden et al., 1990; Premack, 1983; Thompson & Oden, 1993; 
Thompson, Oden & Rattermann, 2001). 
The issue of the transitory or sustained nature of rule-learning facilitated by a differential 
outcomes procedure is seldom explicitly noted in the literature. Cook, Cavoto and Cavoto (1995) 
instituted a system of differential outcome to promote learning of same-different texture 
discrimination when pigeons appeared not to show success. On subsequent transfer tests with 
equalized outcomes, Cook et al. (1995) observed no change in their birds’ performances. 
Schmidtke et al. (2010), found that the differential outcomes procedure did not affect rate of 
acquisition of same and different concepts for pigeons, but rather enhanced rate of transfer to 
novel 32-item sets (but not smaller set sizes). Their pigeons’ transfer, albeit marginal, to an 
equalized outcome procedure is consistent with the results reported by Cook et al. (1995).  
Alternatively, Uricuioli & DeMarse (1994) found that while a differential outcomes 
procedure facilitated acquisition of matching-to-sample by pigeons, the observed transfer 
observed was “neither perfect nor as strong as” what might be observed in other studies. The 
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authors argued that the reason for such low transfer is that the differential outcomes control, 
rather than simply facilitate choice behavior. Uriciolo & DeMarse (1994) did not speculate as to 
how the differential outcomes control behavior but results from other studies suggest that the 
relative differential hedonic value of the outcomes alone may be sufficient to facilitate 
comparison choice (Astley et al., 2001; Astley & Wasserman, 1999).  
Other recent reports provide evidence for differential outcome-faciliated same/different 
concept learning in pigeons (Friedrich & Zentall, 2010; Schmidtke, Katz & Wright, 2010). 
Friedrich & Zentall (2010) trained pigeons on a conditional discrimination task which involved 
either differential probability of reinforcement or differential responding (via key pecks) to 
comparison stimuli. Differential outcomes in two conditional discriminations effectively formed 
two stimulus classes. With the institution of a differential outcome system of equalized hedonic 
value, the authors state that arbitrary differential properties of outcomes can effectively serve as 
choice comparison cues. While this study illustrated an enhancement in speed of acquisition of 
same/different concepts, it did not addresses the learning of a novel rule via differential outcome 
procedures. 
At this point, one might ask exactly how differential outcomes allow for the attainment of 
a seemingly novel analogical rule for our rhesus monkeys. Although additional studies will be 
required to elaborate on the specific mechanisms involved, one explanation for our observed 
‘analogical emergence’ via differential outcomes draws on Spence’s (1956) theory of reward 
expectancy as a guiding mechanism for choice behavior. As previously reported (Fagot et al. 
2001; Flemming et al. 2008) relational matching is not only difficult for monkeys to attain, but 
also perceptually grounded. Thus, it stands to reason that a conceptual shift in attention (not 
unlike the relational shift children experience from perceptual to relational properties, e.g. 
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Rattermann & Gentner, 1998b) may be difficult as well.  
We assume that the monkeys’ default attentional focus under nondifferential 
reinforcement and punishment is on the perceptual properties (predicates) of individual stimuli 
instantiating the experimental stimulus pairs (i.e. Thompson & Oden, 2000). There is good 
independent evidence that monkeys focus on the local properties of stimuli grouped together and, 
more so than chimpanzees (Fagot & Tomanaga, 1999), find it difficult to focus on the more 
global structures they instantiate (De Lillo et al., 2005; Dereulle & Fagot, 1998; Fagot & 
Dereulle, 1997; Spinozzi et al., 2003). We further assume that monkey subjects learn stimulus-
type specific representations or expectancies of the differential reinforcing/punishing events. 
Berridge and Robinson (2003) discuss these reward expectations as a form of “cognitive 
incentive” wherein hedonic expectations serve as a basis for motivation. Brain substrates for 
cognitive incentives, however, are different from and operate independently of typical 
motivational components that may account for mere associative responses. Cognitive incentives, 
rather, allow for the emergence of more goal-directed strategies (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). 
Perhaps the contrast in reward only, punishment-only, and both conditions is driving the 
facilitative effect by a selective attention mechanism that operates to assist in analogical 
reasoning abilities. This cognitive incentive-motivation system guiding choice behavior may 
operate to shift and maintain the animals’ attentional focus from the local features of the 
individual stimuli within pairs to the more global relational properties of the stimulus pairs in a 
manner analogous to the way in which the decision criteria of marine mammals are 
systematically made more conservative or liberal as measured in ROC curves by differential 
contingencies of reward and punishment (Schusterman, Barrett & Moore, 1975).  
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With attention to the conceptual pair and hedonic state instantiated, a search between two 
alternate choice pairs (also hedonically enhanced) and animals’ choice behavior is guided much 
in the same way as a traditional one-item matching-to-sample task. Differential outcome 
procedures such as those instantiated in the current study may then provide the means necessary 
for multiple representations of relational-conceptual stimuli and the subsequent mapping of 
relations-between-relations. We suggest that the magnitude of reward and punishment in the both 
condition provides a sufficient and adequate ‘cognitive incentive’ to compensate for the 
increased cognitive cost/load of executing the series of computational steps requisite for 
identifying the correct choice in the RMTS task as suggested by Thompson & Oden (1996). That 
the monkeys in the current study could not retain the analogical rule learned with differential 
outcomes further suggests that the hedonic cognitive incentives in the absence of differential 
outcomes (reward & punishment) are no longer sufficient to maintain responding at the global 
conceptual relational level in the face of its cognitive costs (i.e., retention of sequential matches). 
Hence the monkeys revert to the cognitively less demanding default perceptually grounded level 
of attention to local/physical properties stimuli. The intermittent 50% reinforcement rate 
associated with such a strategy presumably is sufficient to maintain execution of responses to 
sample and comparison stimuli without regard to their abstract categorical/conceptual content. 
Although there is no evidence that we have no evidence that differential outcomes serve 
as proto-symbolic cues oft-cited as integral to analogical reasoning (Oden et al., 1990; Premack, 
1983; Thompson & Oden, 1993), it appears that differential outcomes can provide the animals 
with the requisite hedonic cognitive incentive ‘magnets’ to focus the animals attention from local 
features to more global relational properties and thereby ‘bridge’ the hitherto uncrossable 
‘conceptual gap’ in analogical reasoning by monkeys. 
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Table 4.1 
Performance Summaries by Experimental Phase 
          Phase              % correct         z                  % emphasized              χ2 
         Condition and subject                          of correct trials 
 
A1 – Differential Outcome 
 
Reward Only (DR) 
  Willie (s)  73.4  10.42*   85.2                400.73* 
  Luke (d)  53.9     1.74   50.8       .12 
 Punish Only (DP) 
Han (s)  47.5   -1.03   52.2       .83 
  Hank (d)  51.1       .49   47.6       .58 
 Both (DB) 
  Gale (s)  84.1  15.25*   52.4    1.09 
  Obi (d)   86.3  16.23*   53.0    2.78 
 
 
B1 – Equalized Outcome 1   
Willie (s)  46.9  -1.39   50.7     .08 
  Luke (d)  51.1      .49   50.1     .01 
Han (s)  52.5    1.12   47.6   1.05 
  Hank (d)  51.2      .49   51.7     .47 
  Gale (s)  52.7    1.21   49.5     .03 
  Obi (d)   54.2    1.83   46.4   2.64 
 
 
B2 – Equalized Outcome 4 
Willie (s)  52.1      .94   49.2     .12 
  Luke (d)  48.1     -.76   48.3     .47 
Han (s)  52.7    1.21   47.9     .76 
  Hank (d)  54.0    1.74   46.2  2.99 
  Gale (s)  50.3      .13   46.9  2.00 
  Obi (d)   46.2    -1.65   50.23     .01 
  
 
A2 – Differential Outcome 
 
Reward Only (DR) 
  Willie (s)  54.2   -1.83   53.5  2.62 
  Luke (d)  75.1  11.23*   81.7           327.53* 
 Punish Only (DP) 
Han (s)  53.0      1.3   50.7    .07 
  Hank (d)  48.3     -.67   48.6    .34 
  134 
 
 Both (DB) 
  Gale (s)  87.5  16.68*   49.1    .26 
  Obi (d)   89.2  17.49*   52.4  1.89 
 
Note. Emphasized relation is represented after subject name in parenthesis (s = same; d = 
different). Percent correct was calculated from the last 500 of 2000 total trials. These percentages 
reflect the same pattern of results as reported in Figure 1 for the entire block of 2000 trials. 
Within the last 500 trials, learning curves had reached a threshold and remained at levels 
approximate to the percent correct reported above. Binomial tests were run only on this last 
quartile of the data for representative statistical results that would not otherwise have been 
reflected with the full 2000 trials. Data for symmetry (% emphasized and corresponding χ2) 
analyses were taken from all correct trials out of 2000. 
*p < .01. 
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Figure 4.1. Depiction of trial choices and outcomes from the DB (both) condition with “same” 
emphasized. Screen captures (left) represent stimulus-pair arrangement as the monkey would 
see; sample pair is centered along top edge and choice pairs are located in lower corners. 
Stimulus images depicted are simplified for publication purposes. Trial-unique multi-colored 
clipart images were used throughout all phases of this project. 
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Figure 4.2. Performance summaries by condition. Percent correct was calculated for each 
individual out of the full set of 2000 trials in each of 4 experimental phases. Order of 
presentation of experimental phases was consistent for each animal and is represented left to 
right on the charts. Emphasized relation for each monkey appears in parentheses after their name. 
Horizontal dashed lines on each graph represent a level of responding consistent with chance 
(50%).  
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Chapter 5: Chimpanzee relational matching: Playing by their own (analogical) rules7 
Abstract 
Chimpanzees have been known to exhibit rudimentary abilities in analogical reasoning 
(Gillian, Premack & Woodruff, 1981; Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider & Washburn, 2008; 
Haun & Call, 2009; Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997; Thompson & Oden, 2000).  With a wide 
array of individual differences, little can be concluded about the species’ capacity for analogies, 
much less their strategies employed for solving such problems. In the current study, we examine 
analogical strategies in three chimpanzees using a 3-dimensional search task (e.g., Kennedy & 
Fragaszy, 2008). Food items were hidden under one of two or three plastic cups of varying sizes. 
Subsequently, chimpanzees searched for food under the cup of the same relative size in their own 
set of cups – reasoning by analogy.  Two chimpanzees initially appeared to fail the first 
relational phase of the task. Meta-analyses revealed, however, that they were instead using a 
secondary strategy not rewarded by the contingencies of the task – choosing based on the same 
relative position in the sample. Although this was not the intended strategy of the task, it was 
nonetheless analogical. In subsequent phases of the task, chimpanzees eventually learned to shift 
their analogical reasoning strategy to match the reward contingencies of the task and successfully 
choose based on relative size.  This evidence not only provides support for the “analogical ape” 
hypothesis (Thompson & Oden, 2000), but also exemplifies how foundational conceptually-
mediated analogical behavior may be for the chimpanzee. 
Keywords: analogical reasoning, relational matching, chimpanzee                                                         7 This chapter submitted for publication as: Flemming, T. M. & Kennedy, E. H. (under review). 
Chimpanzee relational matching: Playing by their own (analogical) rules. Journal of 
Comparative Psychology.  
  146 
 
For humans, analogies have stimulated critical thinking by helping to identify and 
construct relationships amongst items and ideas allowing for the generation of novel thought.  It 
is this higher-level reasoning that traditionally was ascribed only to humans, but throughout the 
years has been observed with varying degrees of success in some apes (e.g. Premack, 1976; 
Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997) and arguably even in monkeys (e.g. Fagot, Wasserman & 
Young, 2001; Spinozzi, De Lillo & Truppa, 2005). Little is known of the emergence of 
analogical reasoning and its complexity of use within vertebrate evolution. In the present study, 
we examine the extent to which chimpanzees may use analogies, which combined with other 
recent research may help to outline the evolutionary underpinnings of our own propensity for 
analogical reasoning and its associated cognitive mechanisms. 
By reasoning analogically, one determines the relationship amongst two or more items 
and searches for that same relationship amongst a novel problem or set of instances. Loosely 
defined, analogies involve a comparison of similarities between items that would otherwise not 
be considered alike. Thus, a conceptual-relational strategy is applied rather than an item-specific 
perceptually-driven strategy. Analogies are both functionally adaptive and cognitively efficient 
in that they allow us to apply previously-learned concepts, strategies, or rules to novel problems. 
Because of their application to critical thinking, inference, problem-solving, decision-making, 
and even memory, Hofstadter (2001) refers to analogies as the “core of cognition,” cementing 
their importance to human thought. 
Due to our shared evolutionary ancestry, chimpanzees have several cognitive 
commonalities with humans. Analogical reasoning as one such potential commonality has been 
explored since the late 1970s. One chimpanzee (Sarah) has provided perhaps the most extensive 
evidence for analogical behavior in a nonhuman (Gillian, Premack & Woodruff, 1981). After 
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extensive training with plastic tokens for the words “same” and “different,” Sarah was capable of 
completing and creating both standard item and functional analogies. Importantly, it is this 
symbolic language-like training that was thought to be responsible for her success. Thompson 
and Oden (1996) suggest that the critical role of her symbols for “same” and “different” was to 
provide her with a concrete means of encoding conceptual-relational information that is 
otherwise abstract. The task of matching then becomes one of covert symbol matching. Premack 
concurs (1976, 1986) that at least in the case of abstract relations, acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge necessary for analogical reasoning is dependent upon these specific language skills. 
 Other than a token-trained chimpanzee, few nonhuman animals have completed a 
relational matching-to-sample task without prior training with symbols for same and different 
(Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997). These chimpanzees, however, had a history of conditional 
discrimination training using tokens and multiple pairs of objects. For example, they viewed 
identically or nonidentically related pairs of stimuli and were rewarded for choosing one of two 
arbitrary tokens. The opposite (required for symbolic training) had not been tested. That is, they 
could choose the correct token in the presence of a relational pair, but it is not known whether 
they might be able to choose the same relational pair in the presence of a specific token. When 
tested using a relational matching-to-sample paradigm, they successfully chose a novel same-
relational pair of objects in the presence of an identical or nonidentically-related pair. Although 
met with minor criticism, this paradigm is widely used and accepted as a test for knowledge of 
analogical reasoning capabilities (Flemming, Beran & Wasburn, 2007; Premack, 1986; 
Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider & Washburn, 2008; Fagot, et al., 2001; Vonk, 2003).  
 Baboons naïve to any symbolic training whatsoever have shown tendencies for 
analogical-like behavior (Fagot et al., 2001). We classify their behavior as “analogical-like” 
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because of its dependence on elevated levels of entropy. Entropy, as Wasserman (2002) defines 
it, is a measure of randomness or disarray within a visual field. It is the detection of this entropy 
that is thought to underlie same and different conceptualization for pigeons and baboons. The 
degree to which an animal can detect lower levels of entropy predicts well the success in the 
utilization of the concepts for reasoning tasks such as analogies. Baboons were presented with 
displays of up to 16 identical or nonidential icons in a relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) 
paradigm. Their acquisition of the relational matching rule was slow and gradual, taking as many 
as 7,000 trials until an 84% criterion was reached and subsequently transferred to new sets of 
exemplars. While success was high with these displays of 16 icons, failure to meet criterion even 
after thousands of trials began when the displays were composed of 8 icons or less. That success 
on the RMTS task could not be garnered with fewer than 8 icons within a display reveals a 
perceptually-grounded understanding of the same and different concepts (as in Flemming et al., 
2007). Without a more rich interpretation of these concepts (i.e., symbolic encoding), one may 
argue that their rudimentary matching behavior was more or less implicit, driven by perceptual 
mechanisms.  
 Was this success by the baboons truly exemplary of analogical reasoning? We propose 
that the “perceptual feel” the baboons seem to receive for “same” and “different” utilizing 
display entropy makes matching displays in an RMTS format elementary. Thus, we do not 
believe that their success in this task is attributable to the same cognitive mechanisms that true 
reasoning by analogy requires. Even with two-item displays, then, one could argue that 
judgments utilizing entropy play a role in performance (match display of entropy=1 [2 different 
objects] to another of entropy=1; match display of entropy=0 [2 identical objects] to another of 
entropy=0). 
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 In an effort to re-examine reasoning by analogy paradigms, Kennedy and Fragaszy 
(2008) investigated the ability of capuchin monkeys to use analogical reasoning in a 3-
dimensional search task involving hidden food under 1 of 2 or 3 plastic cups of different sizes. 
Food was hidden under two sets of cups and then revealed by an experimenter in one set of cups. 
The other set of cups of different absolute sizes was available for the capuchin monkey to search 
under. Capuchins searched directly under one cup and lifted it to reveal either the presence or 
absence of reward, contingent upon matched relative size between subject and experimenter sets. 
One of four capuchin monkeys performed at levels above chance not only on a basic 2-item task, 
but also on a series of transfer tasks with 3 novel stimuli and distracters. This study along with 
results of Spinozzi et al. (2005) provides the first evidence of analogical reasoning in a capuchin 
monkey. The authors hypothesized that the intentional extensive problem-solving experience of 
this subject may have provided the scaffolding (physical to relational matching) on which this 
newly emerging analogical reasoning was built.  
 This design has several advantages over RMTS. First, it distances any connection to a 
dependency on entropy. Perceptual uniformity and chaos are no longer able to guide choice 
behavior, strengthening the argument that success on this task is exemplary of reasoning by 
analogy in the most stringent sense. Secondly, the concepts of sameness and difference are no 
longer fraught with the potential to confound with the search for sameness between sets. For 
analogy, it is trivial that the relationship within sets is the same relationship instantiated between 
sets. For example, in an analogy where the first two terms may be banana/grape, we are not 
likely to label them “same” but rather we would more specifically say that they are both “fruits.” 
If we were to label the pairing as “same” (“fruit” being implied) the search for the same 
relationship becomes more confounded.  
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Finally, a 3-dimensional search task is both interesting and advantageous over an RMTS 
task when studying analogies because it adds a level of application and ecological validity for 
reasoning. Rather than matching pre-determined concepts (i.e., same and different) subjects of 
this task are free to attempt any number of strategies, only one of which ultimately providing 
reward. For instance, the subject may choose based on absolute size searching under the cup that 
is most physically similar to, or an exact match for the absolute size of the sample. Alternatively, 
one may choose based on the same relative position as the sample. While not rewarded, this 
choice behavior is also analogical. Finally, and consistent with the reward contingencies of the 
task, subjects may (and should) choose based on relative size to the sample. Importantly, we 
should not ignore attempts using other strategies, particularly the second which is exemplary of 
analogical behavior despite reward contingencies. 
From a comparative perspective, another advantage of using the three-dimensional 
analogical search paradigm is that this task is more similar to analogical tasks that have been 
presented to children. Kennedy and Fragaszy (2008) modeled their task on one presented to 3- to 
4-year-old children by Gentner and Ratterman (1991). In this study, children searched for 
stickers hidden under analogous sets of flower-pots of different sizes. Flower pots were arranged 
in decreasing size from left to right on a table top for both the child and experimenter. 
Importantly, the sets often included distracter objects such as pots of the same absolute size 
(which were not the correct “relative size” choices) in order to determine whether the children 
relied on a strategy of object or relational similarity. To begin a trial, the experimenter 
demonstrated with her set the pots where a sticker was hidden and instructed the child to “use 
this information” to find a sticker hidden somewhere under his or her set. She then allowed the 
child to search his or her set to find the sticker. The correct choice was always to search under 
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the pot of the same relative size as the one lifted by the experimenter, a choice that was markedly 
difficult for 3-year-olds, but seemed to emerge gradually for 4-year-olds.  
This development over time of the ability to reason analogically forms the basis for the 
relational shift hypothesis (Gentner, 1988). While children initially utilize physical similarity to 
respond to problems involving two or more objects, developmental psychologists have 
recognized a ‘relational shift’ whereby the ability to understand relational similarities emerges. 
This knowledge of relational sameness subsequently allows for an application to analogical 
reasoning abilities. Attentional resources based on the amount of contextual novelty are thought 
to drive this shift (Gentner, Rattermann & Forbes, 1993). For instance, if an analogy is proposed 
in a somewhat unfamiliar context, surface similarities override any attentional focus on structural 
(relational) similarities. In familiar contexts, though, analogies can be solved because attentional 
resources are no longer consumed by surface analyses, allowing for a structural analysis to 
commence. 
Because of confounding results highly dependent on methodology, the visual MTS 
paradigm has recently been argued to be less certain in assessing “relational similarity proper” 
(Haun & Call, 2009). Because entropy could play a role in even small stimulus arrays, any 
outcome from a visual MTS test could rely heavily on exact physical features of individual 
stimuli. In an effort to examine truly conceptually-mediated analogical behavior in token-naïve 
animals, we chose to implement an adapted spatial relational similarity paradigm that has been 
used to investigate both human children (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991) and capuchin monkeys 
(Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008) The current study examines not only the possible existence of 
analogical reasoning skills in chimpanzees with no prior training of same/different concepts, but 
also the emergence of such reasoning given multiple potential strategies by which to approach a 
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task. In a series of three-dimensional interactive search tasks, chimpanzees were given the 
opportunity to search for a food reward under a cup analogous to one from a demonstrated 
baiting by an experimenter. With the oft-cited argument for the “analogical ape,” (Thompson & 
Oden, 2000) we hypothesized that chimpanzees would successfully employ an analogical 
strategy in significantly fewer trials than a capuchin monkey (c.f., Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008). 
In accordance with the relational shift hypothesis, we also expected to observe an initial focus on 
surface similarities with a later emergence of the focus on structural similarities for analogical 
reasoning. 
Method 
Subjects 
 Three adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) age 23-38 years old participated in all phases 
of this study. The chimpanzees were housed at Georgia State University’s Language Research 
Center (LRC) and have been involved in research for more than 20 years. These animals 
participated in many studies as part of the LRC’s Language Project including symbol and 
concept acquisition tasks (see Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003 for comprehensive review). While 
they are lexigram-trained chimpanzees, they had not acquired symbols for same/different or and 
size relations. All animals were symbol-naïve with respect to these analogical tasks. Two years 
prior to the current study, the chimpanzees completed 75-200 trials of a computerized relational 
matching-to-sample (RMTS) task examining the effects of meaningful stimuli on analogical 
reasoning with varying degrees of success (Flemming et al., 2008). We do not believe that this 
experience presented any confound for the current study due to the differences in computerized 
and interactive methodology as well as the duration between the tasks and minimal degrees of 
success in the previous tasks.  
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 All chimpanzees were familiar with testing paradigms in which pointing through metal 
fencing resulted in the receipt of an object or the indication of an object for the subsequent 
delivery of reward. Chimpanzees remained in their home cages during testing and were not food 
or water deprived. All housing and testing procedures were approved by Georgia State 
University’s animal care and use committees. 
Materials 
 Two sets of eight plastic stacking cups served as the experimental stimuli under which 
food rewards (M&M candies) were hidden. All cups were painted black to ensure uniform 
appearance apart from size (diameter range 5 cm to 9 cm). For subsequent transfer tests, two new 
sets of yellow plastic stacking cubes (width range 4 cm to 7 cm) were presented in order to vary 
both shape and color. These same stimulus sets were previously used by Kennedy and Fragaszy 
(2008) with capuchin monkeys. 
Testing stimuli were presented on a sliding wooden bench positioned slightly below eye 
level of the animal directly in front of the home enclosure. The 25cm x 15cm bench consisted of 
a stationary surface and a sliding surface 2.5 cm below the stationary top surface that could slide 
toward the home cage, much like a computer drawer on an office desk. To obstruct the subject’s 
view of the cups during baiting with food reward, a 40cm x 40cm white plastic panel was 
positioned between the testing bench and the front of the enclosure.  
Procedure 
 Test sessions took place approximately once per week over the course of 4-5 months for 
each animal. Sessions lasted no more than 30 minutes and/or 30 trials. Refusal to participate 
resulted in the termination of a session. All animals completed sessions from test phases in the 
following succession with the exception of one animal who skipped phase 2: 1- match-to-sample 
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training; 2- relational matching; 3- relational matching with distracter; 4- relational matching 
with novel transfer distracter; and 5- relational matching with dissimilar transfer distracter. 
 In all testing phases, one set of cups was linearly positioned on the upper level of the 
bench and served as the experimenter’s demonstration set. Another set was simultaneously 
placed on the lower sliding shelf and served as the set to which the animal could indicate via 
pointing. Cups were randomly assigned to one of five positions on each surface level in all 
testing phases so that no spatial arrangement was consistent between or within trials. Therefore, 
the likelihood that an animal would make absolute position-based selections was low. After 
invisible baiting of cups, trials in all phases began with the experimenter lifting a cup to reveal 
the location of an M&M candy reward. The sliding shelf was then pushed toward the animal to 
request selection via pointing. All pointing resulted in the experimenter lifting the cup indicated 
to reveal the presence or absence of an M&M candy reward. In the event of a correct selection, 
the visible M&M candy reward was delivered by hand to the animal through the front of the 
enclosure.  
 Careful attention was given not to cue the subjects during trials. The experimenter 
indicated the location of the reward in the sample set and immediately looked away from all 
stimuli before sliding the subject’s set forward. The experimenter only looked toward the stimuli 
once a choice was made by the subject to verify the location of the selection. See Figure 5.1 for a 
depiction of stimulus arrangements for all experimental phases. 
Matching-to-Sample (MTS) 
Out of view of the animal, the experimenter placed one or two cups upside-down on the 
higher platform (the experimenter’s set) and two upside-down choice cups (subject’s set) 
containing one identical match to the sample in randomly assigned locations on the lower sliding 
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shelf. Both the sample and correct choice were baited with one M&M candy reward. The 
experimenter then removed the obstructing panel revealing the entire apparatus and cups to the 
subject. To initiate a trial, the experimenter lifted his sample cup and pointed to the M&M. After 
two seconds, the cup was replaced, re-covering the reward. The experimenter then slid the lower 
shelf toward the front of the subject’s enclosure. To find the hidden reward in their set, the 
subject had to choose via pointing to the cup that matched the absolute size of the sample. Once 
indicated, the experimenter lifted the cup and revealed either the absence (incorrect choice) or 
presence (correct choice) of reward and handed the subject the reward in the event of a correct 
choice. 
 Each subject continued testing until he/she reached a significant criterion of 9 correct 
trials out of 11 consecutive trials in 2 testing sessions. This criterion provides statistical 
significance under a binomial test with chance responding at 50%, p <0.05. In a trial type 
involving sets of 2 cups (2 choices for the subject) chance responding was 50%. In phases of this 
experiment involving sets of 3 cups (3 choices for the subject) chance responding was 33%. 
However, in an effort to be more conservative, the alpha level remained at .05 for all analyses in 
all phases of the experiment. 
Relational Matching 
 Subjects progressed to relational matching trials only after reaching criterion on the MTS 
phase. In relational matching trials, each of the four cups was of different size. Relational 
matching procedures were carried out in exactly the same manner as previous MTS trials, 
however, the hidden reward in the subject’s set was always under the cup of the same relative 
size as the experimenter’s. That is, if the experimenter revealed the location of the hidden food in 
his set under the larger of the two cups, the subject could only find their reward by indicating the 
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larger cup in their set, regardless of absolute size. Careful attention was given not to present 
correctly matching cups of the same absolute size. Rather, employing a strategy of searching 
under the cup of the same relative size was the only option that yielded reward. Each subject 
continued testing until he/she reached a significant criterion of 9 correct trials out of 11 
consecutive trials in 2 sessions. 
 After reaching criterion on two-cup sets (with the exception of one animal), we 
introduced trials with sets of three cups. Sample and choice sets each included: largest, 
intermediate, and smallest size cups. Rewards were hidden under any one of the three cups in 
both the experimenter’s and subject’s sets. The correct strategy remained the same, requiring the 
animal to point to the cup in their set of the same relative size as indicated in the experimenter’s 
set whether largest, intermediate, or smallest. Each subject continued testing until he/she reached 
a significant criterion of 9 correct trials out of 11 consecutive trials in 2 sessions. 
Relational Matching with Distracter 
 All procedures in the first part of this phase were identical to those followed in relational 
matching, albeit the inclusion of a purposeful foil as one of the two choice cups in the four cup 
arrangement. In order to validate correct choices as the result of relational matching only and not 
one of absolute size, we utilized the cup of the same absolute size as the target sample as a 
distracter - the incorrect choice cup. For instance, if a reward were hidden under a size 6 cup in a 
sample set comprised of size 6 (larger) and size 1 (smaller), a size 6 cup would be included in the 
choice set as the smaller of the two; while it is identical to the sample cup under which the 
reward was hidden, it is not the same relative size and should be ignored. 
 In addition to two-cup trials, we also used three-cup sets in the second part of this phase. 
In three-item trials, the distracter cup was used as either of the two incorrect choices. Thus, if a 
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size 3 cup was the target and smallest of the experimenter’s set, that size 3 cup would be 
included in the subject’s set a either the intermediate or largest. All subjects continued testing 
until a criterion of 9 correct trials of 11 consecutive trials in 2 sessions was achieved.  
Relational Matching with Distracter: Novel Transfer 
 All procedures for this phase were identical to those of relational matching with distracter 
except for the objects under which the rewards were hidden. Yellow stacking cubes replaced all 
black cups for this transfer test. Of special importance to the demonstration of analogical 
reasoning, generalization to novel stimuli can provide the necessary evidence for flexible use of 
the strategic rule rather than the possible employment of rote memorization. 
Relational Matching with Distracter: Dissimilar Transfer 
As a final transfer test, we utilized both sets of previously presented stimuli. Both black 
cups and yellow cubes served as sets for relational matching. Groups of three black cups could 
be presented as either the experimenter’s or subject’s set, while yellow cubes comprised the 
other set. For example, the experimenter hid the reward under the intermediate yellow cube in 
his set and the intermediate black cup of the subject’s set. Employment of the correct strategy 
required using the relational size rule to match physically dissimilar objects from two completely 
different stimulus sets. All subjects continued testing until a criterion of 9 correct trials of 11 
consecutive trials in 2 sessions was achieved.  
Results 
Matching-to-Sample 
 On the one-sample MTS task, all 3 chimpanzees met a criterion of 9 correct of 11 
consecutive trials in 2 sessions within an average of 33 trials (Panzee – 21 trials; Sherman – 38 
trials; Lana – 39 trials). No apparent side-biases or alternate strategies were observed.  
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 On the physical match of a two-sample MTS task, all 3 chimpanzees met the same 
criterion in an average of 28 trials across 2 testing sessions. Again, no apparent side biases or 
alternate strategies were observed.  See Figure 5.2 for a summary of trials to criterion.  
Relational Matching 
 Two of three subjects met criterion on the relational matching task. Panzee met criterion 
after completing 54 trials. Sherman met criterion after only 42 trials, relatively consistent with 
his rate of acquisition on simple physical matching tasks. The third subject, Lana, completed 
more than 143 trials without meeting a criterion of 9 consecutive trials correct.  
 No side biases were observed. However, alternate strategies and consistent patterns of 
error were observed for two of three animals. Sherman’s first strategy relied on relative position 
of the choice cups to the sample cups, rather than relative size. In 100% of the first 14 trials 
performed, Sherman chose the cup in his set that was in the same relative position as the sample 
cup. If the reward was revealed to be under the experimenter’s right-side cup (from the subject’s 
point of view), Sherman indicated for a search under the right-most cup in his set. Because of 
randomly assigned positioning of cups, this strategy cannot be attributed to proximity of choice 
cups to sample cups. In some trials, the leftmost sample cup was in closer proximity to the right 
choice cup (and vice versa). Within his 42 trials to criterion, 27 were chosen on the basis of a 
relative positioning within each set (z = 1.7, p<.05).  
 Panzee completed trials with chance accuracy in the first session of 33 trials (z = 2.87, p 
>.05). Like Sherman, Panzee significantly favored a relative position strategy (z = 3.83, p<.05); 
on 28 of 33 trials, she chose the cup in the same relative position as the correct sample, before 
switching to the intended relative size strategy. 
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 The third subject, Lana, had no clear alternate strategies and performed at levels 
consistent with chance alone for 143 trials (z = -.17, p>.05). No other biases were observed. 
Relational Matching with Distracter 
 Two subjects met criterion with two-item sets on the relational matching with distracter 
phase. Panzee completed 100% of the first 9 trials correctly. Sherman met the set criterion within 
30 trials. Because Lana did not meet criterion in the previous phase, she was not tested on the 
same paradigm with distracters. No apparent biases or alternate strategies were observed. 
 In sessions including 3 cup sizes, all 3 subjects were tested and met criterion. Panzee and 
Sherman both met criterion within 46 and 53 trials respectively, a rate relatively consistent with 
acquisition in other phases. Panzee and Sherman both initially favored a relative position 
strategy. Panzee chose the cup of same relative position in 100% of the first 17 trials performed 
before switching to a consistent pattern of choice on relative size. Sherman perseverated on 
choice by relative position for 13 out of 13 trials before utilizing a relative size strategy.  
Lana, who had not met criterion on any phase of the experiment involving sets of 2 cups, 
met criterion in only 26 trials in the 3-item relational matching with distracter.  
Relational Matching with Distracter: Novel Transfer 
 All 3 subjects met criterion on this novel transfer test consisting of sets of yellow cubes. 
Panzee, Sherman, and Lana chose correctly on 9 of 11 consecutive trials in 2 sessions within 
totals of 32, 27, and 24 trials, respectively. No apparent side biases or alternate strategies were 
observed. 
Relational Matching with Distracter: Dissimilar Transfer 
 All 3 subjects met criterion on the final transfer test with dissimilar sets of sample and 
choice stimuli. Panzee, Sherman, and Lana searched correctly on 9 of 11 consecutive trials in 2 
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sessions within totals of 29, 23, and 26 trials, respectively. No apparent side biases or alternate 
strategies were observed. See Figure 5.2 for a summary of trials-to-criterion data for all 
experimental phases. 
Discussion 
 Three chimpanzees used conceptual size information about relations to successfully 
employ reasoning by analogy in a conceptually-mediated three-dimensional search task. Along 
with the results of one capuchin monkey (Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008), this series of experiments 
with chimpanzees provides unique evidence of analogical reasoning in nonhuman primates 
without dependence on specialized token training. In addition, chimpanzees in the current study 
demonstrate a pattern of responding that, while not initially intended by the experimental 
contingencies, was nonetheless analogical in nature. Initial errors made in relational matching 
tests were almost entirely due to a search under cups that matched in relative position to the 
sample, rather than the intended cup of relative size. This predisposition for the utilization of an 
analogical strategy provides the first evidence that the so-called “analogical ape” (Thompson & 
Oden, 2000) is not merely capable of such reasoning with extensive specialized training, but 
perhaps reliant on relational or analogical rules in its daily behavioral repertoire. 
In experiments with children and adult humans, researchers agree that surface similarities 
are the key to whether participants will employ analogy to solve a problem when not explicitly 
told to do so (Catrambone, 2002; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbes, 1993). In addition, human 
participants are particularly distracted by surface similarities in analogous problems, even when 
they are unimportant (Ross, 1987). That chimpanzees avoided these purposely included 
distracters in the current study is worthy of further discussion. Since all stimuli presented were 
cups identical in every respect except for size, it is perhaps the case that surface properties were 
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quickly disregarded as a viable search dimension. Because structural similarities often present 
such confound in the employment of analogies, using less variable stimuli seems to present a 
distinct advantage for relational learning and provides insight for future studies. 
Also sensitive to surface similarities and perceptual predisposition, Vonk (2003) 
demonstrated understanding by orangutans and a gorilla of second-order relations similar to 
requirements in the current study. Animals completed an identity vs. nonidentity relational 
matching-to-sample task akin to those that often present difficulty for non-apes. Importantly, all 
stimuli were drawn from a set of four simple geometric shapes filled with one of four colors. By 
controlling the number of dimensions on which the stimulus pairs and relations could vary, 
Vonk’s (2003) task encouraged a strategy not reliant upon extensive perceptual processing. Like 
the current study, orangutans and a gorilla demonstrated rapid learning of the analogical rule 
perhaps due to a mediated shift in focus to more conceptual properties available in the test 
display. 
The findings of the current study extend the results of Haun and Call (2009) investigating 
recognition training for relational similarity. Three groups of great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, 
and orangutans) as well as 3- and 4-year old children were presented with a series of tasks 
involving a search for reward under sets of three cups in which a relational strategy resulted in 
success. Haun & Call (2009) presented the sets of cups on an inclined platform with one set at 
the top and another at the bottom for subjects to search amongst. In two conditions, correct 
choices of cups were physically connected to each other with plastic tubes or lines painted on the 
surface of the platform. In a final condition, no tubes or lines were present to connect correct 
choices, leaving a task highly analogous to the present study. While the first two conditions 
provide little evidence for true relational understanding and analogy completion, subjects 
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excelled in making correct choices, specifically in those trials in which correct choices were in 
the closest proximity to samples. Gorillas and orangutans showed less success in matching on the 
basis of relation when objects were connected only by lines and were farthest in proximity to 
samples. In the final phase of the experiment where objects were not connected, only 
chimpanzees performed above chance, albeit undetermined significance. Human children, 
bonobos, and gorillas were not presented with this variation of the task. One may argue that with 
physical connections between sample and choice objects, subjects in this series of experiments 
need not employ a relational strategy to succeed. Rather, physical connectedness and proximity 
seem a more parsimonious explanation. That chimpanzees had markedly more difficulty with the 
task when objects were not physically connected leaves uncertain their ability to use relational 
similarity to reason analogically. Thus, our current study is unique in providing such evidence. 
 In contrast to results from 3 of 4 capuchins from Kennedy and Fragaszy (2008), 
chimpanzees in our current study appeared to have no greater difficulty meeting criterion on 
relational tasks than physical matching-to-sample tasks (See Figure 5.3). Presenting physical 
matching tasks before those in which relational matches could have created an additional 
confound of the necessity to switch rules between tasks. That no deficits were observed when 
transitioning from physical matching to relational matching for both our chimpanzees and 1 of 4 
capuchins (Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008), it is likely that physical matching tasks (with which the 
chimpanzees in this study have extensive experience) facilitate parallel relational tasks.  
 While we observe less contrast between physical matching and relational matching in 
chimpanzees than Kennedy & Fragaszy (2008) found with capuchins, the most notable 
difference between ape and monkey performance is a reduction in the number of trials required 
to reach criterion for chimpanzees. One capuchin monkey reached criterion on tasks involving 
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relational similarity in an average of 150 trials (with more than 800 trials required for MTS 
training). With 54 trials, Panzee was the chimpanzee who required the most trials to reach 
criterion on any task requiring a relational match. Notably, this was also the first task requiring a 
shift from physical to relational matching. On average, the three chimpanzees in this series of 
experiments required approximately 34 trials to reach a criterion of 9 out of the last 11 
consecutive trials correct in 2 consecutive testing sessions. Acquisition of the analogical rule in 
this case required roughly ¼ the number of trials on average for chimpanzees than a capuchin 
monkey.  
A possible contributing factor for the success of the chimpanzees in the present study, as 
suggested by Thompson, Oden and Boysen (1997), is their generalized symbol-training history. 
Although these animals never received any symbolic training for referents relevant to the current 
tasks, we believe that symbols may provide a more generalized system by which animals can 
otherwise represent their world. With the use of symbols, external objects can be represented 
internally, allowing for the mapping of two iconically equivalent states in an analogy (Thompson 
et al., 1997; Premack, 1986). Future studies with completely symbol-naïve chimpanzees would 
provide the potential for comparison in possible rates of success.  
Previous tasks suggest difficulty in identity/nonidentity RMTS tasks for several 
nonhuman primate species including monkeys and apes (Flemming et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 
1997). The three-dimensional search task presented in the current study is perhaps more effective 
and applied for chimpanzees (and capuchins in Kennedy & Fragasy, 2008) given a higher degree 
of ecological salience. Consider a foraging scenario for a primate in which it must choose a site 
based on its size relative to the size of surrounding sites. It is likely that primates would learn the 
benefits of choosing the largest tree/site in its field of vision because it produces the highest gain. 
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In its next encounter with foraging sites, knowledge of relative size comparisons and the 
corresponding yield may be recalled. In the case of impending predators, one may also consider 
size relations in reverse preference: avoid the largest of visible predators. The rather spontaneous 
employment of analogies by chimpanzees in the current study may speak to application of the 
strategy in a more ecologically salient setting than in some previous studies.  
Recognizing relations within a set appears almost trivial for both rhesus monkeys (e.g., 
Fagot et al., 2001; Flemming et al., 2007) and chimpanzees (see Thompson & Oden, 2000 for 
review), but the application of that relational knowledge between sets is hindered for some. 
Why? We suggest that in identity vs. nonidentity (same/different) tasks, there exists a confound 
between within and between set comparisons. For example, in traditional RMTS tasks, the 
question posed is “here is the same sample pair, now pick the SAME choice pair as the sample 
from either same or different.” In these tasks, subjects are required to apply the same concept in 
two conflicting ways. This added layer of difficulty in RMTS tasks may help to explain prevalent 
failures by non-ape species as well as the success of a capuchin monkey in the present size-
relation three-dimensional search paradigm.  
It is perhaps the case that the success demonstrated by chimpanzees in the current study 
along with the successful performance of other apes (for review, see Thompson & Oden, 2000; 
Vonk, 2003) and monkeys (Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008; Spinozzi et al., 2003) in contrast to 
failure of some monkeys (Flemming et al., 2007) to succeed in the judgment of relations-
between-relations may also be attributable to differences in experimental procedures. A 
paradigm shift for future studies toward less perceptually-dependent concepts may more fairly 
evaluate the analogical abilities of non-apes and allow for a more critical analysis of mechanisms 
involved from a comparative perspective based on what is truly required for analogy.  
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In conclusion, this study provides unique evidence for successful employment of 
reasoning by analogy by token-naïve chimpanzees on a task that is less grounded in perceptual 
features of stimuli (i.e. not based on identity/nonidentity relations).   That chimpanzees so readily 
learn this analogical task and employ analogical strategies even when the reward contingencies 
of the task are not met suggests a predisposition for and deeper integration of analogical abilities 
with other areas of cognition and daily behavior than originally hypothesized.  
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Figure 5.1. Rendering of trial types presented to chimpanzees. Numbered circles represent cups 
of an example absolute size. The top row in each phase represents the experimenter’s set of cups; 
bottom row represents subject’s choice set. Arrows connecting cups indicate correct matches. 
Squares represent cubes used for transfer tests. Not all images drawn to scale between phases. 
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Figure 5.2. Number of trials required to reach criterion for each experimental phase. MTS = one-
sample matching-to-sample; Physical Match = two-sample matching-to-sample; Rel Match = 
two-item relational matching; Rel Distract = two-item relational matching with distracters; Rel 3 
Distract = three-item relational matching with distracters; Rel 3 Distract Transfer = three-item 
relational matching using all novel stimuli; Rel 3 Distract Dissimilar = three-item relational 
matching with novel stimuli used only in subject’s set. Criterion not reached for Lana in 
relational matching and relational matching with distracter phases. 
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Figure 5.3. Summary across session types for all physical matching tasks (MTS and physical 
match) and all two- and three-item relational matching tasks (relational match, relational 
matching with distracters, three-item relational matching with distracters, three-item relational 
matching using all novel stimuli; three-item relational matching with dissimilar stimuli) for each 
animal. 
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Chapter 6: Synthesis and Discussion 
 
Comparative studies of the capacity for analogical reasoning have produced an important 
debate in the literature. I have argued here and elsewhere (Thompson & Flemming, 2008) that 
the difference between the cognitive operations of same/different discrimination and relational 
matching (analogy) is in fact one of degree rather than kind.  Conversely, Penn, Holyoak and 
Povinelli (2008) remain firm in their case for the contrary. Rather than considering a 
computation of a higher degree for RMTS, Penn et al. (2008) attributed failure by monkeys to 
complete RMTS tasks to a cognitive difference of kind: a kind attributable to a specialized 
system of symbols for reinterpretation of relational concepts unique to humans. Whereas I 
understand their argument, I believe that the crux of our counter-argument was overlooked. With 
an abundance of recent evidence that similar symbolic systems exist in our nearest primate 
relatives (Chapter 2; Gillian, Premack & Woodruff, 1981; Harris, Gulledge, Beran & Washburn, 
2010; Pepperberg, 2002; Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith & Lawson, 1980; Thompson & 
Oden, 1996; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Washburn, Thompson & Oden, 1997), why would it be 
that the mapping of relations still seems so difficult if Penn et al.’s (2008) relational 
reinterpretation (RR) hypothesis holds true?  
The argument developed in this dissertation helps shed light on the answer: Whereas 
symbol systems can certainly facilitate reasoning by analogy, they are not the only modality 
through which the mapping of relations can be accomplished. Knowledge of relational concepts 
dependent entirely on contrast in perceptual variability (Fagot, Wasserman & Young, 2001), as 
Penn et al. (2008) suggest, seems implausible given the propensity of monkeys to discriminate 
same from different at the lowest level of contrast (Chapter 3). Additionally, even with a proto-
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symbolic system in place (Chapter 2) rhesus monkeys still failed to complete a relational 
matching-to-sample task. Further, relational matching can be accomplished by the rhesus 
monkey with specific (perhaps attention re-directing) scaffolding in place (Chapter 4). Data 
from apes (Chapter 5) without any potential for confound with perceptual variability further 
implicates a more conceptual understanding as underlying reasoning by analogy in nonhuman 
primates, and in particular chimpanzees.  
Penn et al.’s (2008) strict representational-only approach excludes nonhuman animals 
from analogical reasoning by definition, and this is counterproductive to a comparative 
psychological understanding of cognition. A more liberal view of analogy allows for the 
consideration of other mechanisms through which analogy can be accomplished. In fact, by more 
conventional definitions, analogy need not be accomplished by any certain modality (Gentner, 
1989; Goswami, 1995; Leech, Mareschal & Cooper, 2008).  In a more inclusive definition, one 
can establish a relationship by any means possible, so long as organisms are able to seek out and 
successfully find that same relationship among novel elements – a task that several species of 
nonhuman primates seem able to accomplish (Chapters 4 & 5; Fagot et al., 2001; Fagot & 
Parron, 2010; Gilliam, et al., 1981; Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008; Spinozzi, Lubrano & Truppa, 
2004; Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997; Vonk, 2003). Through a discussion of hypothesized 
accounts of the emergence of analogical reasoning, I will provide evidence that points to the 
existence of an ability to reason analogically or at least to analogical precursors that function in 
much the same way throughout the primate lineage. 
Analogy: Just an extension of similarity? 
With the consistencies between the mechanisms of conceptual and perceptual cognitive 
systems outlined earlier, and at length by Goldstone and Barsalou (1998), it should be clear that 
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the conceptual system is not only dependent upon but also likely emerged from the more basic 
mechanisms of perception. From a theoretical standpoint, the question then remains whether 
perceptual similarity and analogy are really similarity of a different kind, and if so what 
distinguishes them.  Consideration of this possible distinction can be divided into a debate of 
surface versus deep similarity (Gentner, 1983) and global versus dimensional similarity (Smith, 
1989).  
A distinction between surface and deep similarity delineates physical from analogical 
similarity (Gentner, 1989).  Surface similarities (physical attributes) give rise to generalizable 
concepts for the relations same and different. Deep similarity on the other hand refers to 
consistency on a level not attributable to physical similarities alone, but rather on a conceptual 
level, based on judgments of one’s mental representations. It is noteworthy that these are 
contrasts in continua, not dichotomies (Gentner, 1989). The continuum on which analogy and 
physical similarity lie is one of the amount of overlap in physical attributes from featural to 
conceptual identity. With mere appearance giving rise to relational concepts, it stands to reason 
that a clear understanding for relational concepts then could give rise to a matching of relations, 
lying successively along the same continuum of similarity. 
An alternative view of similarity analysis, one of dimensional and global similarity, 
makes clearer the consistencies as mediated by expertise in subject matter that more directly 
influence one’s ability to generalize a similarity rule. Smith (1989) argued that differences in 
similarity are driven largely by knowledge about the stimuli involved. Dimensional similarity 
refers to that which is limited to known objects, based on any number of similarities inferred 
from the knowledge of those objects.  Global similarity, rather, implies the application of some 
rule to entirely novel domains.  This shift from domain-specific to domain-general is crucial for 
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consideration of reasoning by analogy, not unlike Gentner’s (1988) description of a relational 
shift with human development that also emphasized an importance of expertise in knowledge for 
domain-specific attributes.  
With the difficulties in relational matching by rhesus monkeys observed in Chapters 2-4, 
it would seem that the gap between simple perceptual similarities and analogy is quite large for 
nonhuman primates. Large amounts of training may be required to make the shift from domain-
specific (surface, dimensions) to domain-general (deep, global) similarity. For instance, it could 
be the case that difficulties in analogical reasoning by animals are eased by increasing exposure 
to new instances upon which the same rules must be applied.  Whereas more rapid learning of 
same and different concepts is typically observed with fewer training instances (Cook, 2002), 
generalizability and application of those concepts more exemplary of true conceptual 
understanding is observed with exposure to larger stimulus sets over a longer time span (Katz, 
Wright & Bachevalier, 2002). Given that gradual learning curves rather than sharp acquisition 
curves were observed in pigeons and several primate species in same/different discrimination 
learning (Katz et al., 2002; Blaisdell, 2005; Fagot et al., 2001), it stands to reason that there may 
be significant effects of exposure in generalization for first- and second-order relational concept 
learning.  Although the gap from similarity (domain-specific) to analogy (domain-general) seems 
wide, the necessary shift seems bridgeable given experience with which to see the forest through 
the trees. 
Analogy as high-level perception 
In the case of multiple-icon arrays used for relational matching-to-sample tasks (Fagot et 
al., 2001), why is it that successful matching is often not considered exemplary of analogical 
reasoning (Cook, 2002; Penn et al., 2008)?  Influence from bottom-up processes of perception 
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should not be discounted as informative to relational mapping. As adults, we do not typically 
rely exclusively on bottom-up processes for analogical mapping (Gentner, 1989), favoring 
instead structured representations and elaborate terms of relatedness (Leech et al., 2008). 
Whereas top-down and bottom-up approaches may seem quite different, they often produce the 
same outcomes.  
One theory of analogy that supports reasoning by detection of perceptual variability is a 
view of relational matching as high-level perception. French and colleagues (Chalmers, French 
& Hofstader, 1992; French, 1995; French, 2000) provided an account for high-level perception 
that describes analogy as driven largely by bottom-up processes involved in the initial stages of 
perception.  This transition from low-level (retinal input) to high-level perception begins where 
concepts play an important role, starting with object recognition and ending with relational 
concept acquisition. Another important facet of high-level perception is that it is extremely 
flexible. A given set of input data may be (and perhaps should be) perceived in a number of 
different ways, dependent upon context or domain of knowledge. This last point should not be 
overlooked, as generalizability is tantamount to the mapping of relational concepts in analogy. 
Chalmers et al. (1992) stated that for high-level perception to be guiding behavior, extraction of 
some level of meaning or true conceptual understanding is required, although they remained 
vague on the exact nature of this meaning, suggesting that a mental representation of said 
concept should be instantiated in some way. 
Although they did not discount the influences of belief, goals or external contexts in 
which previous learning may have taken place (top-down processes), French and colleagues 
argued that early application of analogy in human children and even adults can be solved by 
high-level perception alone. From a comparative perspective, this same logic could apply for 
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nonhuman animals, given the significant role of entropy and other perceptual measures involved 
in relational concept learning (Chapters 2-3; Wasserman & Young, 2010), wherein the line 
between that which is perceptually- versus conceptually guided is blurred. Although relational 
matching-to-sample tasks that involve multiple icon arrays (i.e., Fagot et al., 2001) are 
exemplary of relational mapping, their validity as measures of understanding of analogy is 
argued because of a possible reliance on perceptual measures alone. 
 Findings from Chapters 2 and 3 confirm that monkeys have a firm understanding of 
relational concepts. Both rhesus and capuchin monkeys used entropy contrast (perceptual 
variability detection), albeit to differing degrees, to learn the relational concepts for same and 
different.  That rhesus monkeys subsequently failed to match these same relations presents an 
argument against analogy as computable by high-level perception alone. Whereas their 
knowledge of relations may likely be attributable to high-level perceptual skills, the mapping of 
one relation to another seems guided by another mechanism. In the case of relational matching-
to-sample tasks, although the animal may use higher-level perception within each pair of 
stimulus elements, they likely are not applying that same perceptual mechanism to the entire 
visual pattern displays (3 pairs). If analogy could be explained by high-level perception alone, 
we would expect rhesus monkeys more easily to move from relational discriminations to 
relational mapping. The disconnect, then, seems in their ability to generalize further this 
relational information, suggesting a more domain-specific restriction on learned relational 
information. 
Analogy as relational priming 
 In Leech et al.’s (2008) theory of analogy, reliance on perceptual abilities alone was 
addressed from a slightly different perspective: analogy as relational priming. Leech and 
  180 
 
collaborators argued against an approach to analogy that involves structured representations and 
structure mapping. Rather than requiring additional mechanisms (higher-level reasoning), 
analogies were seen to grow out of the normal functioning of memory with one relation priming 
the next. In this way, analogy emerged as a byproduct of spreading activation.  Leech and 
colleagues believed consideration of an implicit mapping approach was warranted given that 
there was no difference between response times for participants to complete the mapping of 
relations and subsequent analogical transfer (Ripoll, Brude & Coulon, 2003).  
 Additional evidence for relational priming in problems of analogy can be gleaned from the 
results of experiments with both human children (Gentner, 1988) and adults (Schunn & Dunbar, 
1996). In both tasks, experimental participants first read one type of story and solved a problem 
proposed afterward with similar underlying structures as material from the story. Control 
participants did not read the story, but were prompted to solve the same problem. Participants in 
the experimental condition were significantly more likely than control participants who had not 
read the first story to propose an appropriate solution to the problem. Surprisingly, none of the 
experimental participants, neither children nor adults, made mention of the first story or 
similarities in resolution, even when prompted for an explanation of how they went about 
solving the problem. Accordingly, Schunn and Dunbar (1996) concluded that the behavior of 
their participants was implicitly informed due to priming. 
 With an absence of evidence for perceptual or conceptual priming effects for rhesus 
monkeys (Basile & Hampton, 2010), failure to match relations in Chapters 2 and 4 leaves open 
the possibility for a model of analogy as relational priming. That priming effects are not often 
observed in monkeys may help to explain why, if we are to consider analogy as relational 
priming, they are not primed by the sample relation to inform their selection of the correct choice 
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relation, giving way to relational matching.  Whereas the current evidence does not clearly 
provide support for a hypothesis equating analogy with relational priming, it is perhaps the case 
that comparative studies with monkeys cannot support nor deny this hypothesis, due to a lack of 
evidence for priming in general. If perceptual or other conceptual priming effects were 
commonly observed in monkeys, failures to match relations by monkeys in Chapters 2 and 4 
would further suggest that analogy is not simply explained by relational priming; the 
presentation of one relation does not prime selection for the correction choice relation. 
The conceptual feel reexamined 
The distinction between processes that may be implicit in nonhuman animals and 
explicitly reasoned by human subjects does not necessitate a difference of kind for the behavioral 
outcome. In Chapter 4, by using what was referred to casually as a conceptual feel, rhesus 
monkeys successfully matched relational concepts for same and different in one of the few 
demonstrations of analogical behavior by a non-ape. Suppose as in the case of the 
aforementioned examination of implicit relational priming in humans (Schunn & Dunbar, 1996), 
the choices by monkeys finding success in a relational matching-to-sample task in Chapter 4 
with differential scaffolding in place were not explicitly guided. Lending further support to an 
implicit judgment of relations-between-relations, the monkeys in this task did not transfer their 
supposed generalizable matching rule to subsequent conditions lacking differential outcomes. If 
their judgments were explicitly made, why then did they not retain these rules for application in 
future sessions? Monkeys finding success with sufficiently bold differential outcomes indeed 
may not have discerned the rules for matching explicitly, but nonetheless gleaned an implicit 
hedonically-guided gist of task demands. 
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Hedonic valence and differential expectancies created by differential outcomes could 
serve as a mechanism through with successful choice behavior was accomplished. Berridge and 
Robinson (2003) discuss hedonic expectation as a form of cognitive incentive that allowed for 
the emergence of more goal-directed strategies. In turn differential hedonic valences are 
produced from differential outcomes. With hedonic valence instantiated, a search between two 
alternate choice pairs (also hedonically enhanced) and animals’ choice behavior is guided more 
simply by the matching of hedonic states.  The magnitude of reward and punishment in the both 
condition of Chapter 4 provides a sufficient and adequate ‘cognitive incentive’ to compensate 
for the increased cognitive cost/load of executing the series of computational steps requisite for 
identifying the correct choice in the RMTS task as suggested by Thompson & Oden (1996). That 
the relational matching by monkeys in Chapter 4 was not sustained without differential 
outcomes further suggests that the hedonic cognitive incentives established were the driving 
mechanism through which choice behavior was independently guided.  Thus, although the 
monkeys were not mapping one relation to another via conceptual reinterpretation (i.e., symbols) 
they were able map one hedonic state instantiated by a relation to another. 
Motivation 
An alternate explanation for successful completion of the relational matching task by 
rhesus monkeys is an overall increase in motivational state. As described above, a system of 
differential rewards and punishments in the RMTS task likely initiated the emergence of 
differently valenced expectancies for relational pairs. Although generally posited to be driven by 
the hedonic value of the reward, heightened motivation alone may produce enough cognitive 
incentive for increased attention to meet task demands (Astley, Peissig & Wasserman, 2001). 
The role of motivation for monkeys in a seemingly difficult task with irregular reinforcement 
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caused by incorrect choices can be substantial (Beran, Washburn & Rumbaugh, 2007). Monkeys 
often develop response biases on computerized tasks from which success (optimal payoff) cannot 
be achieved (Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider & Washburn, 2008). Motivation, heightened 
by an increase in reward, can in turn activate goal-directed behavior. One control condition in the 
task in Chapter 4 attempted to address a more generalized role of motivation and effect of 
reward magnitude alone. In the equalized outcome with a magnitude of 4:1 base reward, the 
effect of mere reward magnitude was assessed and found to be not significant in inducing 
successful matching of relations. If however, heightened matching performance was observed in 
this condition, a generalized heightened motivational state might be implicated for relational 
matching. Thus, a hypothesis for general heightened motivation is not supported by the data from 
Chapter 4. 
Attention 
With a more general effect of motivation likely not implicated for reasoning by analogy, 
a better explanation is that of attention as a mediating factor in motivation’s influence on 
reasoning. It stands to reason that differential rewards and punishment in this task did not so 
much influence generalized motivation as they increased the level of stimulus examination, 
encouraging a relational shift that allowed for the emergence of relational matching.  As 
previously reported (Fagot et al. 2001; Fagot & Parron, 2010; Flemming et al. 2008) relational 
matching is not only difficult for monkeys to attain, but also perceptually grounded. Thus, it 
seems likely that a required conceptual shift in attention, not unlike the relational shift described 
by Gentner (1983), may be dependent upon motivational incentive. 
It is assumed that a monkey’s default attentional focus under nondifferential 
reinforcement and punishment is on the perceptual properties (predicates) of individual stimuli 
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instantiating the experimental stimulus pairs (i.e., Thompson & Oden, 2000). There is good 
independent evidence that monkeys focus on the local properties of stimuli grouped together and, 
more so than chimpanzees, find it difficult to focus on the more global structures they instantiate 
(De Lillo, Spinozzi, Truppa & Naylor, 2005; Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; 
Fagot & Tomanaga, 1999; Spinozzi, De Lillo & Truppa, 2003). Thus, a generalized motivational 
incentive system guiding choice behavior may operate to shift and maintain the animals’ 
attentional focus from the local features of the individual stimuli within pairs to the more global 
relational properties of the stimulus pairs. 
Another level on which attention may operate in a relational matching task is in the 
ability perceptually to separate the elements of paired stimuli. Baboons (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; 
Fagot & Parron, 2010) and rhesus monkeys (Hopkins & Washburn, 2002) tend to process 
compound stimuli locally, being largely driven by the distance between them. This is critical in 
consideration of stimulus arrangement in the relational matching-to-sample task where distances 
are great between pairs, but not within, thus encouraging comparison of grouped stimulus 
conglomerates, rather than a comparison between pairs distinctly composed of two elements 
each. Increased attentional focus to the stimulus elements may allow for a global processing both 
within and between the pairs.  Thus, attention is critical in encouraging the proper structuring of 
the task as one of a comparison between pairs of stimuli likely not present without motivational 
incentive by differential outcomes. Improper structuring then is a result of a binding failure 
(Treisman, 1991) wherein relations are not the most salient feature. 
The existence of species differences in perceptual processing provides support for the 
differences observed in propensity for relational matching between rhesus monkeys and 
chimpanzees. Hopkins and Washburn (2002) reported not only that rhesus monkeys exhibited a 
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local-to-global approach to processing visual stimuli (where global processing is relevant to 
relational concept extraction), but also that, like humans (Fujita & Matsuzawa, 1988), 
chimpanzees employed global-to-local processing strategies (Hopkins & Washburn, 2002). A 
global approach to visual processing brings to the forefront of a relational matching-to-sample 
trial the relational concepts instantiated by pairs of elements, rather than features of individual 
stimuli. This important difference in approach for chimpanzees affords a seemingly default 
analogical mechanism whereby relational matching is observed quickly and without difficulty 
(Chapter 5) relative to rhesus monkeys (Chapter 4).  
 For rhesus monkeys, a local-to-global approach in visual processing results in a focus on 
perceptual features of stimuli, disrupting the formation of relational concepts and certainly the 
recognition of relations-between-relations. Fagot and Parron (2010) attributed previous failures 
on relational matching-to-sample tasks by rhesus monkeys to spatial discontiguity of stimuli. 
Because of the distance between stimuli within pairs in traditional relational matching tasks, 
Fagot and Parron (2010) suggested that same and different relational concepts simply were not 
formed, rendering the subsequent mapping of those relations impossible. Successful performance 
by baboons in recent experiments with compound stimuli provides support for this argument 
(Fagot and Parron, 2010), but does not discount the finding that other factors (e.g. differential 
outcomes) also provide means through which monkeys form relational concepts and 
subsequently match relations. Rather, the proper structuring of the task is accomplished even in 
light of these spatial discontiguities through other means of focusing attention (Chapter 4). 
Why analogy still seems so difficult 
Analogical reasoning is clearly a multi-faceted ability requiring the selection of 
information that is relevant and rejecting the information that is not.  Richland, Morrison and 
  186 
 
Holyoak (2006) took a somewhat different approach to why analogy is often perceived as 
difficult in that it is cognitively demanding and likely requires a significant degree of executive 
function to integrate a multitude of relations. Thibaut, French and Vezneva (2010) favored 
Richland et al.’s (2006) argument over other accounts that implicated domain knowledge as 
driving the relational shift for analogy in human children (Gentner, 1988; Goswami & Brown, 
1990; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). In large measure, the Richland et al. (2006) hypothesis 
excels because specific cognitive mechanisms involved in the shift are not specified and not 
easily quantified due to differences across domain knowledge. The mechanism, according to 
Thibaut et al. (2010) is one of executive function brought about by competition between relations 
and attributes of objects involved. With age, and presumably greater executive control, Thibaut 
et al. (2010) concluded that children were increasingly able to use analogy to solve non-semantic 
relational matches based on a variety of shape transformations. Younger children seemed to lack 
control of inhibition (one of the primary components of executive functioning) in both 
responding to and searching of the entire solution space for correct alternatives, implicating a 
continuum of executive control. 
Tests of executive control in rhesus monkeys reveal even larger deficits in inhibition 
relative to humans. For example, macaques manifest larger Stroop effects, or disruptions from 
irrelevant but prepotent competing response cues that could not be inhibited, than do humans 
when both species are directly compared (Washburn, 1994). To the degree that a task requires 
increasing levels of executive control, monkeys tend to have decreasing levels of success. 
Attention-shifting, task-switching, planning, monitoring, and response inhibition testing 
paradigms are measures of executive function that when presented to monkeys implicate not 
only behavioral but also functional differences in the prefrontal cortex relative to humans (Stoet 
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& Snyder, 2003). In relational matching-to-sample, within- and between-pair stimulus 
evaluations require independent computation before choice selection. In addition, an attentional 
shift from perceptual features to relational-conceptual focus is required. With increased difficulty 
and cost in response inhibition and attention shifting, it stands to reason that for monkeys, 
relational matching tasks requiring a high degree of executive function will be especially 
demanding and likely require other means through which attentional focus can be achieved (i.e., 
differential reward scaffolding, Chapter 4).  
Representation and the language “requirement” 
Without any explicit token-training as once implicated necessary for analogy (Premack, 
1981), three monkey species have recently been shown to pass tests of relational matching-to-
sample with or without other specialized scaffolding in place (Chapter 4; Fagot et al., 2001; 
Fagot & Parron, 2010; Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008; Spinozzi et al., 2004). What then is the role 
of language and/or token training in analogy? Without question, the use of language gives way to 
a broader generalization of the analogical rule in humans (Gentner, 1989; Holyoak & Hummel, 
2001; Premack & Premack, 2010). In fact, one of the main reasons for consideration of the role 
of language in analogy was their co-emergence throughout development (Goswami, 1995; 
Piaget, 1977). A collection of evidence that token- and symbol-trained chimpanzees succeed in 
reasoning by analogy (usually utilizing these very same tokens within exemplary tasks) does not 
implicate language as a sole contributing factor. Rather, it is at least suggestive that symbols and 
representation may expedite the realization of a problem as solvable by analogy, at least in 
humans and chimpanzees capable of learning specialized symbols systems. 
Evidence from the studies included in this manuscript do not lend particular support to a 
role of symbols or language in reasoning by analogy, unless we are to assume that any failures to 
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match relations are due to a failure of representation by symbol systems. Data from the study 
provided in Appendix directly addressed the potential facilitative and confounding roles of 
meaning for nonhuman animals. Whereas the meaningfulness of stimuli seemed to have no effect 
on the ability of rhesus monkeys to match relations, the representational value instantiated by 
meaningful stimuli proved a hindrance for one chimpanzee, but assistance for another 
chimpanzee, making conclusive determination of the role of meaning and/or language in 
particular difficult.  
By conventional definition, and of importance in defining this or any other cognitive 
construct, mechanisms involved in reasoning by analogy require the representation of relations. 
This is the crux of Penn et al.’s (2008) argument that, by definition, analogy requires the 
reinterpretation by mental representation of relational concepts via symbols (see also Holyoak & 
Hummel, 2001). This stance by definition limits the study of, or even consideration of capacity 
for analogy to animals without evidenced symbol systems.  
All of the above discussion of analogy then seems for naught if relational reinterpretation 
cannot be sufficiently evidenced in any nonhuman animal.  Clearly I disagree with this claim of 
Penn et al.’s (2008) in light of evidence from Chapter 2 that monkeys that are actually capable of 
relational reinterpretation (at least to a minimal extent) subsequently fail the RMTS task. Penn 
and colleagues’ proposed difference in kind then cannot hold true, as Penn et al. (2008) 
themselves perhaps inadvertently admitted when they noted that the representation of a relational 
concept for animals may simply not be strong enough to operate in the same way as it may for 
humans. This continuum of representation then should implicate a difference in degree for the re-
encoding of relational concepts. Throughout this manuscript, I have extended this logic to 
analogical reasoning, arguing that the analogical precursors observed in nonhuman animals show 
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sufficient evidence for a claim of cognitive continuity and emergence of analogical reasoning 
within the primate lineage.  
Emergence of analogical reasoning 
Whereas evidence for analogical reasoning in species other than humans is sparse and 
controvertible, precursors to reasoning by analogy in nonhuman primates presented here add to 
the growing body of evidence in support of an emergent theory for analogical reasoning. In 
Rumbaugh’s (2002) account of rational behaviorism, emergents are defined as behaviors not 
attributable to classical or operant conditioning, but rather to “integrative processes” in cognition 
(p. 9). Emergents are new behaviors or capabilities such as those attributed to insight by Köhler 
(1925). Reasoning by analogy is one such emergent behavior that exemplifies the important shift 
in learning processes from associative to relational. Another characteristic of emergent behaviors 
in Rumbaugh’s (2002) account is a positive correlation between an animal’s relative cranial 
capacity and its propensity for the emergent capability. Evidence provided in this manuscript 
finds itself in accord with this posited relationship. Limited by evidence from only four primate 
species and an unstandardized measure of analogy, a general trend nonetheless exists from 
capuchin and rhesus monkeys to chimpanzees and humans whereby increases in propensity for 
analogical reasoning skills and/or analogical precursors is observed.  
The future of analogy for comparative psychologists 
With several hypotheses outlined illustrating the causes of our analogical paradox in 
nonhuman primates (see Table 6.1), there is great opportunity for comparative psychologists 
investigating both the paradox and pervasive nature of analogy throughout the animal kingdom.  
In light of evidence for and meaningful failures in relational concept acquisition and judgment of 
relations-between-relations provided in this dissertation, future investigations of analogical  
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Table 6.1 
Summary of discussed hypotheses in analogical reasoning for nonhuman primates 
 
SUPPORTED     Evidence 
 
1.  Analogy as an Emergent   Chapters 2-5, Appendix 
Analogy is not attributable to S-R learning. A trend of 
increasing ability to reason analogically with recency of 
common ancestor is observed.    
 
2.  Local-to-global attentional shift    Chapters 4 & 5 
Chimpanzees with global-to-local visual processing match 
relations with relative ease. Attention of monkeys must be 
shifted by differential scaffolding. 
 
3.  Executive function / control of   Chapters 2 & 4 
inhibition Monkeys lacking control of inhibition cannot succeed on a 2-
item RMTS task that requires the inhibition of a local/ 
perceptual predisposition.  
 
4.  Implicit judgments based on   Chapter 4 
hedonic valence Monkeys succeed on the RMTS task only with differential 
outcome scaffolding in place. 
 
 
DISCOUNTED     Evidence 
 
5.  Relational reinterpretation (RR)    Chapters 2 & 5, Appendix 
via symbols (Penn et al., 2008) Monkeys with an understanding of symbols failed to succeed 
on RMTS tasks. Chimpanzees, albeit a history of generalized 
symbol use, succeed on a relational matching task not 
employing symbol use. Further, chimpanzees show mixed 
results on tasks despite the inclusion of symbolic stimuli. 
 
6.  Analogy as relational priming   Chapters 2-4 
Monkeys clearly acquire S/D relational concepts. If they were 
primed by these relations, they could be successful in RMTS 
tasks without additional scaffolding. Caveat: There is little 
evidence for priming effects in nonhuman primates. 
 
7.  High-level perception    Chapters 2-3 
Monkeys may use high-level perception to learn relational 
concepts but subsequent failure on RMTS tasks indicates that 
they likely do not apply this same mechanism to problems of 
analogy. 
 
8.  Generalized motivation    Chapter 4 
With heightened equalized incentive for correct trials on 
RMTS, monkeys failed to succeed. Monkeys only succeeded 
on RMTS trials in the experimental condition offering 
differential rewards. 
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reasoning should continue to recognize the posited perceptual predisposition of monkeys. Those 
studies not confounded with entropy as a controlling factor in relational matching will provide 
the best insight into the nature of representation in reasoning by analogy.   
 Studies in recent years (i.e., Fagot & Parron, 2010; Fagot et al., 2001) as well as those 
included in this dissertation have largely attempted to outline the difficulties that monkeys face 
in the mapping of one relation to another. In a more optimistic light, researchers may choose to 
shift the focus of their attention to applications of problem-solving by analogy wherein monkeys 
are more likely to find success. For instance, it is perhaps the case that analogical relations are 
simply more salient in other domains such as social hierarchy organization. For example, 
individuals able to understand their role in relation to individuals within a hierarchy (e.g., 
matriline) may greatly benefit from mapping those relationships from one matriline to another to 
avoid interactions detrimental to their survival. By examining new applications for analogical 
reasoning in nonhuman animals (all the while recognizing that these observations may not be 
completely domain-independent) the willingness of researchers to attribute these skills may 
continue to broaden, along with our definition of analogy in comparative psychology.  
 
Prior to the work included in this dissertation project, the dominant view by comparative 
psychologists of analogical reasoning in nonhuman primates was one of dichotomy between apes 
(including humans) and monkeys: the distinction between the analogical ape and paleological 
monkey (Thompson & Oden, 2000).  Whereas evidence for analogy proper by representational 
reinterpretation in monkeys is sparse and debated, the gap between that which is analogic and 
paleologic has been narrowed by the studies presented here. In conclusion, the studies in this 
dissertation provide further evidence of the potential cognitive mechanisms involved in 
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analogical reasoning for nonhuman primates. Several included studies outline meaningful 
failures that in part help to explain patterns of emergence of this skill along the primate lineage. 
Representation of relational concepts important for analogy proves difficult for rhesus and 
capuchin monkeys without the ability to rely on a greater amount of perceptual variability, 
implicating a perceptually-bound predisposition in problem-solving (Chapters 2-3).  Like human 
children, this shift in attention from perceptual features to abstract concepts for employment in 
relational matching is again difficult, but not impossible given cognitive incentive in the form of 
differential outcomes to refocus attention on conceptual properties (Chapter 4). Finally, 
chimpanzees, unlike monkeys, appear more apt to reason by analogy, perhaps due to more 
default conceptual focus (Chapter 5). Taken together, these studies provide an account for the 
emergence of analogical reasoning skills throughout the primate lineage in contrast to views 
regarding analogy a hallmark of human intelligence. 
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APPENDIX 
What meaning means for same and different: Analogical reasoning in humans, chimpanzees, and 
rhesus monkeys8 
 
Abstract 
Thus far, language and token-trained apes (e.g. Premack, 1976; Thompson, Oden, & 
Boysen, 1997) provide the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and 
construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the 
phenomenon. In this study, we examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical 
reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans, chimpanzees, and rhesus monkeys 
completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and 
nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for 
analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for 
human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning 
can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed 
in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason 
analogically, if present at all, may be dependent upon a dimension other than the representational 
value of stimuli. 
Keywords: MEANING, REPRESENTATION, SAME/DIFFERENT, ANALOGICAL 
REASONING, PRIMATE 
                                                         8 Appendix previously published as: Flemming, T. M., Beran, M. J., Thompson, R. K. R., 
Kleider, H. M., & Washburn, D. A. (2008). What meaning means for same and different: 
Analogical reasoning in humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus 
monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Comparative Psychology 122, 176-185.  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Analogical reasoning, Halford (1992) argued, is the mechanism that allows for 
conceptual thinking, including logical inference. Knowledge about analogies forces explicit 
expression of conceptual knowledge, unlike simple discriminations that rely on implicit types of 
conceptual knowledge (Premack, 1976). In an analogy, a relationship must be established 
between the first two elements in the series (i.e. the base relation).  Then, and only then, can one 
continue to the second set of elements (i.e. the target relation) and seek the same relation 
instantiated in the base (Genter, Rattermann, & Forbes, 1993; Thompson & Oden, 2000). If one 
matches two abstract relations, one has in essence recognized the analogical equivalence of 
relations. 
Evidence of this ability is very rare in nonhuman animals, although the chimpanzee, 
Sarah, provided perhaps the best evidence of analogical reasoning (Gillan, Premack & Woodruff, 
1981; Premack, 1983; Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 2001). Sarah was given a variety of 
analogical reasoning problems using arrays of meaningful plastic chips of different colors and 
shapes. Two tangible plastic objects that varied on one dimension (color, shape, or size) were 
placed to the left of a center chip which signified the concept same.  This plastic chip with 
specialized symbolic meaning seems to be the impetus by which Sarah was capable of judging 
the relations between those relations. To the right of the same symbol was placed only one 
object. The task thus required the chimpanzee to perceive the relationship between the shapes on 
the left and recreate its analog to the right of the center chip. Not only did Sarah complete the 
task with flat geometric shapes, but she also was successful when the items presented were 
everyday three-dimensional objects (Gillan, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981).  
Whereas it is often difficult for humans to describe identity/nonidentity relations, for 
which nonhuman primates possess some knowledge, without using the words same and different, 
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these abstract concepts have no linguistic prerequisites (Premack, 1976).  These words can be 
applied to objects that themselves do not have names. Moreover, in relation-level problem 
solving, the names of the objects are irrelevant. Rather, the relation between the objects is the 
only relevant information. In relational matching tasks, an individual must abandon ordinary 
matching entirely and move to a different level of problem solving--the relational level 
(Premack, 1986; Thompson & Oden, 1996).  
Premack (1976, 1983, 1986) suggested that, at least in the case of abstract relations, 
acquisition of conceptual knowledge depends upon language. Accordingly, it should come as no 
surprise that while language-naïve nonhuman animals show varying degrees of perception-based 
conceptual knowledge, they lack the capacity to understand abstract concepts such as same and 
different to the same extent as humans understand them (Premack, 1983, 1986; Thompson, 1995; 
Thompson & Oden, 2000). Symbolic representation of relations has further been implicated as 
the main mechanism responsible for the judgment of relations-between-relations—that is, 
second-order relations (Premack, 1976, 1983; Thompson & Oden, 2000). 
As Thompson & Oden (1996, 2000) posit, to complete a relational matching-to-sample 
problem successfully, participants must recognize the relationship between the members of each 
pair as the critical aspects of the problem. How might one go about recognizing these relations? 
Acquisition of concrete symbolic tokens of otherwise abstract relationships may be the necessary 
(and perhaps sufficient) component to any relational match-to-sample task (Oden, et al., 2000). 
Thompson, Oden, and Boysen (1997) hypothesized that the judgment of relations-between-
relations is made possible by an animal’s representational capacity to re-encode abstract relations 
into iconically equivalent symbols. They presented adult chimpanzees with a Relational 
matching-to-sample task  after they had learned to choose a heart-shaped token when presented 
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with a pair of identical objects and to choose a diagnonally shaped token when presented with a 
nonidentical pair of objects. In the RMTS task, the chimpanzees viewed paired random junk 
objects as identical or nonidentical sample pairs and pictorial paired stimuli on a touch screen as 
the target choice stimuli. The goal was to indicate the target that conveyed the same relation 
between the objects as in the base sample. Four of five chimpanzees spontaneously judged the 
conceptual equivalence of relations-between-relations in the absence of the symbolic tokens. The 
fifth chimpanzee differed in his learning history; unlike the other chimpanzees, he was naïve 
with respect to both numeric problem solving and symbolic token training. Therefore, it seems 
that this experience with symbols may have played a functional role in the acquisition of abstract 
concepts in these chimpanzees.  Thompson and Oden (1996) suggested that the critical role of 
these symbols was to provide animals with a concrete icon for encoding a propositional 
representation that is otherwise abstract. Thompson et al. (1997) also suggested that conceptual-
relational matching is akin to covert symbol matching. It should follow then, that such symbolic 
training produces a system for universal computation (Clark & Thornton, 1997). 
Can abstract relations be labeled without symbolic representation? If the answer to this 
question is “no,” then we should not be surprised by Premack’s (1983) suggestion that 
participants, human or nonhuman, cannot complete a relational matching task without extensive 
language training. However, if effective labeling for relational information can be accomplished 
without language per se, and in particular, symbolic representation, then we should expect that 
language-naïve nonhuman species could also succeed on tasks requiring analogical reasoning, if 
they have the truly relevant cognitive mechanisms necessary for such reasoning.  
Acquisition of, and discrimination between, abstract relations has been investigated in 
several species of old-world monkeys. Fagot, et al. (2001), for example, demonstrated that at 
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least two baboons had marked difficulty with a relational identity/nonidentity matching-to-
sample (RMTS) task with multiple icons. Multiple item displays were used as stimuli in a 
matching-to-sample task. One stimulus array (composed of 16 or fewer identical or nonidentical 
items) served as the sample. One choice pair was composed of identical images (but different 
from any of those present in the sample pair) and the other was made of numerous images that 
differed physically from each other.  Baboons were required to choose the array that matched the 
relation (either same or different) of the sample array. Baboons completed the task successfully 
until stimulus arrays contained 4 or fewer items, providing evidence that entropy detection most 
likely underlied same-different discrimination abilities (Fagot, et al., 2001). Thus, the relational 
matching strategy in this task was more perceptually bound. 
By contrast, some judgments of identity are conceptually bound. Baboons also proved 
proficient in the judgment of conceptual identity. Bovet & Vauclair (2001) trained baboons to 
discriminate between food and nonfood stimuli. In tests of conceptual matching, baboons were 
able to identify pairs of food or nonfood items as same or different based on their conceptual 
relationships. For instance, if one apple and one banana were presented, baboons responded by 
pulling the rope indicating same because they both belong to the food category. Importantly, 
those judgments, in contrast to ones made by baboons in the Fagot et al. (2001) study, could not 
be made on the basis of physical similarities because “sameness” in that task required that 
baboons generalized amongst different items within a category. In addition, these types of 
discriminations are exemplary of first-order relations only, as opposed to second order relations 
as outlined by Thompson & Oden (2000). 
  Flemming, Beran, and Washburn (2007) investigated the role that entropy measures, 
discriminative cues, and symbolic knowledge play for rhesus monkeys in the acquisition of the 
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concepts of same and different in a computerized relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task. 
After repeatedly failing to discriminate relations between pairs of stimuli in a two-choice 
discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly learned to discriminate between 8-element arrays. 
Subsequent tests with smaller arrays, however, suggested that, although important for the initial 
acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a variable on which monkeys are dependent.  Not only 
did the rhesus monkeys choose a corresponding equivalent relational pair in the presence of a 
discriminative cue, but they also chose the cue itself in the presence of the relational pair--in 
essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent persistent failure in the judgment of relations-
between-relations in the RMTS task (a non-perceptually based matching strategy), however, 
suggested that perhaps an as yet unidentified qualitatively different cognitive component exists 
that prevents monkeys from behaving analogically.  
The purpose of the current study was to determine the role of stimulus meaning in the 
analogical reasoning abilities of three primate species. Such comparisons outline further our 
understanding of the cognitive capacities of various species and further our knowledge about 
concepts and mechanisms of concept learning in general. By implementing a more conceptual 
variable, meaning, into perceptually-based judgments, one might expect conceptual strategies for 
the task to emerge more quickly than they otherwise might.  
Rhesus monkeys, chimpanzees, and human participants completed an identity/nonidentity 
relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task composed of meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. It 
is important to discern what we mean by “meaningful.” We define meaningful stimuli as those 
that function as a cue to evoke representations of external objects or concepts. Meaningful 
stimuli in this experiment, unlike linguistic equivalents in previous research (e.g. Premack, 1976; 
Thompson, et al., 1997) did not represent relational categories such as same and different, but 
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rather reference concrete objects or numerical quantities, making more overt the relational 
concept of which they are a part. Without using a symbolic token for the relational concept itself, 
we were further able to investigate the role of earlier “linguistic” prerequisites amongst the three 
primate species.  
Method 
Participants 
Three groups of participants were tested on the analogical reasoning task: adult humans 
(Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). 
Eighty-two undergraduates (67 females) were recruited from Georgia State University’s 
psychology research pool with half assigned to each stimulus condition (meaningful and 
nonmeaningful stimuli) in the relational match-to-sample task. The mean age of the participants 
was 20 years and 60% were minority students. All participants completed an informed consent 
form and received debriefing instructions upon completion of the task.  
Four chimpanzees (18 to 34 years of age) housed at Georgia State University’s Language 
Research Center (LRC) also were tested. The chimpanzees previously had participated in 
experiments involving the matching-to-sample paradigm with joysticks (Beran & Washburn, 
2002), but were naïve to the specific testing procedures involving the S/D concepts. Individuals 
were randomly assigned to receive one of two conditions (meaningful and nonmeaningful 
lexigram stimuli) first, followed by completion of the remaining condition. For three of the four 
chimpanzees, the meaningful stimuli were the lexigram symbols that they learned when young 
(Brakke & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995, 1996; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986, Rumbaugh, 1977) and 
have used for all of their lives. The fourth chimpanzee, Mercury, received no lexical training at 
all; therefore both conditions were essentially nonmeaningful, providing an additional control. 
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The LRC chimpanzees have been shown to retain the meaning of these symbols for more than 20 
years (Beran, Pate, Richardson, & Rumbaugh, 2000). In addition, the animals sorted lexigrams 
into labeled groups more accurately than they do real-world objects and photographs (Savage-
Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith & Lawson, 1980).  The chimpanzees were not food or water 
deprived. Individuals worked at mobile testing systems at their home cages for designated 1-hour 
sessions each day. 
Five male rhesus monkeys (10 to 20 years of age) housed at the LRC also completed the 
RMTS task. All monkeys began this study with previous experience on other tasks involving the 
same-different paradigm. In the Flemming et al. (2007) study, monkeys discriminated between 
arrays composed of identical or nonidentical clipart images. In the presence of a discriminative 
color cue, monkeys successfully discriminated same from different displays of 8, 6, 4, and 2 
items. In addition, monkeys completed but failed RMTS tasks similar to those in the current 
study when only nonmeaningful clipart images were used.  The monkeys were not food or water 
deprived for purposes of testing, and allowed to work ad libitum throughout the day in their 
home cages. 
Stimuli 
Meaningful stimuli for human participants were composed of 3- to 7-letter words that 
referred to concrete objects such as foods and places.  Nonmeaningful stimuli were composed of 
3- to 7-letter strings of illegal nonwords generated by the program WordGen® (Duyck, Desment, 
Verbeke & Brysbaert, 2004). Illegal nonwords were utilized as nonmeaningful stimuli because 
they carry with them no inherent referential value, and they cannot be recoded into sensible 
phonemes in the English language. Both sets of stimuli appeared as white letters inside a black 
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rectangle. Figure A.1 a-b provides example displays presented to human participants.  A total of 
50 unique words or 50 unique nonwords were presented throughout a testing session. 
For chimpanzees, only lexigrams with which they have had extensive experience and 
have been shown to retain meaning were presented during the meaningful condition. Lexigrams 
may function more like whole words for the animals carrying with them a specialized meaning 
(Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003). Exemplars from an unknown, never before seen subset of 
lexigrams were used as nonmeaningful for chimpanzees (see Figure A.1 c-d). One chimpanzee, 
Mercury, had no such experience, and therefore both conditions for him consisted of 
nonmeaningful stimuli. Each individual has a unique vocabulary subset. Consequently, the 
number of unique known lexigrams differs across individuals, and we used only concrete 
lexigrams that were part of each chimpanzee’s larger unique vocabulary [Panzee = 65, Sherman 
= 28, Lana = 19; Mercury’s stimulus sets each included 30 randomly chosen lexigrams]. The 
number of nonmeaningful stimuli was balanced for each individual.  
 There is sufficient evidence that monkeys can use some types of symbols as labels for 
certain concepts. In tasks presented to the rhesus monkeys at the LRC, Arabic numerals have 
been paired with specific numbers of pellets, allowing the animals to associate these numeric 
symbols with quantity information (Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991). Thus, Arabic numerals were 
utilized as meaningful stimuli. In addition to simple quantity information that numerals may 
convey, Arabic numerals have also produced Stroop-like effects in rhesus monkeys at the LRC 
(Washburn, 1994). Because meaning of the numerals interferes with judgments about amount, 
numerals mean amounts, and thus can be said to have symbolic representation for the monkeys.  
These numerals also control other types of responding. Harris & Washburn (2005) 
presented the monkeys with series of reinforced and nonreinforced maze trials in which Arabic 
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numerals indicated the number of reinforced mazes that could be completed before a 
nonreinforced maze trial was presented. Monkeys developed a pattern of responding slower on 
nonreinforced trials than the preceding reinforced trial; they used the Arabic numeral as a cue to 
the number of reinforced maze trials that would occur in a series (Harris & Washburn, 2005). 
These previously learned Arabic numerals were utilized in paired stimuli in the meaningful 
condition (see Figure A.1 e-f). 
In the nonmeaningful condition, stimuli consisted of Latin alphabet letters. Special 
attention was given so that letters used in previous tasks for specific choice responses were not 
included in the subset of letters used in this task. Choice of letters and numerals controlled for 
perceptual qualities of the stimuli by balancing their basic physical properties.  Monkeys were 
randomly assigned to receive one of two conditions (meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli) 
first, followed by completion of the remaining condition.  
Although there are components of both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli that are 
familiar in the words, lexigrams, letters, and numerals presented to the three species (i.e. 
individual letters, lines, and shapes), it is the combination of individual familiar stimulus features 
that makes them meaningful.  Pilot experiments using the same stimuli over many trials still 
failed to show any evidence of relational matching in rhesus monkeys even though by the end of 
the experiment those stimuli certainly had become familiar.  Thus, familiarity is not the issue but 
rather meaningfulness is the issue in this study.  Of course, meaningful stimuli must be familiar 
stimuli, and so one cannot completely dissociate these two things. 
Apparatus 
The LRC’s Computerized Test System (LRC-CTS) consists of an IBM-compatible 
desktop personal computer (Washburn et al., 1992). This same apparatus was used throughout all 
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parts of the project, with slight variations for each species. Undergraduate students at Georgia 
State University were tested at a desktop computer using a hand-held joystick.  Each nonhuman 
animal had access to its own testing station.  During tasks, monkeys controlled a cursor on a 17-
inch SVGA monitor via a vertically-mounted joystick. The monitor was positioned 
approximately 15 cm from the home cage behind a transparent Lexan plate. Chimpanzees 
controlled a horizontally-mounted joystick within a port attached to their home cages; stimuli 
were presented on a monitor approximately 1m outside of the home cage on a mobile cart. 
Speakers provided auditory feedback for all tasks, including a low buzzing sound for 
incorrect choices and an increasing crescendo sound for correct choices. These sounds have been 
paired with these outcomes on many previous tasks used with the nonhuman primates.  For the 
current tasks, the increasing crescendo sound was always accompanied by the dispensing of a 
94-mg banana-flavored pellet to rhesus monkeys and small portions of fruit or 1-g pellets to the 
chimpanzees.  
Task 
 In the RMTS task, stimuli were presented in pairs with one sample pair (base) and two 
choice pairs (targets).  At the initiation of a trial, one pair of stimuli (either two identical or 
nonidentical clipart images) was centered at the top of the computer screen; stimuli were 
approximately 5 cm x 3 cm. Participants were required to contact this sample pair with the cursor 
in order for the choice pairs to appear. Once contact with the sample pair was made, the joystick 
cursor was re-centered on the screen, and the choice pairs appeared in the bottom half of the 
screen on the left and right sides. One choice pair contained two identical items, whereas the 
other contained two physically nonidentical items. Importantly, no stimulus in the choice pairs 
was ever physically identical to stimuli in the sample pair and choice stimuli were randomly 
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assigned to position on the screen. Thus, the task required participants to either match a pair of 
the form AA with a pair of the form BB (and not CD) or to match a pair of the form EF with a 
pair of the form GH (and not JJ).  Similar testing paradigms have been frequently utilized 
(Flemming et al., 2007; Premack, 1976; Thompson et al., 1997). Successful performance of the 
conceptual-relation matching task required that the participants judge one relation to be the same 
or different from another relation. 
To make a response, the cursor was moved either left or right toward the choice pairs. 
Once contact was made with a choice pair, a feedback sound was played (an increasing tone if 
the choice was correct or a buzzing sound if incorrect). Reward was provided on correct trials for 
nonhuman animals and a short intertrial interval (ITI) then was presented before the sample pair 
for the next trial appeared.  For correct choices, rewards were automatically dispensed to the 
animals accompanied by a 2-s ITI.  When choices were incorrect, no food reward was dispensed 
and longer ITIs were imposed (15 s for rhesus monkeys and 5 s for chimpanzees).  
Nonhuman primate participants completed varying numbers of trials per session, and thus 
a different number of total sessions. The total number of trials for each animal in both conditions 
are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  Chimpanzees completed sessions of 25 trials each unless 
attention became diverted and side biases emerged. Only data from trials when attention was 
focused on the computer screen were analyzed. Rhesus monkeys completed sessions of 200 trials 
each. Testing was aborted after side biases emerged and only data from trials before side biases 
became evident were analyzed. 
Humans received instruction as to the meaning of the feedback sounds. This was the only 
instruction they received. Thus, tasks were very well equated between species. Rather than 
telling humans to do what animals must learn, humans also had to learn the task in a similar trial-
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by-trial fashion. In addition, humans received no food reward and 2-s ITIs for both correct and 
incorrect choices. After the ITI, the next trial was automatically initiated and the next sample 
pair appeared at top of the screen. Human participants completed a total of 100 trials in one 
session. 
Human participants were randomly divided into two groups, each receiving one 
condition.9  Three monkeys received nonmeaningful stimuli (letters) first and the other two 
monkeys receiving meaningful stimuli (numerals) first.  Two chimpanzees received 
nonmeaningful stimuli (pseudo-lexigrams) first and the other two chimpanzees received 
meaningful stimuli (lexigrams) first.   
Results 
Humans  
 Accuracy-by-condition was assessed by comparing the average performance for the 
entire 100-trial block between the two groups of participants (meaningful/ nonmeaningful). 
Participants in the meaningful condition completed the task with a significantly higher number of 
trials correct (M = 93.86 , SE = 1.73) than participants in the nonmeaningful condition (M = 
87.48, SE = 2.47); t(80) = 2.13, p < .05, d = 6.38. 
Because accuracy was generally high for participants in both conditions, the number of 
trials-to-criterion was assessed to determine how long participants needed to learn the analogical 
rule. Trials-to-criterion for each participant was calculated by summing the total number of trials 
until eight out of the previous ten trials attempted were completed correctly. Within a 100-trial                                                         
9 Pilot studies revealed that a within-subjects design was not feasible for human participants. 
Participants were debriefed after the first condition and articulated full understanding of the 
analogical rule. All participants began the second condition utilizing the same rule across 
categories of stimuli. Beginning with trial 1 of the second condition, all participants achieved 
100% accuracy. 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testing session of either the meaningful or nonmeaningful stimuli, 76 of 82 participants met the 
criterion (correct responses to 8 out of the previous 10 trials attempted) for sufficient acquisition 
of an analogical rule. Two participants who received the meaningful condition never met a 
criterial level of accuracy; four participants assigned to the nonmeaningful condition did not 
perform at levels significantly above chance (50%) after 100 trials. These six participants were 
removed from analysis for trials-to-criterion and response time.  Participants in the meaningful 
condition met criterion on average within 14.35 trials (SE = 1.38), fewer than the number of 
trials required for the participants in the nonmeaningful condition (M = 19.08; SE = 2.60); 
however, this difference was not statistically significant, t(74) = 1.65, p = .10, d = 4.73.  
Chimpanzees 
 There were individual differences in performance by the chimpanzees on the RMTS task. 
Table A.1 presents performance summaries for the chimpanzees. Two chimpanzees (Lana and 
Mercury) never performed significantly above chance in any condition—meaningful or 
nonmeaningful—after at least 130 trials in each condition. 
Panzee completed trials with meaningful stimuli before receiving the nonmeaningful 
condition. She performed at levels above chance in the meaningful condition completing 66% of 
202 trials correctly, z = 4.64, p < .01, but failed to perform above chance levels in the 
nonmeaningful condition (55% of 227 trials, z = 1.53, p > .05). Figure A.2 presents Panzee’s 
percentage of correct responses as a function of trial block for both conditions.  
Panzee’s, accuracy on same trials and different trials was statistically equivalent in the 
meaningful condition: χ2 (1, 202) = 2.06, p > .05. In the nonmeaningful condition (which yielded 
overall chance performance), her accuracy was significantly higher on different trials (65%) than 
on same trials (49%), χ2 (1, 186) = 4.61, p < .05. 
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Sherman completed trials with nonmeaningful stimuli before receiving the meaningful 
condition. He performed at levels above chance in the nonmeaningful condition, completing 65% 
of 263 trials correctly, z = 4.99, p < 0.01. However, he failed to reach significance in the 
meaningful condition (54% of 186 trials, z = 1.17, p > .05).. Figure A.3 presents Sherman’s 
percentage of correct responses as a function of trial block for both conditions. 
Sherman’s, accuracy on same trials and different trials was statistically equivalent for the 
meaningful condition, χ2 (1, 227) = 0.48, p > .05. In the nonmeaningful condition his accuracy 
was significantly higher on different trials (80.6%) than on same trials (50%), χ2 (1, 263) = 
27.18, p > .05. 
Rhesus Monkeys 
The monkeys completed an average of 1,937 trials in each condition, but no monkey 
achieved levels of performance significantly above chance in either condition, regardless of 
which was presented first. Performance summaries of the rhesus monkeys are shown in Table 
A.2, with illustrative accuracy levels displayed in Figure A.4 for Hank (although any monkey 
could be shown with nearly identical results). The trends of the learning curves presented in 
Figure 4 with Hank are representative of the performance of all other monkeys in this study. 
Performance failed to improve across trials, and position biases emerged for every animal and 
condition. 
If performance gradually improved across trials, eventually approaching significance, we 
could conclude that the animals slowly learned an analogical rule through trial-and-error. This 
was not the case, as no monkey ever reached a level of performance significantly different from 
chance. To illustrate that there was no evidence that performance improved across trials, blocks 
of 100 trials were analyzed independently for Hank for the first 1,000 trials in both conditions. 
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Percent correct was not significantly different from chance in any trial block except for trials 
601-700 (60% correct; z = 2.0, p < 0.05) in the nonmeaningful condition. Subsequent trial blocks 
rebounded to near chance performance. 
All but one monkey completed same and different trials with equivalent levels of 
accuracy in every condition; their treatment of same and different trials was symmetric (Murph-
numerals χ2 (1, 2766) = .92, p > .05; Murph-letters χ2 (1, 779) = .24, p > .05; Lou-numerals χ2 
(1, 1826) = .07, p > .05; Lou-letters χ2 (1, 3599) = .03, p > .05; Willie-numerals χ2 (1, 3242) = 
.87, p > .05; Willie-letters χ2 (1, 1100) = .05, p > .05; Gale-numerals χ2 (1, 1306) = .23, p > .05; 
Gale-letters χ2 (1, 1174) = 2.43, p > .05; Hank-numerals χ2 (1, 2399) = 2.12, p > .05). In the 
nonmeaningful condition, Hank completed same trials (56.12%) with significantly greater 
accuracy than different trials (48.70%) (χ2 (1, 1178) = 6.60, p > .05).  
Discussion 
 Robust differences in performance emerged across species in this analogical reasoning 
task. For humans, meaningfulness of stimuli had overall positive effects on their ability to reason 
analogically, whereas this was not uniformly the case for the chimpanzees and completely absent 
in the case of the monkeys. There also was another major disconnect between the performance of 
humans and nonhuman animals.  Although meaningfulness facilitated statistically higher 
performance for humans, success was also observed in the RMTS task with nonmeaningful 
stimuli (and at a rather high overall level).  Overall, the nonhuman primates not only failed to 
show facilitation from meaningful stimuli, but they also showed no evidence of solving the 
RMTS task with similarly high rates of success.  It seems to be the case that numerals for 
monkeys and lexigrams for chimpanzees do not operate at the same conceptual level as words do 
for humans in terms of facilitating analogical reasoning.  Not only did human participants 
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outperform chimpanzees and monkeys, but the role of meaning when completing an analogy was 
also dissimilar across species. According to these data, stimuli with representational value can 
facilitate, hinder, or have no effect on the completion of an analogy of same and different 
objects. 
Taken together, the results of this comparative study both lend support and opposition to 
the previous suggestion that language-like abilities and symbolic training are integral to the 
capacity of analogical reasoning. Premack (1983) concluded that language-like training is 
necessary based on his experiments with a chimpanzee. Similarly, Thompson et al. (1997) 
posited that labeling of relational information is a necessary component of analogical thinking. 
Whereas the results of the current study do not allow for the conclusion that human and 
chimpanzee participants were labeling the related pairs of stimuli, individual differences that 
arose between the chimpanzees urge the consideration of an alternate hypothesis.  
For human participants, the known, discrete meaning of stimuli appeared to facilitate 
responding in the RMTS task. Although performance was generally high across conditions, 
participants in the meaningful condition performed at significantly higher rates of accuracy than 
those in the nonmeaningful condition. For those participants in the meaningful condition, the 
analogical rule was also learned in fewer trials, albeit this difference was not statistically 
significant.  
 The representational value of each stimulus may have enabled the relational concepts of 
sameness and difference to be more salient to the human participants in the meaningful condition 
than to those who completed the task with nonmeaningful stimuli that had no inherent 
representational value. The discrete meaningful value of a stimulus not only enhanced its own 
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uniqueness, but may also have removed extraneous associations it may have had to the stimulus 
with which it is paired.  
 It is especially noteworthy that some human participants failed to learn the analogical 
rule under any condition. On their debriefing forms, these participants noted that they simply 
“never figured it out” or “tried to match similar things, but that didn’t work.” Therefore, 
relational similarities and differences never became salient as part of a rule-learning strategy for 
these participants. Like children (Gentner, 1988), these adult participants may have been 
distracted by the surface similarities between the components of one trial (e.g., using the same 
elements). Whereas failure to learn the analogical rule may have been due to differences in 
motivation to participate, it is likely that if structural similarities (i.e., the matching rule) were 
disclosed to the participants at the beginning of the experiment, success would be instantaneous.  
In experiments with children and adult humans, researchers agree that surface similarities 
are the key to whether participants will think of using an analogy to solve a problem when not 
explicitly told to do so (Gentner, et al., 1993; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). In addition, human 
participants are particularly distracted by surface similarities in analogous problems, even when 
they are unimportant (Ross, 1987).  In the current study, only structural (e.g. content) similarities 
exist across trials. The repeated presentation of individual stimuli (albeit in various locations and 
combinations of pairings) could be interpreted as surface similarities which act as confounds not 
related to the application of analogical knowledge. If stimulus X is present in the sample pair, not 
only may the subject attempt to search for stimulus X amongst the choice pairs, but he or she 
may also retain knowledge of the role of stimulus X for future trials. Thus, if stimulus X is 
encountered again, regardless of current location or pairing, rules previously associated with it 
may be incorrectly applied to the current scenario. 
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 For chimpanzees, the meaning of meaningfulness is more ambiguous. Rather than 
facilitating the acquisition of the analogical rule, one chimpanzee failed to apply the analogical 
rule at all unless the stimuli had discrete meaning. Even after completing the meaningful sessions 
first, Panzee failed to perform above chance levels during nonmeaningful sessions. This would 
indicate that what she learned during the meaningful sessions was not as broad an analogical rule 
as humans might conceive it. If that were the case, she should have transferred her knowledge 
across categories. The analogical rule that she learned may be specific to those stimuli with 
external representation and thus the rule could not be applied in instances in which meaningful 
symbols are not present. 
 With respect to the effect of meaningfulness Sherman’s performances were the complete 
opposite of Panzee’s. He completed trials only in the nonmeaningful condition above chance 
levels. That he could correctly complete only nonmeaningful trials may indicate that his 
analogical rule was confounded by the meaningfulness of the stimuli. Perhaps he attended more 
to the perceptual qualities of a stimulus in order to determine its relatedness both within the pair 
and between target and choice pairs. However, if using a purely perceptually bound relational 
matching strategy, it should follow that Sherman could succeed in the meaningful condition as 
well. This valuable error lends even more support that meaningfulness plays an integral role in 
analogical reasoning. Perhaps it is the case that meaningful stimuli add a layer of confusion to 
what, for Sherman, could have been a more perceptually bound task. 
Our chimpanzees seemingly are not as analogical by nature as was the chimpanzee Sarah 
(Oden, Thompson & Premack, 2001). The main difference between Sarah and the chimpanzees 
in this study is the employment of special tokens or symbols for the relational concepts 
themselves. While Panzee, Sherman and Lana have been trained with lexigrams, no lexigrams 
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specifically connote meaning of relational concepts such as same and different. Rather, they refer 
to concrete objects, people, and places. Sarah, however, had exactly those two tokens for 
sameness and difference. Perhaps to more fully apply an analogical rule one must have the 
capacity to recode relational concepts symbolically. 
For both Panzee and Sherman, poor performance on subsequent conditions may be 
indicative of the inflexibility of their application of the analogical matching rule to a 
categorically novel relational stimulus set.  Asymmetric performance by Sherman on different 
trials in comparison to same trials in the condition yielding overall success (nonmeaningful) 
indicates that the analogical rule he may have acquired applied only to differently related pairs of 
items. Rather than using the rule to match relations flexibly across trial types, asymmetric 
performance indicates that the strategy used may not be as broadly conceived so that a consistent 
rule could be applied to same relations.  
Both people and pigeons are predisposed to notice differences rather than similarities 
(Young & Wasserman, 2002). Like people and pigeons, chimpanzees exhibited some differences 
in performance on same versus different trials, sometimes performing better on different trials. If 
we suppose that chimpanzees are predisposed to noticing only differences, it is likely that an 
analogical rule was realized only through experience matching differently related pairs with 
other differently related pairs. In subsequent trials, when similarly related pairs were presenting, 
the limited analogical rule that had been learned no longer was applied. 
Although conclusions about individual differences between and within species are 
speculative, it may be the case that the richness of the symbol systems for the animals plays an 
important role. For chimpanzees, lexigrams are most likely not as seamlessly integrated into the 
cognitive system as words, symbols, and other linguistic tools are for humans. Certainly for 
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rhesus monkeys, numerals convey some meaning, but not at a level equivalent to words for 
humans or even lexigrams for chimpanzees. Therefore, the inequity of meaning between the 
species may account for some of these disparities.  
A within-species comparison may follow similar logic. There are significant differences 
between the usage of lexigrams by Panzee and Sherman that relate back to rearing history and 
early experiences. Panzee’s current vocabulary includes many more lexigrams than does 
Sherman’s vocabulary (Beran, Savage-Rumbaugh, Brakke, Kelley, & Rumbaugh, 1998).  Panzee 
uses a wider range of lexigrams and seems to have a better understanding of what they may 
afford her. It may be the case that Panzee’s use of lexigrams may be better integrated in 
cognitive systems that allow for analogical reasoning, thus accounting for her success with 
meaningful lexigrams. 
The inconsistencies in the performances of our chimpanzees also are contrasted with 
other recent evidence that is relevant to relational matching.  Vonk (2003) provided evidence that 
four orangutans and one gorilla without any symbol or language training succeeded in a similar 
non-matching-to-sample task. By making judgments between pairs of stimuli that matched on 
only one dimension (color or shape), Vonk claimed that the non-symbol trained great apes were 
capable of abstracting relations between relations that were not as dependent on perceptual 
processing. However, the apes in that study may have been dependent on an even lower level of 
perceptual processing. That is, those apes may have been choosing the match choice that was 
perceptually less similar to the sample pair. For instance, if a sample pair consisted of two items 
that were the same shape, the subject could have selected a choice pair in which there was only 
one unique shape. Likewise, if color were the critical dimension, subjects viewing a sample in 
which color was the same for both shapes could simply have responded to a choice pair in which 
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there was only one color present. Following this reasoning, when stimuli can differ on only two 
dimensions, the judgment process may be even more tightly perceptually conceived in contrast to 
more complex stimuli that vary on several perceptual dimensions.  
Failure by the rhesus monkeys in the current study to match relational pairs correctly in 
this task could be the result of one or more of a variety of reasons: the monkeys could not extract 
the necessary relational information from a pair of objects; relational knowledge was not 
encoded in such a way that it was accessible for application to novel behaviors; or perceptual 
properties of stimuli could not be ignored in a matching paradigm.  
 From their performance on previous tasks (e.g., Flemming et al., 2007), we know that 
monkeys can extract relational information from a pair of objects. In a two-choice discrimination 
paradigm, monkeys chose either a pair of identical or nonidentical objects in the presence of a 
discriminative cue. It may be the case that the monkeys’ ability to extract relational information 
is reliant on a discriminative cue; the discriminative cue prompts the search for relational 
information present in the given sample. In the current task, no discriminative cue was offered, 
perhaps not enabling the search for a relation between the items in the pair. 
 The relational matching paradigm utilized throughout this study tests analogical 
reasoning skills by forcing explicit expression of conceptual knowledge for identically and 
nonidentically related pairs. One may argue that the RMTS task may be solved using perceptual 
judgments of uniformity and regularity as in entropy-infused displays (i.e. Fagot et al., 2001). 
Perhaps it is the case that humans have a greater ability to detect small variations in entropy 
(same pairs have an entropy value of 0 whereas different pairs have an entropy of 1). If this were 
true, however, we would expect to find no differences between condition for humans or 
chimpanzees. In fact, differences between meaningful and nonmeaningful conditions, regardless 
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of which condition allows for higher levels of success, indicates that there is an inherent 
conceptual component to the task as it is presented in the current study. If one can detect small 
variations in entropy with meaningful words, one should also be able to do so with 
nonmeaningful combinations of letters. Furthermore, monkeys can detect these small variations 
in entropy [0 vs. 1] but nonetheless fail the RMTS task (e.g., Flemming et al., 2007).  There is no 
logical reason for this failure without the consideration of an analogical component to the RMTS 
task. 
Analogy completion assumes (and relies on) conceptual knowledge of same and 
different. It may also be important, as evidenced by nonhuman primate performance on the task, 
to have concrete symbolic tokens of otherwise abstract relationships as Oden et al. (2001) posit. 
Certainly, human participants in this study have a very broad conception of same and different, 
as humans regularly classify objects into groups based on similarities and differences. Perhaps 
our propensity to do so is driven by the salience of relations. Whereas it is clear that other 
animals have the capacity to perceive the relations of same and different (Bovet & Vauclair, 
2001; Cook, Cavoto, & Cavoto, 1995; Flemming et al. 2007; Katz, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002; 
Vonk, 2003; Wasserman, Frank, & Young, 2002), the acquisition of these concepts for birds and 
monkeys does not emerge for sometimes hundreds or thousands of trials. Human participants as 
young as 3 years old provide evidence that the identity/nonidentity concept emerges in 
significantly fewer trials (Rattermann & Gentner, 1998).  
If the concepts of same and different are not as salient to nonhuman primates as they are 
to humans, then their accessibility when the former search for an already abstract matching rule 
(in RMTS) will not be readily available as a strategy. Pigeons and monkeys that have been 
shown to rely on arrays of multiple items in order to glean relational information (e.g., Fagot, et 
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al. 2001; Wasserman, et al., 2002) may rely on more possibly ecologically valid perceptually 
based strategies (i.e., colors and shapes) when presented with a matching-to-sample task. Unlike 
simple discriminations that are founded upon only on implicit types of conceptual knowledge, 
the analogical paradigm carried throughout this study requires the explicit use of the 
same/different strategy. Because the same/different concept is less salient and possibly more 
narrowly construed by nonhuman primates, it stands to reason that the application of the concept 
would be more difficult, if not impossible, for such an animal. 
 Despite the ambiguity of the exact mechanism by which analogies are realized, the 
present study does provide a comparison of the capacity for the acquisition of an analogical rule 
across three species of primates. Results from the present study reveal both common threads and 
disparities in the analogical reasoning skills of members of the old-world primate lineage. 
Whereas meaningful stimuli act as facilitators for humans in making more salient the relational 
information presented and consequently the nature of an analogical rule, meaning can take on 
various roles for other primate species. Symbolic representation of categorical content, unlike 
relational representation, seems to have little or no facillatory role at all for nonhuman primates. 
These data may reflect one fundamental way that nonhuman primates differ from humans in how 
they represent their worlds.  
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Table A.1  
Performance summaries of chimpanzees 
 
Subject  Condition          Order of   # of Trials   Percent          z 
                Presentation         Completed   Correct 
 
Lana   Meaningful  1st      238       52             0.65 
   Nonmeaningful 2nd      166       54  1.09 
 
Mercury  Meaningful  2nd      191       49  -0.21 
   Nonmeaningful 1st      133       56  1.47 
 
Panzee   Meaningful  1st      202       66  4.64* 
   Nonmeaningful 2nd      186       54  1.17 
 
Sherman  Meaningful  2nd      227       55  1.53 
   Nonmeaningful 1st      263       65  4.99* 
* p < 0.05 
 
Note. Number of trials for each individual and condition varies as a result of how many trials 
each chimpanzee was able to complete in a given testing session. When chimpanzees showed 
lasting position biases or no longer attended to the task, testing was aborted. This also affected 
the number of trials completed by each animal when refusal to work on the task persisted. These 
data represent approximately 12 sessions per animal over the span of 21 weeks of testing. 
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Table A.2 
Performance Summaries of the Rhesus Monkeys 
 
Subject  Condition       Order of  Trials         Percent      z 
                      Presentation         Completed      Correct 
 
Murph   Meaningful  1st  2,766  50    .99  
   Nonmeaningful 2nd  779  48    .61 
Lou   Meaningful  2nd  1,826  51    .94  
   Nonmeaningful 1st  3,599  48   -2.15* 
Willie   Meaningful  1st  3,242  50    .21 
   Nonmeaningful 2nd  1,100  48   -.78 
Gale   Meaningful  2nd  1,306  49   -.44 
   Nonmeaningful 1st  1,174  47   -1.40 
Hank   Meaningful  1st  2,400  50    .08 
   Nonmeaningful 2nd  1,178  52    1.75 
* p < 0.05 
 
Note. Number of trials for each individual and condition varies as a result of how many trials 
each monkey was able to complete in a given testing session. These data represent approximately 
ten sessions over the span of two weeks. 
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Figure A.1. Screen captures from RMTS task for human participants (a) same-nonmeaningful (b) 
different-meaningful, chimpanzees (c) different-nonmeaningful (d) same-meaningful, and rhesus 
monkeys (e) same-nonmeaningful (f) different-meaningful. 
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Figure A.2. Performance summary for Panzee (Pan troglodytes). Percent accuracy is displayed 
in blocks of 10 trials for both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. The horizontal line at 50% 
represents chance performance. Asterisks represent a performance level significantly different 
from chance. 
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Figure A.3. Performance summary for Sherman (Pan troglodytes). Percent accuracy is displayed 
in blocks of 10 trials for both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. The horizontal line at 50% 
represents chance performance. Asterisks represent a performance level significantly different 
from chance. 
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Figure A.4. Performance summary for Hank (Macaca mulatta). Percent accuracy is displayed in 
blocks of 100 trials for both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. The horizontal line at 50% 
represents chance performance. Performance is similar to and indicative of performance 
outcomes for all monkeys tested. Subsequently, graphical depictions of the nonsignificant results 
for all monkeys is not presented. No performance levels on any trial block were significantly 
different from chance. 
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